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INTRODUCTION
1
The thesis of four chapters addresses a wide array of questions concerning banking
regulation and the informational value of risk measures. In the first three chapters,
I explore how regulation affects the behaviour of actors in different areas of financial
markets. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the public and academic outcry for a
more stringent regulation was loud. However, the effect of a more stringent regulation is
not clear-cut. On the one hand, stricter regulation ties the hands of actors in financial
markets and thereby limits irrational or opportunistic behaviour. On the other hand,
stricter regulation - if badly designed - might throw a spanner in the works of financial
markets and might be exploitable. This thesis provides examples for both, areas in which
a tighter regulation is needed as well as examples where increased regulation might have
adverse effects.
In the first chapter, “Underreporting by Overdiversification? Strategic Usage of VaR
Diversification”, I examine whether and how banks use modelling freedom to underreport
their exposure to market risk. Though earlier literature nearly unanimously finds that
banks over- rather than understate their Value-at-Risk - a measure of market risk -, the
financial crisis and a stricter regulation might have altered the relationship. Indeed, Be-
gley et al. (2016) find that banks seemingly underreport their Value-at-Risk, if equity is
low, but remain silent on the tools that allow banks to manage the VaR. This chapter
proposes diversification - a reduction in the overall Value-at-Risk due to imperfect corre-
lation between broad asset classes - as possible channel for underreporting. By combining
reported broad asset class Value-at-Risks with observed correlation, I construct a counter-
factual overall diversification as benchmark. To elicit possible underreporting, I examine
how incentives to report a lower market risk affect the deviation from the counterfactual
Value-at-Risk. I am able to show that banks report a higher diversification when they
are weakly capitalised, but a lower diversification, if the potential penalty from underre-
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porting is high. Finally, I show that backtesting exceptions - daily losses that exceed the
Value-at-Risk - are more frequent if banks report a higher diversification relative to the
benchmark. This chapter adds to the literature on the strategic usage of internal mod-
els by isolating a particular channel for underreporting market risk. Here, the regulator
should adopt - and did indeed adopt while I was writing this chapter - a stricter regulation
in the sense that the modelling freedom of banks is limited.
The second chapter, “How does the Dodd-Frank Act affect Issuer Ratings and Rating
Reports?”, provides evidence for unintended and adverse consequences of tighter regula-
tion. Against the backdrop of the apparent underestimation of the riskiness of asset-
backed securities by credit rating agencies, the U.S. Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act
in 2010, which increased the liability of credit rating agencies for their ratings. The in-
creased liability was intended to induce rating agencies to decide more faithfully about
rating levels and changes. However, the existing literature documents a downwards bias
rather than an increased accuracy of bond ratings as a reaction to the Dodd-Frank Act
(Dimitrov et al., 2015). This chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it
analyses how the increased liability affects one of the main business lines of rating agencies:
Issuer ratings. To evaluate possible effects of the Dodd-Frank Act, I use market-based
risk measures - namely equity-implied, the credit default swap-implied and a failure prob-
ability based on a calibration of Hilscher and Wilson (2016) - as unaffected counterfactual
to issuer ratings. Though I find a downwards bias in issuer ratings relative to the market-
based counterfactuals, it is not robust to specification changes and the regressions appear
to pick up a crisis effect rather than the impact of the Dodd-Frank-Act. For example, if I
shorten the sample period from eight to four years or use a different function form of the
macroeconomic control variables, the downwards bias either disappears or is of negligible
magnitude. Second, the chapter looks at so far unexplored rating reports. Rating reports
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explain the rationale behind a rating decision by providing qualitative information and
outlooks on the future of the company. After the Dodd-Frank Act, these reports contain
more forward-looking words, but for lower rated issuers - for which ratings and rating re-
ports have conceivably the highest importance - the wording is more ambiguous and the
information content reduced. In this case, imposing a stricter regulation on an industry
did not increase its efficiency, but rather devalued the information content of ratings in
general.
The value of well-designed institutions and information for the financial markets is
highlighted in the third chapter, “Credit Institutions, Ownership and Bank Lending in
Transition Economies”.1 This chapter examines the transition of the banking sector in
Eastern Europe from government control to private, often foreign ownership. It challenges
the common perception that foreign ownership was the main driver behind the credit
growth in the region and the contraction of lending after the crisis. Rather, a well-
designed institutional setup mitigated the effect of the crisis. In particular, the empirical
analysis shows that the crisis shock had a smaller impact on loan growth in countries
with credit registers or bureaus for the recording of loans. This chapter shows that well-
designed regulation for banking institutions is an important determinant of the success of
a banking system.
Chapter 4 “Liquidity and Price Discovery in the CDS Market” looks at the speed of
the price discovery, i.e. the speed with which new information is compounded into prices,
of the credit default swap (CDS) market relative to the equity market.2 CDS started
to become popular in the early 2000s and rose to prominence during the financial crisis.
On the one hand, CDS were heavily criticised as tool of malicious speculation, on the
1This chapter is joint work with Rainer Haselmann and Paul Wachtel. It is published in the Palgrave
Handbook of European Banking.
2This chapter is joint work with Philipp Koziol.
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other hand they were commonly used as a direct and timely measure of the riskiness of
a borrower, for instance during the European debt crisis. However, at least for publicly
traded companies, CDS are not the only security that prices in the probability of default
of that company. The question, which security type prices new information earlier than
the other, arises naturally and is important, since delayed pricing might open up arbitrage
opportunities. Most of the literature on this topic focuses on the price discovery process of
CDS relative to equity as the equity market is the largest and most liquid market besides
CDS. Consequently, we study the price discovery process of CDS vis-à-vis equity in sample
consisting of 530 firms and spanning from 2011 to 2013. In line with existing literature,
we document an information flow from equity to CDS. However, entity-level analysis
reveals that the results are driven by just around half of the firms and the magnitude of
the information flow varies strongly, both between and within firms. We try to explain
the differences in the price discovery process by differences in CDS liquidity and trading.
Though price discovery appears to be affected by CDS liquidity and trading, the actual
effect of the different measures varies widely between specifications.
5
CHAPTER 1
UNDERREPORTING BY OVERDIVERSIFICATION?
STRATEGIC USAGE OF VAR DIVERSIFICATION
6
1.1 Introduction
Regulators increasingly allow banks to use internal models to calculate capital require-
ments. Banks have an incentive to design and calibrate these models in a capital-
requirement minimizing way. For credit risk, Behn et al. (2016) have shown that banks
use modelling leeway to reduce capital charges for loans. Begley et al. (2016) claim to
have found a similar pattern for market risk. The capital requirements for market risk
are calculated as multiple of the Value-at-risk (VaR, henceforth) of the trading portfolio,
an upper bound for trading losses obtained by using internal models. Banks seemingly
underreport their VaR if their equity ratio is low. Begley et al. (2016) measures under-
reporting by the number of trading days on which trading losses exceed their VaR, the
upper bound for losses. More of these so-called backtesting exceptions occurred when the
equity ratio was low. This finding is surprising against the backdrop of earlier literature,
which asserts that banks provide conservative estimates for their market risk exposure.
For example, Perignon et al. (2008a) and Perignon and Smith (2010a) found that banks
systematically overreport their VaR. This chapter examines one potential channel of pos-
sible underreporting, the diversification component in the VaR.
Broadly speaking, the diversification component is a reduction of the VaR due to
non-perfect correlation between assets. For example, if a bank has a long position in
two, imperfectly correlated assets, the probability that both assets incur severe trading
losses on the same day is smaller than one. Hence, the VaR of holding both assets is
smaller than the sum of the VaR of the single assets. Banks enjoy leeway in calculating
this diversification effect. In the past, banks have reported an apparently conservative
diversification effect and, hence, a higher VaR. For example, in its 2002 annual report,
the Bank of America states that it does not “fully account for correlation among broad
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asset classes” to report a more conservative VaR. These conservative estimates provide the
banks with some cushion for adverse economic development. If banks report a conservative
VaR, they can either extend their trading operations without increasing the reported VaR
or reduce the reported VaR while leaving their trading portfolio unchanged. In these cases,
using the portfolio diversification does not translate into actual underreporting, but rather
in less overreporting. However, as banks have increasingly reported a less conservative
VaR, the diversification component could have been used to report a VaR that lies below
the true VaR, to actually underreport market risk.
Diversification in absolute terms depends on three factors: The volatility of the
returns, the level of asset holdings, and the correlation between the assets. In this chapter,
I adopted a method proposed by Perignon and Smith (2010a) to calculate a hypothetical
diversification component as a counterfactual to the reported diversification component.
The approach takes the first two components - the volatility and level of asset holdings
- as given, but relies on a counterfactual correlation matrix derived from market indices
to calculate a counterfactual VaR. As no asset-level data is published by the banks, the
analysis relies on the broad-asset classes VaR reported by the banks. A broad asset class
VaR is the VaR of a sub-portfolio of the banks that is sensitive to particular market prices
and rates. The Basel II regulation prescribes five broad asset classes: Equity, interest,
credit, foreign exchange (FX, henceforth) and commodities. For example, the commodity
VaR describes the possible losses that a bank could incur due to changes in the commodity
prices. Likewise, the equity VaR reports possible losses of securities that are primarily
sensitive to changes in stock prices. Put differently, this chapter neglects any potential
underreporting in the single broad asset class VaR and focuses solely on the aggregation
of the sub-VaRs. There is some anecdotal evidence that banks underreport the sub-VaRs,
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but without asset-level data, detecting this kind of underreporting proves to be difficult.1
Consider the following stylised example: A bank’s trading portfolio is composed of
10 m USD equity VaR and 10 m USD credit risk. The undiversified VaR - the sum of the
VaR of all broad asset classes - equals 20 m USD, but the bank reports a diversified VaR
of 15 m USD, i.e. 25% of the undiversified VaR is offset by imperfect correlation between
equity and credit risk. In this simple example, the assumed correlation between equity
and credit risk can be backed out. Jorion (2006) has shown that the diversified VaR -
given the VaR of the broad asset classes - can be expressed as DVAR =
√
V ′RV where V
is the vector of broad asset class VaRs and R the correlation matrix. For this particular
example, this expression reads as follows:
15 =
√√√√([10
10
]
×
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
]
×
[
10 10
])
and one can solve for the correlation between equity and credit VaR: ρ = 0.125. To
evaluate whether this implicitly reported correlation is on the high or low end, I compare
the implied correlation with the correlation between two market indices that track equity
and credit risk: The SP500 for equity and the Aaa-Baa credit spread for credit risk.
Assume that the correlation between those two indices is 0.25 instead of 0.125. Plugging
this value in the above expression yields a diversified VaR of 15.81 m USD rather than
reported 15 m USD. In other words, relative to the benchmark of index correlation, the
bank reports a diversified VaR that is 0.81 m USD lower than the benchmark suggests.
Note that this approach does not rely on backing out the implied correlation between the
different broad asset classes, but compares the reported diversified VaR with an alternative
aggregation mechanism based on observable correlation.
1For example, Deutsche Bank was being investigated for not including certain interest rate bets in
their VaR (Eaglesham, 2013a).
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Table 1.1 provides a real-life example for the diversification effect. In April 2004,
the Bank of Nova Scotia reported a diversified VaR of 8.2 m USD. The diversification
component is sizeable. It offsets 38% of the undiversified VaR of 13.7 m USD. Comparing
April 2004 with April 2003 reveals, that the diversification component as percentage of
the undiversified VaR (diversification share) varies over time. In 2003, only 33% of the
undiversified VaR was offset by broad asset class diversification effects whereas in 2004,
the share rose to 40%. Using a correlation matrix based on market indices, I calculate a
counterfactual diversified VaR of 8.68 m USD. Compared to this benchmark, the Bank of
Nova Scotia underreports their exposure by 0.48 m USD or 5.8 percentage point of the
reported VaR. This chapter examines whether such deviations from the benchmark are
systematic and coincide with incentives to underreport market risk.
This chapter contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it extends the analysis
of Perignon and Smith (2010a) and examines how VaR diversification is affected by the
financial crisis. Second, it tests for a possible strategic usage of internal models. In partic-
ular, it proposes the diversification components as potential channel for the underreporting
detected by Begley et al. (2016). Understanding the channels of underreporting is impor-
tant as it provides the basis for improved regulation. If the diversification component is
indeed used in a strategic manner, imposing more stringent rules on the deductibility of
broad asset class diversification might also improve the informational value of the VaR.
The chapter finds significant and persistent deviations of the reported VaR from
the benchmark VaR. Banks report a particularly low VaR if their leverage ratio is high
and if the potential penalties for underreporting are high. However, the VaR bias does
not react to changes in the regulatory capital ratios. In combination with the finding
that backtesting exceptions appear to occur less frequently if banks overreport their VaR
relative to the empirical benchmark, these results suggest that banks use the diversification
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component to strategically manage the reported VaR.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. First, more information on
the usage of the VaR in the regulatory context, on the modelling freedom of banks and on
the calculation of the hypothetical VaR are provided. The second section describes the
dataset and the evolution of the VaR bias. Third, the VaR bias is set into the context of
possible strategic underreporting by banks to economize on equity capital.
1.2 Value-at-Risk: Regulatory Aspects and Empirical
Counterfactual
1.2.1 VaR and Market Risk Capital Requirements
A VaR model gives thresholds that losses are not expected to be exceeded over a fixed
time period with a certain probability. Technically speaking, the VaR is a low quantile
of the distribution of trading gains and losses. Basel II prescribes a 99% threshold and
10 day holding period for the VaR models used for regulatory purposes. However, banks
frequently use other holding periods (one day) and other probabilities (95%, 99.9%) for
internal purposes. The capital requirement for the trading portfolio equals the diversi-
fied VaR times the so-called regulatory multiplier. By using the diversified rather than
the undiversified VaR, increasing (decreasing) the diversification automatically reduces
(increases) the capital requirements for the trading portfolio.
To disincentivise underreporting and for validation purposes, VaR models are back-
tested: If a bank incurs a loss larger than the VaR - a so-called backtesting exception -
it is penalized by an increase of the multiplier that translates the VaR into capital re-
quirements. Table 1.6 shows the increase of the multiplier. If the number of backtesting
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exceptions was below or equal to four in the last 250 trading days, the multiplier is equal
to three. If more backtesting exceptions occurred, the multiplier increases gradually until
it reaches four if ten or more backtesting exceptions were experienced and the bank is
said to be in the “red” zone. The zone in between “green” and “red” is referred to as “
yellow” zone. Note that the increase in the multiplier is not monotone: If the number of
past exceptions in the last 250 trading days was 4, an additional exception increases the
multiplier by 0.4 whereas if the number of past exceptions was 8, the increase would be
0.1.
In addition to the capital penalty due to an increased multiplier, banks face more
severe regulatory scrutiny in the yellow and red zone. The supervisory framework explic-
itly states that the “burden of proof in these situations should not be on the supervisor to
prove that a problem exists, but rather should be on the bank to prove that their model is
fundamentally sound.” (BIS, 1996b). In particular, increased regulatory scrutiny includes
the provision of disaggregated VaR data on the trading-unit level.
1.2.2 Modelling Freedom
Allowing banks to account for diversification between asset classes has been subject to
discussion ever since the introduction of VaR for regulatory purposes. The initial proposal
in April 1995 did not permit banks to recognize correlation between asset classes for the
calculation of the regulatory VaR. However, the actual amendment from January 1996
did allow banks to adjust their VaR for between asset class correlation (BIS, 1996a).
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the Bank for International Settlement (BIS)
repeatedly expressed its concern that banks miscalulate the diversification component.
In May 2012, the BIS asserts that “the current model-based approach may lead to sig-
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nificant over-estimation of overall portfolio diversification benefits across broad categories
of exposures and consequent underestimation of the actual required capital ”. In the ad-
vent of market stress, correlation structures might change rapidly and cannot reliably
be estimated using past data. A breakdown of the correlation structure might lead to
dysfunctional hedges and disappearing diversification benefits. As a potential remedy, the
BIS proposed constraining the modelling freedom of banks regarding the correlation struc-
ture. In particular, the BIS proposed that the trading portfolio should be divided into
more granular, standardized sub-portfolios and the correlation between the sub-portfolios
would be prescribed by the regulator.
Banks have a large set of modelling choices that affects the diversification component.
These options can broadly be categorized by the frequency by which they can be altered.
First, banks have an array of primarily time-invariant modelling choices. In particular,
banks can choose whether they use the advanced Monte Carlo Method or the less complex
historical simulation approach to calculate the VaR.2 None of the banks in the sample did
change the calculation method in the observation period. A second set of modelling choices
can be altered at low frequency. Notably, banks can choose the length and weighting
scheme of the sample period. The Basel regulation only constrains banks to the extent
that the sample period must be at least one year. Banks are free to choose any weighting
scheme as long as the weighted average time lags of the individual observations do not fall
below six months. The third and final set of options contains tools that can frequently
be changed and that are not publicly observable. First, banks update their parameters to
calculate their VaR frequently. In fact, a survey by the BIS in 2013 revealed that many
institutions updated the parameters used to calculate the VaR on a bi-weekly basis and
some large institutes even exhibited a weekly update schedule (BIS, 2013). As estimates
2A further option is the scaling of the VaR to the ten-day holding period. Banks can either calculate
their losses over a ten-day horizon directly or scale one-day losses to a ten day period. However, this
options affects only the level of VaR, not the diversification component.
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for parameters are highly variable and provide a band of possible parameters rather than
point estimates, banks might use these re-calibrations in their favour. Second, banks might
hedge open positions with securities that exhibit payoffs in tail events with probabilities
below the VaR threshold, e.g. out-of-the-money options. Such securities might violate
the sub- additivity assumptions of the VaR, i.e. the sum of the individual positions is
actually larger than the total VaR of the portfolio (Danielsson, 2002a). In the latter case,
the diversification component is only affected, if securities from other broad asset classes
are used to hedge the risk. This chapter remains agnostic about the tools used to manage
the diversification component, but assumes that banks have the opportunity to influence
the level of diversification in their trading portfolios.
In a revision of the market risk framework in January 2016, the VaR model was
replaced by a new risk metric: Expected shortfall (ES). After this revision, banks are no
longer allowed to claim cross risk class diversification benefits (BIS, 2016).3
1.2.3 Counterfactual Diversification
The empirical diversification share is calculated following Jorion (2006) and Perignon
et al. (2008a). Jorion (2006) has shown that the VaR can be written as a function of
the VaRs of the broad asset classes and a correlation matrix thereof. Let V be a vector
of the individual VaRs of the broad asset classes and R the correlation matrix, then the
diversified VaR of bank i in quarter t is:
DVARempi,t =
√
V ′i,tRtVi,t (1.1)
The correlation matrix R required to calculate DVARempi,t is approximated by a corre-
3Though only adopted for regulatory purposes in early 2016, the concept of ES is not new. Acerbi and
Tasche (2002) provides a theoretical comparison of ES and VaR, Yamai and Yoshiba (2005) a practical
perspective.
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lation matrix of returns of benchmark indices / rates as proposed by Perignon and Smith
(2010a): To capture equity risk, I use the national stock market lead indices. Commod-
ity risk is approximated by the Bloomberg Commodity Index.4 Moody’s Aaa-Baa credit
spread is used to track credit risk. To mirror interest risk, I use the one-year constant
maturity US bond yield for North American banks. For the European counterparts, I use
the one-year constant maturity yield on German Bunds. Exchange rate risk is captured
by the trade-weighted exchange rate of the domestic currency. To study the co-movement
of the indices, the daily log returns are calculated as difference in the natural logarithm
of the indices. Using the returns of the indices is equivalent to assuming that banks hold
a net long position in this asset class. Although this assumptions appears reasonable, I
discuss the validity in section 1.4.4.1 and test my results for robustness to this assumption.
I calculate several versions of the correlation matrix R. For the baseline results, I
use a 250 day window, starting 250 days before the last day of the quarter and ending
with the last day of the quarter. The choice of a 250 day window is in line with earlier
literature (Perignon and Smith, 2010a) and reflects the minimum sample length of the
Basel regulation (BIS, 1996a). A concern with this specification is that it - by using all
available return data for a quarter - includes information that banks do not possess when
determining their portfolio in the beginning of the quarter. For example, the correlation
matrix Rt might be driven by the observations in the last month in the quarter. However,
banks do not have this information for determining their portfolio in the first two month
of the quarter. However, as correlation matrices are relatively stable over time and change
only incrementally, the bias should not be large. In addition, the bias is further reduced
by using the average quarterly VaR, rather than daily observations (such as the maximum
VaR or the quarter-end VaR), but - to address this concern further - I calculate a different
4Formerly known as Dow Jones-AIG Commodity Index and Dow Jones-UBS Commodity Index.
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version of the correlation matrix using a 250 day window ending with the last day before
the quarter. As an alternative to the sample correlation, I use an dynamic conditional
correlation (DCC) model as proposed by Engle (1999) and used by Perignon and Smith
(2010a).
In essence, the DCC model is a univariate GARCH model that adjusts the correla-
tions for time-varying volatility. This adjustment provides a better fit than the sample
correlation, particularly in settings with abrupt changes (Engle, 2002). Methodologically,
the DCC model strikes a balance between the flexibility of a univariate GARCH model
and the computational complexity of multivariate GARCH models. This class of GARCH
models is estimated in a two-step procedure. First, a univariate GARCH model is esti-
mated. Second, the so-obtained estimates are used to calculate the correlation matrix.
The first step yields the conditional covariance matrix Ht = E(ete′t) = DtRtDt where
et = rt − E(rt|t− 1) represents the unexpected returns and Dt is a diagonal matrix with
the conditional standard deviations on the main diagonal.5 Formally, Dt reads:
D2t = diag(ωi) + diag(αi) ◦ (ete′t) + diag(βi) ◦D2t−1
where ◦ denotes the element-by-element multiplier, and Rt is the conditional corre-
lation matrix. Rt can be written as:
Rt = diag(Qt)
− 1
2 ×Qt × diag(Qt)− 12
Qt is calculated as a function of the standardized residuals and two additional scalar
parameters θ1 and θ2:
Qt = R(1− θ1 − θ2) + θ1(ztzt−1) + θ2Qt−1
5The description of the DCC procedure borrows heavily from Perignon and Smith (2010a) and Engle
(2002)
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with R being the unconditional correlation matrix of the standardized residuals.
Intuitively, the DCC model adjusts the unconditional correlation matrix R for time vari-
ations in volatilities. Eventually, the DCC model generates a correlation matrix for each
trading day. The quarterly DCC correlation matrix is calculated as the average of the
daily DCC correlations from 250 days before the last day in the quarter to the last day
in a quarter.
To quantify the extend of over-/underdiversification, the difference between the re-
ported and empirical VaR is scaled by the reported VaR. Formally, I calculate:
VaR Biasi,t =
DVaRreportedi,t − DVaRempiricali,t
DVaRreportedi,t
(1.2)
The interpretation of VaR Biasi,t is straight-forward. If VaR Biasi,t is positive, the
bank reports a higher VaR than the empirical diversification implies, i.e. the bank over-
reports risk. Likewise, if VaR Biasi,t is negative, the empirical VaR is higher than the
reported VaR, i.e. the bank underreports VaR relative to the empirical benchmark.
To make the evolution of the VaR more traceable and highlight the source of the bias,
two additional variables are coded: The reported diversification and the empirical diver-
sification share. Intuitively, the diversification shares - the percentage of the undiversified
VaR that is offset by between broad asset class correlation - describe the percentage of
the undiversified VaR, which is offset by the correlation between broad asset classes. The
empirical diversification is obtained by subtracting the empirical VaR from the reported
VaR. Then, the empirical and reported VaR diversification share is calculated as follows:
Diversification Share =
Diversification in USD∑5
i=1 VaRi
(1.3)
where i is an index for each of the five broad asset classes.
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Overall, this approach is similar to the BIS proposal of narrowing down the modelling
choices of the banks. Essentially, it compares the reported VaR to a counterfactual that
is constrained to using only market-observable correlation.
1.3 Data
The dataset consists of three types of data: Quarterly VaR data, bank balance sheet
data, and returns on the indices. Bank balance sheet data is obtained from SNL, and
- if not available from SNL - from Datastream and the quarterly reports. Returns on
the commodity risk index (Bloomberg Commodity Index, BCOM) and the national stock
markets are taken from Bloomberg. The Aaa-Baa Spread of seasoned bonds is available
on the FRED Database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. The trade-weighted
exchange rates and the constant maturity government bonds were downloaded from the
national central banks.
VaR data is hand-collected from the banks’ annual and quarterly reports. Reporting
of VaR information is coarse and the availability of VaR data restricts the sample to 16
banks (Perignon and Smith, 2010b).6 To be included in the sample, banks must report
the individual VaR components, the holding period and the confidence interval for at least
3 years. The sample consists of 16 banks and spans from 2002 to 2014.7
All banks in the sample report their VaR either as quarterly averages or year-to-
date averages.8 In addition to the averages, some banks report a wider array of summary
6The final sample includes the following banks: BNP Paribas, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Bank of
Montreal, Candian Bank of Commerce, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, ING,
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of New York Mellon, Nordea, Royal Bank of Canada, Santander Bank, Bank of
Nova Scotia, UBS.
7Data availability for VaR is very limited before 2002.
8In the latter case, the quarterly averages are backed out by recursively solving for the average VaR
of bank i in year y and quarter N:VaRi,y,N = N ∗VaRavgi,y,N −
∑N−1
j=1 VaRi,y,j
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statistics, such as minimum, maximum and quarter-end VaRs. Quarterly averages are the
preferred measurement of the VaR, as the other measures that are essentially single-day
snapshots are exposed to strong market movement (minimum and maximum) on a single
day or window-dressing (quarter-end).
As described above, the incentive of banks to underreport risk depends on the level
of equity. Scarcity of equity is measured in three specifications: The leverage ratio -
shareholder equity over total assets (Eq/A) - and the regulatory capital ratio tier one
(CET1 ratio) and the total regulatory capital ratio (CE ratio). The reason for using all
three measures is threefold. First, the regulatory capital ratios might be partly endogenous
since a lower VaR due to overdiversification increases the regulatory capital ratio by
reducing the risk-weighted assets. This might lead to a downwards bias in the coefficient
of regulatory capital ratios. Second, the regulatory ratios might be driven by regulatory
changes. Namely the introduction and phase-in of Basel III during the observation period
decreased regulatory ratios mechanically. Third, regulatory capital ratios might be a
diluted measure of the capital ratio since the risk-weights assigned to the different assets
do not necessarily reflect actual riskiness (Acharya et al., 2014). The leverage ratio is not
driven by risk-weighting or regulatory changes, but has the disadvantage of being no real
constraint for the bank. The Basel Regulation requires a minimum risk-weighted capital
ratio, but no leverage ratio. Therefore, a bank with a high leverage might be far away
from a binding equity constraint.
As an additional measure of capitalization, I resort to CDS spreads. CDS spreads are
strongly linked to the default probability of the underlying reference entity and a proxy for
the refinancing costs of the bank. High CDS spreads indicate a high probability of default
and high funding costs. Like the leverage ratio, it does not reflect any regulatory threshold
and is not subject to accounting changes, but rather reflects the market perception of the
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riskiness of a bank.
1.3.1 Summary Statistics
Table 1.3 displays summary statistics. The average bank in the sample has total assets of
1,140.22 bn USD and a regulatory capital ratio of 14.30%. The leverage ratio, defined as
book equity over total assets (Eq/A), is much lower at around 5.89%. On average, banks
were profitable with an average net income to total assets ratio of 0.15%.
On average, banks report a VaR of 133 m USD, but the range is large. The smallest
reported VaR was 6.0 m USD by the Bank of New York Mellon in 2006q3. JP Morgan
exhibited the highest VaR in the sample with 604.21 m USD.9
The VaR Bias is on average negative, indicating that the empirical VaR is generally
larger than the stated VaR. Qualitatively, this implies that banks are underreporting
their VaR relative to the empirical counterfactual. Quantitatively, the average baseline
VaR Bias of -6.17 suggests that banks should increase their reported VaR by 6.17%,
if the empirical correlation holds true for their portfolio. The VaR bias based on the
alternative estimation window ending with the first day of the quarter, Var Bias (alt),
is slightly smaller with an average of -6.05. The VaR bias calculated based on the DCC
correlations, VaR Bias (DCC), is more negative on average (-8.42) and exhibits a smaller
standard deviation and narrower range.
In unreported regressions, I examine the autocorrelation in the VaR Bias. All three
variations of the VaR Bias are highly autocorrelated with a coefficient between 0.58 of
9VaR in currencies other than USD were converted using the quarter-end exchange rate. VaR re-
ported at the 95% level were transformed into 99% VaR by assuming a normal distribution. Under this
assumption, the 95% VaR can be converted into the 99% VaR by multiplying it with normal score of the
99% percentile (2.33) and dividing by the normal score of the 95% percentile (1.65).
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the baseline VaR Bias and 0.78 for VaR Bias (DCC).10 Therefore, adjusting for autocor-
relation in the dependent variable is paramount.
In order to be a valid counterfactual, the empirical and reported VaR should be
positively but imperfectly correlated. Indeed, the stated VaR is highly correlated with all
three empirical VaR measures. The correlation of the stated VaR is the strongest with
VaR bias based on the alternative start dates (correlation coefficient: 0.91) and lowest
with the DCC bias (0.88). As expected, the different empirical VaR bias measures are
highly correlated among each other with no coefficients being lower than 0.9.
For the subsample of banks for which data on backtesting exceptions is available,
the average number of exceptions is 0.6 per quarter. In 82 percent of the bank-quarter
observations, banks were in the green zone, i.e. they had four or less backtesting exceptions
in the last three quarters. Only four percent of the observations fall into the yellow zone,
whereas 14 percent of the observations fall into the red zone.
1.3.2 Cross-sectional and Over Time Variation of the VaR Bias
The VaR bias varies both between banks and over time. Table 1.4 provides a break-down
of the VaR bias by banks. Most banks exhibit a negative VaR bias on average, i.e. they
report a lower VaR than the benchmark correlation would imply. In some cases, for
instance the UBS, with an average bias of 31.9 pp, or the Bank of America, with a bias
of -30.8, the bias is large and persistent. The differences are in line with the estimates of
Perignon and Smith (2010a), who find differences in the diversification share, i.e. in the
level of reported VaR, between -25 and 35 pp.
A persistent bias either suggests that the bank consistently under- or overreports
10Formally, I estimate the following equation: VaR Biasi,t = αi + αt + β ×VaR Biasi,t−1. In the text,
I report β.
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diversification or that the benchmark correlation matrix does not perfectly reflect the
bank’s trading portfolio. For example, it is conceivable that the bank holds a commodity
portfolio that does not completely reflect the composition of the Bloomberg Commodity
Index. In this case, the correlation of the commodity return vis-à-vis the other risk indices
does not perfectly represent the true correlation of the bank’s portfolio and leads to a VaR
bias.
The variation of the aggregated VaR bias over time is explored in Figure 1.1, Fig-
ure 1.2 shows the individual development for each bank. Rather than the VaR bias, the
source of the bias - the different diversification shares - are shown. Initially, the empir-
ical diversification was lower than the reported diversification, but from 2004 to 2008,
the empirical diversification exceeds the reported diversification. From 2008 onwards,
the picture is reversed and the reported diversification exceeds empirical diversification.
Translated into the VaR bias, the sample period breaks downs into roughly two periods.
In the first period ranging from 2004 to mid-2007, banks, on average, provide a seemingly
conservative estimate of their VaR. From mid-2007 onwards, the VaR bias is negative, i.e.
banks overreport diversification and underreport VaR risk.
The trend in the average bias suggests a common factor for all banks. A possible
common factor is the historic volatility that is fed into all banks’ VaR models. As banks
use time-series data as input for their VaR models - up to 5 years of past data - the current
volatility may be much lower than the historic volatility levels. In this case, the reported
VaR might be below the level that current volatility implies. Likewise, in periods with
high volatility, the average volatility used in the models is smoothed by earlier periods
with lower volatility. Indeed, eye-balling of Figure 1.3 suggests that periods of a high VaR
bias, i.e. overreporting, coincide with a period of relatively low volatility.
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To explore how changes in correlation might drive changes in the bias, I analyse
how changes in the correlation matrix co-move with changes in the VaR bias. If sluggish
adjustments to changes in the correlation matrix drive the VaR bias, one should observe
larger biases when the changes to the correlation matrix are large. Changes in the corre-
lation matrix are calculated by first summing up and then taking the square root of the
squared difference of the correlation matrix used in the last period and the one used for
the current year-quarter. It should be noted that this measure does not indicate whether
there is “more” or “less” diversification between the different risk indices. Figure 1.4 shows
a scatter plot of the absolute changes in the VaR bias and the change in the correlation
matrix. Eye-balling suggests and (unreported) regression analysis finds only a very weak
relationship between changes in the correlation matrix and changes in the VaR bias. I
conclude that sluggish updating of the correlation matrix is not a major driver of the VaR
bias.
1.4 Strategic Diversification
In this section, possible strategic considerations behind the VaR bias are examined. As
outlined above, banks have both the tools as well as the incentives to strategically adjust
the calculation of the VaR diversification. Banks face a trade-off between benefits of
underreporting and its costs: Lower capital requirement today due to a higher reported
VaR versus potential higher capital requirement tomorrow due to an increased multiplier.
Both, the costs and benefits vary within a bank and over time. This variation of incentives
is exploited to elicit possible strategic considerations behind the VaR bias.
The benefits today are driven by two factors: The scarcity of equity and the regu-
latory multiplier. The costs of having higher capital requirements today are increasing
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the scarcity of equity and increasing the regulatory multiplier. In other words, reducing
the capital requirements today is more valuable, if the capital ratio is low and / or the
regulatory multiplier is high. The benefits of having a higher equity ratio are manifold.
First, low capital ratio could attract the attention of the regulator and might even trig-
ger regulatory actions. Second, a lower capital ratio might reduce the credit rating and
thereby increase the cost of capital. Therefore, the bias is expected to be higher, if the
capital ratio is low. This reasoning condenses into the first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 Banks underreport VaR relative to the benchmark VaR if their equity ratio
is low.
Banks benefit more from underreporting their VaR, if the regulatory multiplier is high
as the “capital savings” from underreporting are a monotone function of the multiplier.
The costs of under-reporting depend on the number of backtesting exceptions in the
previous quarters. As shown in Table 1.6, the marginal costs of an additional exception,
i.e. increase in the multiplier, vary with the number of past exceptions. For example, an
additional backtesting exception incurs no increase in the multiplier, if the number of past
exceptions lies between zero and three. However, if the number of past exceptions equals
four, the multiplier jumps from 3.0 to 3.4, if an additional exception is observed. Note
that this reasoning is distinct from the benefit considerations above. Above, the already
prevalent costs of incurred exceptions are examined. Here, the effects of the marginal costs
of an additional exception are in the focus. It is expected that banks report a higher VaR
relative to the benchmark, if the penalty for an additional exception is high. Formally,
the second hypothesis reads as follows:
Hypothesis 2 Banks overreport VaR if the marginal costs of an additional exception are
high and underreport their VaR if the regulatory multiplier is high.
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Finally, the VaR bias will be related to the number of backtesting exceptions. If
the VaR bias is indeed used to over-/underreport market risk, a positive VaR bias should
translate into a higher number of exceptions.
Hypothesis 3 Backtesting exceptions occur more frequently if banks report a low VaR
compared to the empirical benchmark.
1.4.1 Hypothesis 1: Scarcity of Equity
The hypothesis that banks increase their capital ratios in times of low equity, the measures
of over-/underdiversification and capital are related in the following regression equation:
VaR Biasi,t = αi + αt
+ β × Capital Ratioi,t
+ κ× Bank Controlsi,t
+ θ ×Market Controlst + i,t
(1.4)
Bank controls include the log of total assets and the ratio of net income and total
assets. To account for the persistent VaR biases at the bank-level and the common trend
in aggregated VaR bias, bank fixed-effects (αi) and year-quarter fixed effects (αt) are
included. Including the bank-fixed effects shifts the focus of the analysis towards within-
bank variation. The year-quarter fixed effects account for common trends and extreme
events, such as the collapse of Lehman Brothers. To further control for the effect of
volatilities, the volatilities of the risk indices are included as independent variables.
The coefficient of interest is β. Recall that higher VaR bias indicates lower levels of
diversification, i.e. overreporting of VaR. If β is positive, banks report a higher VaR if
equity is not scarce. Recall that a positive coefficient does not immediately translate into
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underreporting. Banks might increase the diversification level (i.e. decrease the reported
VaR), but still remain under the empirical diversification level.
Table 2.2 presents the results of the main specification (Equation 1.4). Column 1 to
3 show the results for different combinations of control variables. Adding control variables
reduces the magnitude and significance only slightly. In column 4, standard errors are
clustered at the year-quarter level rather than the bank-level. Using standard errors
clustered at the bank-level generally provide less conservative estimates of the standard
error. To account for the different sizes of the trading portfolios, I weigh the bank-quarter
observations by the undiversified VaR in this quarter in column 5. Using the weights
increases both magnitude and significance of β.
To tackle possible biases due to autocorrelation in the dependent variable, I include
the lagged VaR bias as additional independent variable. As pointed out by Arellano and
Bond (1991), including lagged dependent variables in a fixed-effects model might bias
the estimates. To obtain consistent estimates, I adopted the general method of moments
(GMM) approach suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and estimated the model in
first differences and using past values of the dependent variable as instrument. Column 6
contains the results of the regression. The coefficient remains positive and significant at
the 10% level. In terms of magnitude, the coefficient of 1.36 is substantially smaller than
previous results.11
Depending on the specification, a one percentage point increase (decrease) in the
leverage ratio is associated with an increase (decrease) in the VaR bias by 1.36 to 4.11
percentage points. The smallest effect of 1.36 is registered in the preferred Arellano-
11Both, the Sargan and Hansen Test do not reject the hypothesis of over-identification at any conven-
tional level of significance. The Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation for the AR(2) process does not
reject the hypothesis of no autocorrelation. In other words, past values are endogenous from current
values and are therefore valid instruments (p-value: 0.792). This holds true for every regression of this
type in the chapter.
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Bond specification. In terms of standard deviation, the effect is relatively small. A one
standard deviation increase in Eq/A increases VaR Bias by 0.14 standard deviations. To
grasp the economic magnitude, recall that the average diversified VaR equals 133.81 m
USD. An VaR Bias by 1.36 pp would increase the VaR by only 1.81 m USD and the
capital requirements by 5.46 m USD.12
1.4.1.1 Alternative Definitions of Equity Scarcity
Table 1.8 displays the results for the alternative specification of equity, the capital tier
one ratio, the regulatory capital ratio and CDS spreads. Surprisingly, the regulatory cap-
ital ratios do not exhibit a significant co-movement with the VaR bias. In other words,
the regulatory capital constraints do not drive overreporting of the VaR diversification.
Regarding CDS spreads, the estimated coefficients are generally in line with the expec-
tations, but insignificant in the case of the preferred specification with adjustment for
autocorrelation (column 6). This finding suggests that market assessment rather than
regulatory pressure incentivises banks to report a lower VaR.
1.4.1.2 Alternative Calculation of the VaR Bias
The results for the alternative specifications of the VaR bias, the alternative estimation
window and the dynamic conditional correlations, are summed up in Tables 1.18 and
1.19. For VaR Bias (alt), the results are virtually unchanged. An exception is the CDS
spread that becomes strongly significant and negative in the Arellano-Bond specification
in Table 1.18, Panel D, Column (6”). For VaR Bias (DCC) as dependent variable, the
results are mixed. The leverage ratio is only significant if no volatility or bank controls
are added or if the observations are weighted with the undiversified VaR. In the remaining
12I approximate the effect on the capital requirement by multiplying the average VaR with the estimated
coefficient and the regulatory multiplier.
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specifications, the leverage ratio does not explain variation of the VaR Bias (DCC).
1.4.1.3 Subsamples
To elicit the drivers of the relationship, Equation 1.4 is adapted by including subsample
dummies and interactions of the subsample dummy with the capital ratio. Table 1.9
contains the results for the subsamples.
First, possible differences between European and North American banks are analysed
in column 1 of Table 1.9. The insignificance of the interactions suggests that there is no
difference between banks that can be attributed to the geographic location.
Second, the sample is split by the calculation method of the VaR. Some banks use
the so-called “historical simulation” approach, whereas others rely on the more advanced
Monte Carlo method. Lazaregue-Bazard (2010a) points out two advantages of the Monte
Carlo method: First, the Monte Carlo Method produces a larger number of possibles paths
of the pre-specified distribution than other methods. Second, Monte Carlo simulations
are more data-intensive and allow for a better modelling of extreme events. However, the
insignificant coefficients do not indicate that the results are driven by banks using either
calculation method.
Third, the size of the trading exposure might affect the bias for several reasons. Banks
with a large trading portfolio might be under more scrutiny by the regulator than banks
with a smaller portfolio. Higher regulatory scrutiny should decrease the bias. Likewise,
banks with a large trading portfolio possibly devote more resources to the calculation of
the VaR and might thereby reduce errors stemming from model quality. To assess the
size effect, a dummy is coded that takes the value of one if the bank has an above mean
VaR and zero if the bank’s VaR is below the mean. The interaction term is negative and
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significant at the 10%-level. The negative sign implies that the relationship between the
VaR Bias and equity scarcity is strongest for banks with a small VaR.
Fourth, the cost side of the trade-off is taken into consideration. The dummy yellow
takes the value of one if the number of past backtesting exceptions was between five and
nine, i.e. in the yellow zone of the regulatory multiplier. The increased multiplier makes
maintaining a higher VaR more costly and thereby increases the incentives to reduce the
reported VaR. The coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant at the
10% level. The negative sign suggests that banks with a low capital ratio report a lower
VaR, if having a higher VaR is more expensive in terms of equity.
Finally, possible changes of the relationship over time are examined in Table 1.9.
The divergent literature on under-/overreporting of VaR might be rooted in banks un-
derreporting risks in troubled times, but overreporting in calm times. Indeed, O’Brien
and Szerszen (2014) find that VaRs were more conservative, but closer to the true values
in the crisis period. Since the start of the financial crisis is ambiguous, I code a dummy
for post 2007, 2008 and 2009 observations and interact the dummies with the leverage
ratio (Eq/A). None of the interactions is significantly different from zero. Hence, it is
concluded that the relation is not driven by particular time periods.
1.4.2 Hypothesis 2: Regulatory Multiplier
This section examines whether the shape of the penalty function translates into differences
in the VaR bias. Note that unlike in the previous section, this specification focuses on
the marginal costs of an additional rather than the already incurred increased penalty for
past exceptions. Equation 1.4 is adapted in the following fashion:
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VaR Biasi,t = αi + αt
+ β × 1[Past Exceptions = n]i,t
+ γ × Bank Controlsi,t
+ κ×Market Controlst
+ φ× VaR Biasi,t−1 + i,t
(1.5)
where αi and αt are again bank and year-quarter fixed effects. Bank and market
controls are the same as in Equation 1.4. 1[PastExceptions = n] is a dummy variable
that takes a value of one if the number of past exceptions in the previous quarter equals n.
Since the largest differences in the marginal costs of additional exceptions occur around
four backtesting exceptions in the previous three quarters, the analysis focuses on this
threshold. Translated in terms of Equation 1.5, Hypothesis 2 translates into an expected
positive β, if an additional exception leads to a penalty, i.e. an increase in the multiplier.
I expect that the effect is stronger, if the increase in the multiplier is larger.
Table 1.6 shows the estimated coefficients for various specifications of the dummy.
The results for four exceptions in the last three quarters is shown is column 4, the re-
maining columns report the results of placebo tests. In the first two columns, the dummy
takes the value of one if the number of exceptions in the last three quarters is equal to
one (column 1) or three (column 2). The coefficients of the dummies are small and not
significant at any conventional level of significance. Column 3 examines whether being in
the green zone affects the level of the VaR bias. Again, the coefficient is small and not
significant. However, if the number of exceptions in the last three quarters equals four
and the penalty for an additional exception is the highest, banks increase their reported
VaR relative to the benchmark VaR by 12.53 pp of the reported VaR (p-value <0.05).
Column 5 and 6 examine the VaR bias above the threshold of four exceptions. The neg-
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ative coefficients suggest that banks report a lower VaR if the multiplier increases above
the baseline of three, but none of the coefficients is significant at conventional levels. This
effect of sitting on the boundary of four exceptions is of considerable economic magnitude:
For an average bank, a 12.53 pp increase in the VaR translates into an increase in the
capital charge of 50 m USD.
The positive coefficient of being at the boundary and non-existing effects of sitting
above or below the threshold suggest that banks report a higher VaR if the marginal costs
are high. Hypothesis 2 is therefore considered to be confirmed. However, it is unclear
whether the penalty in form of the increased multiplier or the threat of higher regulatory
scrutiny is ultimately responsible for the overreporting around the threshold.
1.4.2.1 Alternative Calculation of VaR Bias
Different calculation methods of the VaR Bias, namely the alternative estimation window
and the dynamic conditional correlation, do not result in different results. Results are
shown in Table 1.10. Crucially, the coefficient of 1[Past Exceptions = 4] remains positive
and significant at the 5% level. All other dummy variables remain insignificant.
1.4.3 Hypothesis 3: Backtesting Exceptions
In this section, the connection between the VaR bias and the number of exceptions is
explored. If the VaR bias is actually connected to underreporting, a negative bias should
increase the number of exceptions.
Modelling the relationship between the VaR bias and backtesting exceptions is not
straightforward. In particular, the data type of the backtesting exceptions is not clear-cut
as the number of exceptions is neither a binary nor a genuine continuous variable. To
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avoid modelling biases, I use four different approaches to test the relationship between
the VaR bias and the number of backtesting exceptions.
The first and most intuitive approach is a binary response model. In this case, the
dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if an exception occurs in a
quarter. However, this option does not account for the number of exceptions in a quarter.
To account for the number of exceptions, I employ a count regression model with the
actual backtesting exceptions as dependent variable. The most commonly used count
regression model, the Poisson regression, is not suited for the data: A key assumption of
the Poisson regression is that the mean and the variance of the dependent variable are
roughly equal. As shown in Table 1.3, even the standard deviation of the exceptions is
more than three times as large as the mean. One remedy for this so-called “overdispersion”
is the negative binomial regression. In essence, the negative binomial regression is a
Poisson regression that explicitly models the overdispersion and uses narrower confidence
intervals (Greene, 2008a). To strike a balance between the first and second approach, I
code an ordinal variable that takes the value of zero if no exceptions occurs, one if only a
single exception occur in a quarter and two if more than one exceptions occurs. In either
specification of the dependent variable, adding fixed effects is problematic. First, adding
year-quarter fixed effects effectively eliminates quarters in which no exceptions occurs
and thereby nearly halves the number of observations. Second, adding fixed effects into
a logistic regression might give rise to the incidental parameter problem, i.e. generates
inconsistent estimates (Lancaster, 2000). This bias is particularly pronounced for panels
with a limited length. As my dataset spans over 52 quarters for 12 banks, the bias
should be limited. In addition, the negative binomial regression does not suffer from
the incidental parameter problem. Finally, I adopt the approach of Begley et al. (2016)
and standardize all continuous variables - including the number of backtesting exceptions
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- to have zero mean and unit variance. This approach circumvents the aforementioned
problem by removing the count character of the exceptions and allows Begley et al. (2016)
to use OLS regressions techniques rather than the aforementioned models that explicitly
account for the type of the dependent variable.
The results for the baseline specification of VaR Bias are reported in Table 1.7. The
upper panel presents the results for the discrete models, the lower panel the coefficients of
the Begley-type regressions. Overall, the results do lend very limited support for Hypoth-
esis 3. Though the sign of the coefficient is - in line with the expectation - negative, i.e.
suggesting that overreporting reduces the likelihood of an exception, it is not significant
in any specification at any conventional level.
In the Begley-type regressions, the coefficients of VaR Bias are negative if any set
of fixed effects added, but only significant if both year-quarter and bank fixed effects
are added. The suggested magnitude of the effect is large. A one standard deviation
increase in the VaR bias, i.e. an increase in overreporting, reduces the number of excep-
tions by 0.117 standard deviations. Overall, the support for Hypothesis 3 in the baseline
specification is limited.
1.4.3.1 Alternative Calculation of the VaR Bias
As for Hypothesis 1 and 2, I estimate all specifications with the alternative estimation
window and the DCC VaR Bias. The results are presented in Tables 1.11 and 1.12. The
results for VaR Bias (alt) are slightly stronger in terms of magnitude and significance, the
coefficients remain insignificant. Unlike for the first two hypothesis, the VaR Bias (DCC)
generates significantly stronger results. In the discrete models, adding either year-quarter
or bank fixed effects to the logistic regression generates significant, negative coefficients of
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the VaR Bias (DCC). The coefficient is not significant in the ordered logistic specification
(Panel A, column 5), but significant at the 10% level in the negative binomial regression.
Results for the Begley-type regression are very similar, yet slightly stronger.
The stronger results for VaR Bias (DCC) might stem from the superiority of the
DCC model in capturing abrupt changes in returns. As shown in Figure 1.5, most of the
exceptions occur during the financial crisis, i.e. in periods of large, unanticipated changes
in the underlying indices. The sample correlations might not capture these movements as
well as the DCC model does.
1.4.4 Robustness Tests and Additional Specification
1.4.4.1 Estimation Window and Short Positions
As outlined in the previous sections, banks differ in their VaR modelling and, in particular,
in their time horizon they use for the VaR calculations. To account for these differences,
I estimate the correlation using a shorter estimation window (150 days) and a longer one
(400 days). Further, I will allow banks to have net short positions in a broad asset class.
To model short positions, the returns of the asset class of which the bank is assumed to
hold a short position are multiplied with minus one. In other words, the trading portfolio
experiences a negative return, if the associated index increases.
Table 1.13 explores how different correlation assumptions affect the results for the
scarcity of equity. It reports the coefficients of the Arellano-Bond specification with year-
quarter and bank fixed effects as well the lagged bias. In column 1 and 2, the estimation
window of the correlation matrix is lengthened to 400 trading days and shortened to 150
trading days. Both, shortening and lengthening the estimation window does not alter the
results qualitatively. In columns 3-7, I allow for short positions in a broad asset class.
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Allowing for a net short position in equity, foreign exchange and commodities leave the
coefficient of the leverage ratio, Eq/A, positive and significant at the 10% level. However,
if banks are assumed to be short in interest rate or credit risk VaR, the coefficient turns
insignificant but remains positive.
Table 1.14 examines whether alternative estimation windows and short positions
generate different results with regards to Hypothesis 2, i.e. that banks overreport if the
costs of exceptions are high. For the sake of brevity, I only report the results for the crucial
threshold of four exceptions in the last three quarters (column 4 in Table 1.6). Similar
to the changes described in the previous paragraph, the coefficient turns insignificant if
banks are assumed to be short in credit, interest rate and equity risk.
Finally, I test whether the results for Hypothesis 3 are affected. In particular, I re-
estimate the logistic regression and the normalized, Begley-type regression with both sets
of fixed effects with the VaR biases that allow for short positions and different estimation
windows. For nearly every specification, the VaR bias does not significantly affect the
number of back-testing exceptions.13
Overall, the results suggest that the assumption of a long position - especially in
credit and interest rate risk - is crucial for the analysis. From the outset, it is unclear
whether the assumption of a long position for the baseline specification is reasonable. In
the tests above, I changed the assumptions that all banks have a long position in each
asset class to the assumption that banks are long in all but one asset class. The reality,
however, might be more complex. Some banks might hold a short position whereas other
banks hold a long position. Likewise, a bank might be long in a broad asset class at some
point in time, but long at another. The literature gives little guidance on the exposure
13Regressions unreported. VaR bias remains significant and negative in the logistic regression if banks
are assumed to be short in equity or credit risk.
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of banks to different risk classes. O’Brien and Berkowitz (2005) find that the exposure
of six large dealer banks to certain risk classes varies only moderately over time and that
all banks in the sample maintained a net long position in interest rate risk over the entire
sample period. However, the sample of O’Brien and Berkowitz (2005) spans from 2000-
2002 and might not capture the effect of the financial crisis and financial innovations, such
as CDS. Using a larger and more recent dataset, Begenau et al. (2015) find - again using
a factor model - that banks maintained not only a positive exposure to interest rate but
also to credit risk, even after accounting for derivative exposure. Therefore, assuming a
net long position in credit and interest rate risk might be a reasonable assumption, though
the question can only be conclusively be answered using asset-level data.
1.4.4.2 Omitting Time Periods
As outlined above, VaR as a risk measure was subject to severe strain in the immediate
aftermath of the financial crisis. In section 1.4.1.3, I examined whether the relationship
between measures of equity scarcity and the VaR bias changes over time by adding inter-
action terms. As a robustness test, I take a different approach to elicit the importance of
the crisis period for the identification of Hypothesis 1 by estimating the Arellano-Bond
specification of Equation 1.4 for subsamples that exclude certain years. I start with drop-
ping observations in a particular year (2004-2010) and conclude by excluding the entire
immediate crisis period (2007-2010). Table 1.15 holds the results. If either all 2006 or
2007 observations are dropped, the leverage ratio is no longer a significant determinant
of VaR Bias. Dropping other years or the entire crisis period strengthens the results. I
conclude that much of the identification stems from the reaction of banks to the crisis in
2007.
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1.4.4.3 Controlling for the Composition of the VaR
A further omitted variable is the composition of the VaR. The composition of the VaR
has two aspects. First, the actual shares of the different sub-portfolios might matter. If -
for example - market correlation captures the co-movement of the equity and commodity
portfolio worse than co-movement of the equity and foreign exchange portfolio, the VaR
bias should be larger for banks with a higher commodity portfolio. Second, the concen-
tration of the total VaR in a certain sub-portfolio might matter. If - hypothetically - the
entire VaR of a bank consists of credit risk, the potential diversification effect is zero by
construction. If the total VaR is less concentrated in a single broad asset class VaR, the
potential diversification benefits and thereby the potential VaR bias is larger.
To control for the first channel, the different shares of the sub-portfolios, I add the
shares of the sub-portfolios on the total VaR as control variables. Adding the shares
makes the results stronger in terms of magnitude and significance. To address the second
potential channel, the concentration of the VaR, I code two variables. First, I calculate
the Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index (HHI) of the shares of the sub-portfolios on the total
VaR as the sum of the squared shares. The HHI is bounded between 1
N
and 1, where N is
the number of broad asset classes to which a bank has a non-zero exposure. Low values
of the HHI indicate a low concentration, high values a high concentration. Second, I code
a variable equalling the number of non-zero sub-portfolios. For example, if a bank has a
non-zero exposure to all five broad asset classes, the variable takes a value of one. If a
bank has, for instance, no exposure to credit risk but to all other exposures, the variable
takes a value of four.14 Adding these controls reduces the magnitude of the effect of the
14Note that the number of non-zero sub-portfolios might vary over time for a bank. Having a positive
exposure in all or only four asset classes are nearly equally common with 313 and 316 bank-quarter
observations, respectively. The remainder of 54 observations exhibits a count of three non-zero sub-
portfolios.
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equity ratio slightly: The coefficient drops from 1.355 (p-value: 0.05) to 0.793 (p-value:
0.06) if the HHI is added as control variable and to 0.976 (p-value: 0.09), if the number
of non-zero sub-portfolios is included as regressor.15
1.4.4.4 Functional Form
Above, I used unscaled versions of the leverage and capital ratios. However, it is conceiv-
able that the relationship between the dependent and independent variable is non-linear.
I therefore re-estimate the core regressions of each hypothesis using different transforma-
tions of the independent variables. Notably, I use the log transformation and second order
polynomial model.
In Table 1.16, I re-estimate the Arellano-Bond specification of Equation 4 for the
different functional forms. In the first column of each panel, I report the coefficient of the
linear model. The second column shows the coefficients of log-transformed capitalisation
measures. In the third column, the squared capitalisation measure is used as dependent
variable. The fourth column shows the results of the polynomial model with the linear
and squared capitalisation measure.
Generally, the results are not driven by the functional form of the capitalisation
measures. For the leverage ratio and the CDS spreads, the log-transformations generates
stronger results in terms of significance. The coefficient of the squared regressors have the
opposite sign as the linear term, but the linear effect dominates the squared effect for the
entire range of the leverage ratio and the CDS spreads in the sample.16 For the regulatory
capital ratios (Panel B and C), the coefficient remains insignificant. One exception is the
15Results are not reported for the sake of conciseness.
16Given the coefficient of 5.64 of the linear component and -0.25 of the squared term suggests a net
negative effect for values above 22.56. However, the largest observed leverage ratio is 13.88. For the CDS
spread, the threshold for a net negative effect is 621 basis points and the highest observed CDS spread is
486 basis points.
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logarithm CET1 Ratio, but the coefficient is small and only marginally significant.
1.4.4.5 Stress Tests
During the sample period, the regulators conducted a series of stress tests to assess the
banks’ ability to withstand the outfall of adverse economic developments. As the design of
the stress tests varied between regions and over time in several dimensions, the stress tests
might not be perfectly comparable. For example the stress tests might vary in the severity
of the assumption of the economic development, the disclosure of bank-level data and the
fail/pass threshold. However, either type of stress test puts the bank, its capitalisation
and its internal models in the spotlight of the regulator. This increased scrutiny might
provide additional incentives for banks to appear less risky then they actually are or
induce caution in risk modelling. Further, as stress tests do not use the current balance
sheet for the stress test, but rather the asset composition at the end of the previous fiscal
year, banks have an incentive to report a lower VaR in the quarter that is used for the
stress test calculations. As stress tests are announced well in advance, banks have the
opportunity to adjust their risk positions in anticipation of the stress test. For example,
the EBA 2014 stress test used the end-2013 balance sheets to calculate the scenarios, but
the results were published in October 2014.
To evaluate a possible effect of stress tests, I examine the VaR bias in quarters in
which stress test results are released and the quarters which serve as a reference or starting
point for the stress test calculations. First, I code the variable REFERENCE, which takes
a value of one, if the balance sheet of the bank in this quarter is used as starting point
for the stress tests and zero otherwise. Second, I code a dummy variable, RESULTS, that
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takes the value of one, if stress test results for a bank are released in a quarter.17 Defining
those quarters is not as straight forward as it might seem at the first glance. Whereas
stress tests by the European Banking Authority and the ECB examined only banks head-
quartered in the European Union, the American counterpart, the Comprehensive Capital
Analysis and Review (CCAR) includes also subsidiaries of foreign banks. For example,
the Deutsche Bank is subject to both, the European stress tests as well as - by proxy of
it subsidiary Deutsche Bank Trust Corporation - the CCARs. However, as the CCAR
examine only the US American business division of a bank, I do not count stress tests of
the division as stress tests for the entire bank. Third, I code a dummy, FAIL, variable
that takes the value of one if a banks does not pass all elements of a stress test. Again,
coding this variable is not straight-forward as the names of failing banks were not always
reported.18 Further, none of the European banks in the sample experienced a capital
shortfall in any scenario. I therefore estimate the effect of RESULTS and FAIL for the
combined EU-North America sample as well as individually for each region.19
Table 1.17 holds the results. The sign of REFERENCE in the full sample is positive,
but the coefficient is not significant at any conventional level (column 1). The negative, yet
insignificant coefficients of RESULTS in the full sample (column 2) suggests that banks
overreport diversification, i.e. underreport their VaR by roughly 2.4 percentage points in
quarters during which stress test results were released. To mitigate possible biases due
to different designs, I estimate the effect separately for American banks (column 3 to 5)
and European banks (column 6 and 7). The results suggest that the results are driven by
17In the US, stress test results were published in the second quarter of the years 2009 to 2014. In the
EU, results were published in 2009q4, 2010q3, 2011q3 and 2014q4. In each case, the reference quarter
was the last quarter in the previous year.
18For instance, the 2011 CCAR or the 2010 EBA stress do not disclose which banks did fail.
19The US stress test sample includes the Bank of America, the Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan
and the Bank of New York Mellon. The European stress test sample consists of the Deutsche Bank, the
ING Group, the Santander Bank, Nordea and the BNP. All European banks in the sample passed each of
the stress tests. The Bank of America and the Citigroup in 2009, the Citigroup in 2012, Goldman Sachs
and JP Morgan in 2013 and the Citigroup in 2014 did not pass all elements of the stress test.
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US banks which underreport market risk by 21.10 percentage points in reference quarters
and by 9.472 percentage points in announcement quarters relative to the VaR benchmark,
whereas the European banks do not exhibit a pronounced pattern around stress tests.
Interestingly, the negative coefficient of RESULTS and the positive coefficient of FAIL
suggests that banks which do not pass a stress test do not underreport market risk as
strongly as those banks that passed the test.20
The interpretation of the results is not clear-cut. It was expected that banks want
to appear to be better capitalised during stress test periods in order to pass the test and
to appear healthier to the public. The negative sign for FAIL could be the manifestation
of an aversion against any further scrutiny by regulators and the market that would be
attracted by a backtesting exception. However, as the number of observations is low, the
tests have only limited power. As banks report their trading portfolios to the regulator,
this question could be better addressed with micro data.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter examines a channel of possible VaR underreporting, the diversification com-
ponent. Past discussions about the diversification component and the removal for correla-
tion effects from the most current regulation suggest that mis-calculations of the diversifi-
cation indeed lead to underestimation of VaR. To control for variations in the correlation
between asset classes, I construct a hypothetical VaR measure using a correlation matrix
derived from public risk indices and the VaR breakdown reported by the banks using a
methodology developed by Perignon and Smith (2010a).
20Banks might anticipate their failure in the stress test and might therefore report an even lower VaR
in the reference quarter. However, failing banks do not exhibit a different behaviour in terms of the VaR
bias in those quarter. The coefficient of the FAIL-specification is 14.45 with a p-value of 0.26.
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I find persistent and systematic deviations of the reported VaR from the counter-
factual benchmark. To examine whether banks strategically use their internal models to
report a favourable VaR, I examine the reaction to time-varying incentives on the within
bank variation of the bias. Banks report a lower VaR if their non-regulatory equity ratio
is low and a higher VaR if marginal costs are high. The results are sensitive to some
assumptions - such as the assumption of a long position in each asset class - and the
modelling of the correlation between the broad asset classes. Overall, the results suggest
that bank did use their modelling freedom to strategically report a lower VaR.
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Tables
Table. 1.1: Example VaR Calculation
Average for the three month ended
Asset Class April 30 January 31 April 30
($ USD millions) 2004 2004 2003
Interest Rate 7.0 8.8 5.9
Equities 4.5 5.4 4.0
Foreign Exchange 1.2 1.4 2.5
Commodities 1.0 1.0 0.5
Undiversified VaR 13.7 16.6 12.9
Diversification (5.5) (6.3) (4.3)
Diversified VaR 8.2 10.3 8.6
Diversification Share 0.40 0.38 0.33
Values are taken from the second quarter report 2004. All
values are in Canadian Dollar. Parentheses indicate negative
values.
Table. 1.2: Penalty Function
Number of Exceptions Multiplier Zone
0-4 3.00 green
5 3.40
6 3.50
7 3.65 yellow
8 3.75
9 3.85
10+ 4.00 red
The table describes the mapping from the VaR
backtesting exceptions during the last 250 trad-
ing days into the regulatory multiplier, that is
used to calculate the capital requirements for
the trading portfolio.
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Table. 1.3: Summary Statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Diversified VaR 674 133.81 132.74 6.00 604.21
VaR Bias 674 -6.17 25.13 -74.97 47.08
VaR Bias (alt) 674 -6.05 25.06 -73.12 47.81
VaR Bias (DCC) 655 -8.42 19.89 -62.97 39.22
VaR Exceptions 469 0.52 1.88 0 12
Green 469 0.88 0.33 0 1
Yellow 469 0.03 0.18 0 1
Red 469 0.09 0.29 0 1
Eq/A 674 5.86 2.65 1.66 13.67
Capital Ratio 602 14.30 2.60 10.50 22.30
CET1 Ratio 617 11.15 2.59 7.10 18.40
CDS spread 530 87.05 72.28 4.71 486.77
Total Assets 674 1140.22 715.09 76.78 3652.90
Net Income 674 0.15 0.14 -0.46 0.41
Diversified VaR is the total, diversified VaR as stated in the quar-
terly and annual reports in USD million. VaR Bias is the relative
difference between the reported and empirical VaR. The suffixes (alt)
and (DCC) indicate different calculation methods of the counterfac-
tual VaR. VaR exceptions is the number of quarterly backtesting
exceptions. Green, Yellow, and Red are dummy variables that take
the value of one if the number of incurred backtesting lies in the
green, yellow or red zone and zero otherwise. Eq/A is the ratio of
book equity and total assets in a quarter. CET1 Ratio and Capital
Ratio are the core equity tier one and the capital ratio according to
the prevailing Basel definition. CDS Spread is the 5y CDS senior,
unsecured spread reported in basis points. Net Income/Total As-
sets is the net income in a quarter divided by Total Assets in that
quarter. All values are transformed to USD using the quarter-end
exchange rate.
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Table. 1.4: VaR Bias by Bank
Bank Mean SD Min Max
BNP -29.8 20.5 -82.2 8.9
Bank of America -30.8 27.1 -77.4 17.8
Bank of Montreal 23.0 15.8 -15.1 45.2
Canadian Bank of Commerce -17.4 27.9 -109.9 16.3
Citi -12.2 10.3 -43.8 6.3
Credit Suisse -10.7 17.2 -46.2 28.5
Deutsche Bank -15.8 18.1 -63.9 7.6
Goldman -0.4 11.3 -33.2 21.8
ING -8.9 12.7 -38.8 9.6
JPMorgan 4.6 19.0 -44.7 45.4
Mellon 9.8 17.6 -27.1 50.6
Nordea -20.4 17.8 -71.0 9.2
Royal Bank of Canada -9.3 16.7 -36.7 53.1
Santander -7.7 18.9 -61.9 31.8
Scotia -6.7 12.4 -27.6 41.8
UBS 31.9 14.4 -12.1 50.0
Total -5.5 25.1 -109.9 53.1
The table reports the VaR Bias as defined in Equation 1.2 in
percentage points. Positive (negative) values indicate empirical
VaR below (above) the reported VaR.
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Table. 1.5: Equity Scarcity
VaR Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eq/A 3.17** 2.90** 3.04** 3.04*** 4.11*** 1.36*
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05)
Undiversified VaR (log) 2.09 2.40 2.40 -1.64 -0.928
(0.67) (0.62) (0.22) (0.79) (0.78)
Total Assets (log) -3.27 -1.76 -1.76 2.87 -1.409
(0.68) (0.82) (0.59) (0.72) (0.75)
Net Income/Total Assets 10.18 9.72 9.72 3.08 -1.510
(0.12) (0.17) (0.11) (0.70) (0.53)
Observations 674 674 674 674 674 656
R-squared 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.66 0.66
Weights Equal Equal Equal Equal VaR Equal
Vola Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Bias No No No No No Yes
Cluster SE Bank Bank Bank Y-Q Bank Bank
The table reports the results of Equation 1.4. The volatility variables capture the an-
nualized volatility of the risk indices in region of the bank’s headquarters. Undiversified
VaR is the sum of the broad asset class VaRs but net of diversification between them.
The remaining variables are described in Table 1.3. Column 6 shows the coefficient of
the Arellano-Bond estimation. P-values of the coefficients are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
46
Table. 1.6: Effect of Marginal Costs on the VaR Bias
VaR Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1[Past Exceptions = 0] -2.627
(0.36)
1[Past Exceptions = 3] -1.583
(0.76)
1[Past Exceptions < 5] 1.561
(0.67)
1[Past Exceptions = 4] 19.82**
(0.04)
1[Past Exceptions = 5] -19.06
(0.17)
1[Past Exceptions > 4] -4.180
(0.55)
Observations 467 467 467 467 467 467
R-squared 0.368 0.366 0.366 0.370 0.374 0.367
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes yes Yes Yes
The table reports the results of Equation 1.5. The independent variables are
dummy variables that take the value of one if the backtesting exceptions in
the three previous quarters satisfy the specified condition. Standard errors are
clustered at the bank level. Standard Errors are clustered at the bank level.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table. 1.7: Predicting Outliers
Panel A: Discrete Models
Exceptions
Dummy Ordered Count
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VaR Bias -0.013 -0.013 -0.019 -0.019 -0.014 -0.008
(0.34) (0.22) (0.10) (0.16) (0.54) (0.20)
Observations 432 236 432 236 236 432
Model Logit Logit Logit Logit Ologit Neg Bin
Year-Quarter FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Continuous Model
Exceptions (z)
(1)’ (2)’ (3)’ (4)’
VaR Bias (z) 0.011 -0.055 -0.112 -0.117*
(0.71) (0.40) (0.19) (0.09)
Observations 432 432 432 432
R-squared 0.253 0.451 0.269 0.467
Year-Quarter FE No Yes No Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports the results of tests for Hypothesis 3. In Panel A, the de-
pendent variables are different specifications of the number of backtesting
exceptions in a quarter. In column 1-4, the dependent variable is a dummy
that takes the value of one of an exception occurred and zero otherwise. In
column 5 (“Ordered”), the variable equals 2 if more than one exception oc-
curred, one if one occurred and zero if none occurred. In column 6 (“Count”),
the dependent variable is the actual number of backtesting exceptions. Vari-
ables amended with “(z)” are normalised to have zero mean and unit variance.
Jackknife re-sampling is used to calculate the standard errors. P-values are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
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Table. 1.8: Alternative Definition of Equity Scarcity
Panel A: Capital Ratio
VaR Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Capital Ratio 1.05 0.80 0.58 0.58 0.88 0.04
(0.21) (0.30) (0.50) (0.21) (0.28) (0.94)
Observations 601 601 601 601 601 587
R-squared 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.66 0.75
Panel B: Capital Tier 1Ratio
VaR Bias
(1)’ (2)’ (3)’ (4)’ (5)’ (6)’
CET1 Ratio 0.83 0.71 0.37 0.37 0.96 0.49
(0.36) (0.41) (0.71) (0.56) (0.26) (0.30)
Observations 616 615 615 615 615 600
R-squared 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.66 0.77
Panel C: CDS Spreads
VaR Bias
(1)” (2)” (3)” (4)” (5)” (6)”
CDS spread -0.05** -0.06** -0.07** -0.07*** -0.08* -0.03
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (<0.00) (0.09) (0.15)
Observations 535 527 527 527 527 515
R-squared 0.48 0.30 0.30 0.68 0.75
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Bank Bank Y-Q Bank Bank
Weights Equal Equal Equal Equal VaR Equal
The table reports the results of Equation 1.4 for different measures of equity
scarcity. The set of coefficients is the same as in table 2.2. A description
of each variable can be found in Table 1.3. The weights applied in the sixth
column are the undiversified VaRs are reported by the banks. Column 7 shows
the coefficient of the Arellano-Bond estimation. P-values of the coefficients are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
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Table. 1.9: Subsamples
VaR Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Eq/A 4.192*** 3.297** 7.081*** 4.098 4.369** 4.264** 3.579**
(0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.14) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
EU × Eq/A 0.333
(0.92)
Monte Carlo × Eq/A 2.544
(0.24)
Large VaR × Eq/A -3.544*
(0.08)
Yellow × Eq/A -5.262*
(0.08)
Post-2007 × Eq/A -1.302
(0.34)
Post-2008 × Eq/A -1.440
(0.29)
Post-2009 × Eq/A -0.920
(0.51)
Observations 674 674 674 343 674 674 674
R-squared 0.340 0.345 0.359 0.369 0.332 0.334 0.330
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports the results of Equation 1.4 with interaction of dummies with Book Equity/Total
Assets (Eq/A). Post-2007, Post-2008,Post-2009 and Post-2010 are dummy variables that take the
value of one for the quarter after the specified year. EU equals one for banks whose headquarters are
located in Europe. Monte Carlo takes the value of one for banks that apply the Monte Carlo method
to calculate the VaR. Large VaR is set to one if a bank’s VaR is above the mean VaR in a quarter.
Yellow equals one if the regulatory multiplier of the bank lies in the yellow zone. A description of
the remaining variables can be found in Table 1.3. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level.
P-values of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table. 1.10: Effect of Marginal Costs on the VaR Bias
VaR Bias (alt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1[Past Exceptions = 0] -2.039
(0.50)
1[Past Exceptions = 3] -2.549
(0.66)
1[Past Exceptions < 5] 3.011
(0.47)
1[Past Exceptions = 4] 18.98**
(0.04)
1[Past Exceptions = 5] -16.72
(0.22)
1[Past Exceptions > 4] -4.091
(0.57)
Observations 467 467 467 467 467 467
R-squared 0.378 0.377 0.377 0.380 0.383 0.378
Panel B: VaR Bias (DCC)
VaR Bias (DCC)
(1)’ (2)’ (3)’ (4)’ (5)’ (6)’
1[Past Exceptions = 0] 0.394
(0.89)
1[Past Exceptions = 3] -5.412
(0.40)
1[Past Exceptions < 5] -5.825
(0.32)
1[Past Exceptions = 4] 16.05**
(0.04)
1[Past Exceptions = 5] -13.48
(0.22)
1[Past Exceptions > 4] -3.872
(0.47)
Observations 467 467 467 467 467 467
R-squared 0.429 0.431 0.432 0.432 0.432 0.430
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
The table reports the results of Equation 1.5. The independent variables are
dummy variables that take the value of one if the backtesting exceptions in
the three previous quarters satisfy the specified condition. Standard errors are
clustered at the bank level. Standard Errors are clustered at the bank level.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
51
Table. 1.11: Predicting Outliers - Alternative Start Date
Panel A: Discrete Models
Exceptions
Dummy Ordered Count
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VaR Bias (alt) -0.016 -0.015 -0.023* -0.022 -0.017 -0.011
(0.24) (0.17) (0.07) (0.12) (0.43) (0.10)
Observations 432 236 432 236 236 432
Model Logit Logit Logit Logit Ologit Neg Bin
Year-Quarter FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Continuous Model
Exceptions (z)
(1)’ (2)’ (3)’ (4)’
VaR Bias (alt, z) <0.000 -0.046 -0.136 -0.109*
(>0.99) (0.44) (0.16) (0.07)
Observations 432 432 432 432
R-squared 0.253 0.451 0.269 0.467
Year-Quarter FE No Yes No Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports the results of tests for Hypothesis 3. In Panel A, the dependent
variables are different specifications of the number of backtesting exceptions in a
quarter. In column 1-4, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value
of one of an exception occurred an zero otherwise. In column 5 (“Ordered”),
the variable equals 2 if more than one exception occurred, one if one occurred
and zero if none occurred. In column 6 (“Count”), the dependent variable is
the actual number of backtesting exceptions. Variables amended with “(z)” are
normalised to have zero mean and unit variance. Jackknife re-sampling is used
to calculate the standard errors. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table. 1.12: Predicting Outliers - DCC Correlation
Panel A: Discrete Models
Exceptions
Dummy Ordered Count
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VaR Bias DCC -0.016 -0.021* -0.020* -0.027** -0.022 -0.013**
(0.34) (0.06) (0.10) (0.04) (0.29) (0.03)
Observations 432 236 432 236 236 432
Model Logit Logit Logit Logit Ologit Neg Bin
Year-Quarter FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Continuous Model
Exceptions (z)
(1)’ (2)’ (3)’ (4)’
VaR Bias DCC (z) -0.056 -0.054 -0.132 -0.103*
(0.32) (0.30) (0.12) (0.05)
Observations 432 432 432 432
R-squared 0.259 0.452 0.275 0.468
Year-Quarter FE No Yes No Yes
Bank FE No No Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports the results of tests for Hypothesis 3. In Panel A, the dependent
variables are different specifications of the number of backtesting exceptions in a
quarter. In column 1-4, the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value
of one of an exception occurred an zero otherwise. In column 5 (“Ordered”), the
variable equals 2 if more than one exception occurred, one if one occurred and zero
if none occurred. In column 6 (“Count”), the dependent variable is the actual number
of backtesting exceptions. Variables amended with “(z)” are normalised to have zero
mean and unit variance. Jackknife re-sampling is used to calculate the standard
errors. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table. 1.13: Short Positions, Hypothesis 1
VaR Bias
Window Short
Short Long Interest Equity FX Credit Commodity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Eq/A 1.13* 1.02* 0.47 0.81* 0.91* 0.51 1.32***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.40) (0.07) (0.10) (0.44) (0.01)
Total Assets (log) -16.70*** -15.02*** -3.41 -1.92 -4.26 -2.87 -6.26*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.48) (0.33) (0.41) (0.07)
Net Income/Total Assets 6.49* 3.56 -1.91 4.97 4.13 0.21 7.75**
(0.08) (0.28) (0.67) (0.11) (0.39) (0.97) (0.01)
Observations 658 658 658 658 658 658 658
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged bias Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
The table reports the results of Equation 1.4 with different specifications of the VaR bias. In column one and
two, the VaR bias has been calculated using a shorter and longer estimation window for the correlation of 150
and 400 days. In column 3-7, the VaR is calculated under the assumption the banks has a short position in the
broad asset class specified in the second row. The regressions include the lagged VaR Bias and is estimated
using the Arellano Bond approach. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. P-values are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table. 1.14: Short Positions, Hypothesis II
Window Short
Short Long Interest Interest FX Commodity Credit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1[Past Exceptions = 4] 17.52*** 16.37*** 1.074 1.179 20.26*** 12.91*** 6.106
(0.01) (0.00) (0.91) (0.86) (0.00) (0.00) (0.23)
Observations 432 432 432 432 432 432 432
R-squared 0.682 0.699 0.711 0.742 0.702 0.673 0.643
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Bias Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports the results of Equation 1.5 with different specifications of the VaR bias, the independent
variable. In column one and two, the VaR bias has been calculated using a shorter and longer estimation
window for the correlation of 150 and 400 days. In column 3-7, the VaR is calculated under the assumption
the banks has a short position in the broad asset class specified in the second row. The dependent variable is
a dummy that takes the value of one if the number of backtesting exceptions in the three previous quarters
equals 4.The regressions include the lagged VaR Bias and is estimated using the Arellano Bond approach.
Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table. 1.15: Omitting Time Periods
VaR Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Eq/A 1.355* 1.65** 1.25 1.15 1.45** 2.08*** 1.94*** 1.72**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.11) (0.19) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03)
Year Dropped 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2007-2009
Observations 656 612 605 601 598 596 593 483
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank
The table reports the results of Equation 1.4 for the full sample in column 1 and reduced samples
in the remaining columns. The years that have been dropped from the sample are specified in the
second line. The regressions include the lagged VaR Bias and estimated using the Arellano Bond
approach. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. P-values are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table. 1.16: Functional Form
Panel A: Leverage Ratio Panel B: Capital Ratio
VaR Bias VaR Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1’) (2’) (3’) (4’)
Leverage 1.35* 5.64** Capital Ratio 0.02 -2.91
(0.06) (0.04) (0.97) (0.33)
Leverage (log) 9.41** Capital Ratio (log) 3.16
(0.02) (0.60)
Leverage (squared) 0.05 -0.25* Capital Ratio (squared) 0.03* 0.14
(0.21) (0.10) (0.10) (0.21)
Observations 656 656 656 656 Observations 587 587 587 587
Panel C: CET1 Ratio Panel D: CDS Spread
VaR Bias VaR Bias
(1”) (2”) (3”) (4”) (1” ’) (2” ’) (3” ’) (4” ’)
CET1 Ratio 0.49 -2.91 CDS Spread -0.03 -0.10***
(0.29) (0.33) (0.14) (0.01)
CET1 Ratio (log) 0.03* CDS Spread (log) -5.78**
(0.10) (0.03)
CET1 Ratio (squared) -0.00 -0.14 CDS Spread (squared) 0.05 0.00**
(0.37) (0.21) (0.21) (0.01)
Observations 600 600 600 600 Observations 600 600 600 600
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Bias Yes Yes Yes Yes Lagged Bias Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table reports the results of Equation 1.4 using different functional forms of the equity variables. The regressions include the lagged
VaR Bias and estimated using the Arellano Bond approach. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. P-values are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table. 1.17: Effect of Stress Tests on the VaR Bias
VaR Bias
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
REFERENCE 3.296 -21.10*** -10.39
(0.60) (0.00) (0.30)
RESULTS -2.404 -9.472*** -10.39*** -2.310
(0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.60)
FAIL 4.730**
(0.03)
Observations 432 432 255 255 255 177 177
R-squared 0.775 0.774 0.799 0.798 0.799 0.785 0.781
Sample US+EU US+EU US US US EU EU
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Y-Q Y-Q Y-Q Y-Q Y-Q Y-Q Y-Q
The table reports the results of Equation 1.4 with additional dummy variables. REFERENCE
equals one if the end-of-quarter balance sheet is used as reference for a stress test in that quarter
t for bank i. RESULTS equals one if stress test results are published in that quarter t for a
bank i. FAIL takes the value of one if a bank did not pass every component of the test. The
US sample consists of the Citi Group, Goldman Sachs, J.P.Morgan and the Bank of New York
Mellon. The EU sample includes the Deutsche Bank, ING, Banco Santander, Nordea and the BNP.
The regressions include the lagged VaR Bias and estimated using the Arellano-Bond approach.
Standard errors are clustered at the year-quarter level. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***,
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table. 1.18: Equity Scarcity II: Alternative Estimation Window for VaR Bias
Panel A: Book Equity/Total Assets
VaR Bias (alt)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eq/A 3.11** 2.90** 3.01** 3.01*** 4.16*** 1.30*
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (<0.00) (<0.00) (0.06)
Observations 674 674 674 674 674 656
R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.66 0.74
Panel B: Capital Ratio
VaR Bias (alt)
(1’) (2’) (3’) (4’) (5’) (6’)
Capital Ratio 1.12 0.94 0.74 0.74 1.02 0.25
(0.16) (0.20) (0.37) (0.11) (0.14) (0.62)
Observations 601 601 601 601 601 587
R-squared 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.66 0.75
Panel C: Capital Tier 1 Ratio
VaR Bias (alt)
(1”) (2”) (3”) (4”) (5”) (6”)
CET1 Ratio 0.76 0.67 0.35 0.35 0.99 0.46
(0.38) (0.42) (0.71) (0.57) (0.17) (0.32)
Observations 616 615 615 615 615 600
R-squared 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.67 0.77
Panel D: CDS Spreads
VaR Bias (alt)
(1” ’) (2” ’) (3” ’) (4” ’) (5” ’) (6” ’)
CDS spread (5y) -0.06** -0.07*** -0.08** -0.08*** -0.09* -0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (<0.00) (0.08) (0.05)
Observations 535 527 527 527 527 515
R-squared 0.48 0.30 0.30 0.68 0.75
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Bank Bank Y-Q Bank Bank
Weightening Equal Equal Equal Equal VaR Equal
The table reports the results of Equation 1.4. The vola variables capture the annual-
ized volatility of the risk indices in region of the bank’s headquarters. Undiversified
VaR is the sum of the broad asset class VaRs but net of diversification between
them. Column 6 shows the coefficient of the Arellano-Bond estimation. P-values
of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table. 1.19: Equity Scarcity III: DCC Correlation
Panel A: Book Equity/Total Assets
VaR Bias (DCC)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Eq/A 2.03** 1.35 1.40 1.40 2.44** 0.58
(0.05) (0.28) (0.26) (0.10) (0.03) (0.42)
Observations 653 653 653 653 653 634
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.55 0.51
Panel B: Capital Ratio
VaR Bias (DCC)
(1’) (2’) (3’) (4’) (5’) (6’)
Capital Ratio 0.61 0.68 0.90 0.90 0.96 -0.26
(0.56) (0.39) (0.31) (0.25) (0.15) (0.62)
Observations 601 601 601 601 601 579
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.45 0.52
Panel C: Capital Tier 1Ratio
VaR Bias (DCC)
(1”) (2”) (3”) (4”) (5”) (6”)
CET1 Ratio 0.76 1.34 1.48 1.48* -0.36 0.01
(0.55) (0.17) (0.31) (0.09) (0.83) (0.98)
Observations 616 615 615 615 615 580
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.30 0.43 0.59
Panel D: CDS Spreads
VaR Bias (DCC)
(1” ’) (2” ’) (3” ’) (4” ’) (5” ’) (6” ’)
CDS spread (5y) -0.02 -0.02 -0.10** -0.10*** -0.06*** -0.03
(0.63) (0.53) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.28)
Observations 535 527 527 527 527 495
R-squared 0.44 0.37 0.44 0.51 0.60
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Vola Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SE Bank Bank Bank Y-Q Bank Bank
Weightening Equal Equal Equal Equal VaR Equal
The table reports the results of Equation 1.4. The vola variables capture the
annualized volatility of the risk indices in region of the bank’s headquarters.
Undiversified VaR is the sum of the broad asset class VaRs but net of diver-
sification between them. Column 6 shows the coefficient of the Arellano-Bond
estimation. P-values of the coefficients are reported in parentheses. ***, **,
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Figures
Figure 1.1: Aggregated Reported vs Empirical Diversification Share over Time
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The figure depicts the evolution of the aggregate reported and empirical diversification share,
i.e. the fraction of the undiversified VaR that is offset by between asset class correlation. The
solid line represents the reported diversification, the dashed line the empirical counterpart.
If the reported diversification is above (below) the counterfactual diversification, the bank
underreports (overreports) its VaR relative to the benchmark.
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Figure 1.2: Difference Reported vs Empirical VaR - Bank Level
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(h) Citigroup
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Figure 1.2: Difference Reported vs Empirical VaR - Bank level (cont.)
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The figures depict the four month moving average of the reported and counterfactual diver-
sification shares, i.e. the fraction of the undiversified VaR that is offset by between asset
class correlation. The solid lines represent the reported diversification, dashed lines the
empirical counterpart. If the reported diversification is above (below) the counterfactual
diversification, the bank underreports (overreports) its VaR relative to the benchmark.
63
Figure 1.3: VaR Bias and Volatility over Time
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The figure plots the evolution of the four quarter moving average of the VaR bias and the
volatility of the risk indices over time.
Figure 1.4: Changes in Correlation Matrix vs Changes in the VaR bias
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The figure plots the absolute changes in the VaR bias on the y-axis against the changes
in the empirical correlation matrix on the x-axis. Changes in the correlation matrix are
calculated as the square root of the squared element-wise differences.
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Figure 1.5: VaR Backtesting Exceptions
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The total number of reported backtesting exceptions by all banks in the sample that report
backtesting exceptions in a quarter.
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CHAPTER 2
HOW DOES THE DODD-FRANK ACT AFFECT
ISSUER RATINGS AND RATING REPORTS?
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Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have been a long-standing subject of criticism. How-
ever, until the most recent financial crisis, they remained largely out of the regulatory
scope. After they had severely misjudged the credit quality of structured finance products
in the advent of the financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) imposed a stricter regula-
tion on CRAs. As one of the most important changes introduced by the regulation, CRAs
no longer enjoy full protection from the freedom of speech for their ratings and are now
more likely to be held liable for their ratings. The chapter provides insights on the effect
of the new regulation in general and the increased liability in particular on one of the most
important business lines of CRAs: Issuer ratings. Since the refinancing costs and thereby
real investment decisions depend heavily on issuer ratings, understanding whether and
how regulation might bias ratings is essential. The effect of increased liability on rating
accuracy is ambiguous: On the one hand, it might induce a higher due-diligence effort by
CRAs, on the other hand it might induce a downwards bias in the ratings as penalties
are likely to occur only for overly optimistic ratings (Goel and Thakor, 2011). Two dis-
tinct approaches are taken to evaluate the impact of the new regulation. First, I assess
whether CRAs are more conservative in the assignment of ratings after the Dodd-Frank
Act (DFA) in the sense that they now assign lower ratings than before. Second, I take
a novel approach and examine the information content of rating reports, which are brief
explanations published by the CRAs that explain their rating decision.
To examine whether CRAs assign lower ratings after the DFA, I evaluate their rat-
ings against market-based counterfactuals. If CRAs do indeed rate issuers lower to pro-
tect themselves against increased liability, they should lower their ratings relative to the
market-based risk measures, which are unaffected by the regulation. Namely, I evaluate
the rating levels against the equity-implied probability of default (PD), the CDS-implied
PD and a PD calculated using the Campbell et al. (2008) failure score. This approach
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can be understood as an extension of Dimitrov et al. (2015), who look at bond ratings but
do not explicitly control for the market assessment of risks. Like Dimitrov et al. (2015),
I find a downward bias in the rating level - even after controlling for market-based risk
measures. However, the results are not robust. For example, the effect vanishes if the
sample period is shortened. In addition, I find little evidence that the lead-lag structure
between ratings and the other risk measures is changed by the DFA. This part of the
chapter connects to three strands of literature. First, it relates to the literature on the
variation of ratings standards over time (Alp, 2013; Cheng and Neamtiu, 2009). Second,
I build on prior work on the relationship between market-based risk measures and credit
ratings (Hilscher and Wilson (2016)). Lastly and most importantly, I add to the litera-
ture on the effect of regulation on credit ratings (Dimitrov et al., 2015; Jankowitsch et al.,
2015; Varmaz et al., 2015).
Furthermore, I provide a different perspective on the effects of regulation on ratings by
looking a rating reports. Rating reports are published by CRAs and provide the rationale
of a rating decision. To the best of my knowledge, the text at hand is the first to
explore these reports. Looking at rating reports is interesting from several angles. Most
importantly, it provides a novel perspective on the market reaction to rating changes.
While a large strand of the literature assesses the information content of rating actions
in general - see among others Hand et al. (1992); Norden and Weber (2004b); Fieberg
et al. (2016), but relatively little has been done to explain market reactions. So far, the
literature explains reactions either with anticipation by the market or by irrelevance of
the rating itself. Rating reports and the information contained in them might explain the
variation in the market reaction. As these reports are likely to be vital in any law suit
against CRAs, they might provide valuable insight on how the regulation affects ratings
and the reaction to ratings.
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The increased liability for their ratings could incentivise CRAs to adopt a more careful
language or publish more information of their due-diligence to provide as little attack
surface as possible for law suits. A more careful or ambiguous language, in turn, decreases
the informational value of the rating report in particular and rating decisions in general.
My hand-collected sample consists of more than 14,000 reports on issuer rating actions
published by Moody’s between September 2006 and September 2014. Indeed, I find that
the wording of reports appears to be more forward-looking and more cautiously worded
after DFA. I explore the effects of the wording on market reactions approximated by the
cumulative abnormal returns after the publication for a subset of 3,875 reports. I find
that the wording of the reports does indeed explain the market reactions. Reports with
a high fraction of forward-looking and precise words appear to be connected with higher
informational value of the report.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In section 2.1, I describe the new
regulation for the CRAs. The evolution of agency ratings vis-à-vis market counterfactuals
is examined in section 2.2. Rating reports are investigated in section 2.3. Section 2.4
provides a conclusion.
2.1 The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies
The existence of CRAs as private watchdogs dates back to the emergence of the railroad
bond market in the U.S. at the turn of the last century (Sylla, 2002). Until recently,
CRAs remained largely out of the focus of regulators. A summary of the regulation of
CRAs before the recent financial crisis is provided by Coskun (2008). The “big bang”
of the regulatory use of credit ratings in financial markets was the introduction of the
Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO) status in 1975, when
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the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) allowed broker-dealers to use credit rat-
ings from NRSRO for the calculation of regulatory capital. In 1986, the SEC included
references to NRSROs into the Investment Company Act and limited the possibility of
portfolio managers to invest in securities with ratings from NRSROs below certain thresh-
olds. Effectively, this regulation has created the institution of credit ratings as they are
known today. It is noteworthy that there were no specific legal standards determining the
qualification of a CRA as a NRSRO at this point. It was rather the experience of the SEC
which led to the development of a few informal standards. Most importantly, a CRA had
to be “nationally recognized” in the U.S., which effectively created entry barriers for new
market participants in the rating market (Coskun, 2008, p. 270). With the lax regulation
and protection from competition, the CRA business prospered in the decades following
the adoption of the NRSRO standard.
The large accounting and auditing scandals at the beginning of the new millennium
caused some doubts about the practice of CRAs and their role before the collapse of Enron
and WorldCom. As the Sarbanes and Oxley Act in 2002 did overhaul the regulation of
auditors but not of CRAs, the pressure on the government and regulators to review the role
and function of credit ratings mounted. This renewed political interest in CRAs eventually
led to the Credit Rating Agency Act in 2006. This reform created new standards for
the qualification as a NRSRO. Specifically, it was the first legislation to require CRAs
to disclose ratings performance, methodologies and potential conflicts of interest. Most
importantly, the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act was intended to foster competition
among CRAs by making it easier to apply for the NRSRO status.1
Finally, the overhaul of financial regulation following the outburst of the subprime
1It is debatable, whether competition increases the efficiency of the ratings market. Bolton et al.
(2012) show that a duopoly or even a monopoly can be more efficient under the current standard of
issuer-paid ratings, as more competition may also increase the incentive for rating-shopping.
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crisis has profoundly affected the business of CRAs. CRAs have been accused of having
produced inflated ratings for structured finance products, in particular mortgage-backed-
securities (Ashcraft et al., 2010; Griffin and Tang, 2012). In July 2010, the DFA was
introduced as a complete overhaul of U.S. financial regulation. As such, it contains specific
new regulations regarding the business of CRAs.2 The reforms in this area can be divided
into two pillars. The first pillar is a sequel of the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act,
as it consists of measures which are intended to increase the transparency of CRAs and
strengthen the integrity of credit ratings as an institution in financial markets. The
pillar-one rules directly assign CRAs to the supervision of the SEC, which has established
an Office of Credit Ratings. Under these rules, CRAs must strengthen internal controls,
implement compliance rules to manage conflicts of interest, fulfil specific requirements with
regard to rating methodology and are subject to enhanced disclosure duties (PWC, 2010).
Subsection C, Rule 932 of the DFA, requires that agencies report, inter alia, information
about the credit rating uncertainty (e.g. limited data availability or bad data quality),
limitations of the rating (i.e. whether certain risk types are not considered) and potential
conflicts of interest. Moreover, the DFA goes one important step further as it is the first
legislation to define specific fines and penalties, which the SEC can impose on CRAs if
they fail to comply with the regulations. Most important for the empirical investigation of
this chapter is the second pillar of the DFA rules for CRAs, which makes the agencies liable
for their rating decisions. Before the introduction of the DFA, plaintiffs had to prove that
CRAs had knowingly issued false ratings or recklessly neglected accuracy. Now, plaintiffs
must only prove that the CRA has failed to conduct a “reasonable investigation” of the
security (Dimitrov et al., 2015, p. 7). This is a substantial relaxation of the burden of
proof, which effectively takes the shield of freedom of speech and expression away from
2A brief summary of the DFA regulation regarding CRAs is available on the SEC website:
https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/creditratingagencies.shtml
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CRAs. Furthermore, the DFA makes CRAs liable as experts under Securities Act Section
11 for material misstatements/omissions relating to their ratings (Section 939G). This
provides investors with a private right of action against CRAs in a similar fashion as
such actions are possible against accountants and security analysts. The magnitude of
the DFA became most visible in the asset-backed securities market. As a reaction to
the increased liability, CRAs refused to allow issuers to include their ratings - which are
required for a public ABS offering - in registration statements or prospectuses and thereby
effectively froze the ABS market until this particular rule was suspended shortly after its
introduction (Carbone, 2010; Brody, 2010). Though the regulation on issuer ratings is
less severe, this example shows that CRAs do care about being liable for their ratings.
Regulatory changes for CRAs after the global financial crisis are not confined to the
USA. In Europe, the European Commission conducted a thorough investigation of the
development of the credit rating market from January 2007 onwards. However, newly
introduced regulatory measures concern mainly competition, supervision and disclosure
rather than liability. For example, the European Securities and Markets Authority was
granted exclusive supervision powers over CRAs registered in the EU, including the sub-
sidiaries of Fitch Ratings, Moody’s and S&P. Crucially, no major regulatory change took
place around July 2010 and the new European regulatory measures are minor compared
to the DFA.3
In the following two sections I investigate the impact of the DFA as a comprehensive
regulatory overhaul on the corporate policy of CRAs. Extending the work of Dimitrov
et al. (2015), I begin with an analysis of the relations between alternative credit risk
indicators (the counterfactual) and credit ratings. In section 2.3, I explore new territories
and investigate the impact of the regulation on rating reports.
3An overview over the regulatory changes can be found on the website
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/rating-agencies/index_en.htm.
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2.2 Market Counterfactual
2.2.1 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Over the course of only a few years, CRAs have transitioned from being “lightly to highly
regulated” (PWC, 2010). Especially the possibility of fines and penalties as well as the
increased liability imposed from the DFA are expected to influence the rating policy of
CRAs. In my investigation about the impact of the DFA on issuer ratings, I follow the
literature on the variation of rating standards over time. This is a rather young, but
quickly growing body of literature. Looking at ratings from 1985 to 2007, Alp (2013)
finds that CRAs become more rigid after the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. For
given firm characteristics, the rating in 2007 was 1.5 notches lower than in 2002. This
interpretation is supported by Cheng and Neamtiu (2009), who show that ratings are
more accurate and less volatile after the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. From a
theoretical perspective, Opp et al. (2013) examine how rating-contingent regulation affects
rating standards. Using a repeated game setup, Opp et al. (2013) show that regulatory
usage of ratings decreases the informativeness of ratings if the advantage of having a
favourable rating is high enough. ? find that competitive pressure causes ratings inflation.
Using the entry of Fitch to the rating market as a natural experiment, the authors are
able to show that the incumbent agencies - Moody’s and S&P - assign higher ratings in
industries with a high Fitch market share. With regard to the DFA, Goel and Thakor
(2011) from a theoretical and Dimitrov et al. (2015) from an empirical perspective discuss
two hypotheses: First, the disciplining hypothesis suggests that ratings have become more
accurate after the DFA in order to avoid penalties and lawsuits. Obviously, this was the
intention of the regulatory overhaul. Second, the risk avoidance hypothesis implies that
the regulation has an adverse effect on the quality of credit ratings by incentivising CRAs
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to produce downward biased ratings. The logic behind this presumption is that CRAs
are now punished for ratings which are too optimistic, but not for ratings which are too
pessimistic. For instance, assigning an investment grade rating to an issuer that defaults
shortly afterwards is likely to be much more costly than denying a relatively sound firm
an investment grade rating.
The accuracy of credit ratings, which is the variable of interest with respect to the
Dimitrov et al. (2015) disciplining hypothesis, is usually examined using information about
defaults and market reactions. Since data about corporate defaults is relatively hard to
come by and also difficult to handle empirically, the literature focusses on the reactions
of bond and stock prices to rating announcements (Dimitrov et al., 2015; Jankowitsch
et al., 2015; Varmaz et al., 2015) before and after the introduction of DFA. Dimitrov et al.
(2015) analyse the reaction of bond prices to rating changes and they report no evidence of
increased bond rating informativeness after the introduction of the DFA. On the contrary,
abnormal bond returns to rating changes are lower after the DFA than before. However,
Jankowitsch et al. (2015) find that rating changes do evoke stronger market reactions after
the introduction of the DFA. For the equity market, Bedeno et al. (2016) find that credit
ratings have an increased information content in the aftermath of reputational shocks
suffered by CRAs. Dimitrov et al. (2015) investigate the risk avoidance hypothesis using
an ordered logistic regression model. Controlling for a number of firm-specific balance
sheet and stock performance variables, they show that issue rating levels have decreased
after the regulatory overhaul. Hence, they conclude that the introduction of the DFA
has not improved the accuracy of ratings, but instead led to a downward bias of ratings
and lower informational value of rating changes induced by the risk avoiding behaviour
of CRAs.
The analysis of Dimitrov et al. (2015) suffers from two drawbacks. First, their logistic
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regressions lack adequate control variables for firm-specific credit risk. It is possible
that the detected downward bias of credit ratings is a consequence of overall decreasing
credit risk or the perception thereof and not an effect of the regulatory overhaul. I
follow the relatively novel literature on the relationship between ratings and alternative,
market-based credit risk measures in my assessment of the impact of the DFA on issuer
ratings. The findings of this string of literature are twofold: Market-based measures
tend to precede rating actions and preserve in large the ordering of riskiness implied by
the ratings (Hull et al., 2004; Norden and Weber, 2004b). In other words, the market-
based risk measure of a highly rated issuer is likely to indicate a lower riskiness than
the one of a lower-rated rated issuer. I verify this relationship later in this chapter.
Performance-wise, Hilscher and Wilson (2016) show that reduced form default risk models
outperform credit ratings in forecasts of corporate defaults. Because of the substantial
model risk and degrees of freedom in modelling credit risk, I control for firm-specific
credit risk using several established credit risk models rather than relying on a single
model. Namely, I evaluate the evolution of ratings against the development of the equity-
implied PD, a failure probability calculated using a model of Campbell et al. (2008) with a
calibration of Hilscher and Wilson (2016) and the CDS-implied PD. Second, the sample of
Dimitrov et al. (2015) contains credit ratings from 2006-2012 and thereby encompasses the
peak of credit risk during the financial crisis of 2008 and the following decline of credit
risk. This pattern is illustrated in Figure 2.3 for issuer ratings and other measures of
credit risk, which are explained in the subsequent section in greater detail. Moreover, the
evolution of credit risk over time is closely related to the trend in several macroeconomic
variables, which are graphically illustrated in Figure 2.3. The slump in Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) growth in 2008 was accompanied by a drastic increase in the implied
volatilities as measured by the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX), a common measure for
the overall market volatility and often dubbed “fear index”. The years following 2009
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constitute a period of normalisation. It is also noteworthy that financial markets have
been extraordinarily influenced by unconventional monetary policy, so called credit easing,
in this time period. These overriding factors are not satisfactorily addressed in the analysis
of Dimitrov et al. (2015) and I provide a more explicit control for them. If not specified
properly, a regression model might easily pick up a pre/post crisis effect rather than
pre/post regulation effect.4
2.2.1.1 Hypothesis Development
This section puts the hypotheses of Dimitrov et al. (2015) to an enhanced test by relating
both issuer credit rating levels and rating changes to several common credit risk measures.
Bond or issue ratings, which are used by Dimitrov et al. (2015), are more suitable to
investigate market reactions, as they are directly linked to the default risk of specific
securities. I use issuer credit ratings because they reflect the long term default risk of
firms (Standard & Poor’s, 2016), which is conceptually closer to the alternative credit risk
measures considered in this article. Plus, issuer ratings are not affected by security-specific
idiosyncrasies - such as collateralization, covenants or maturities - that might drive the
rating of a particular security. To assess the impact of the DFA, I test two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 The DFA has caused a downward bias of issuer ratings (risk avoidance
hypothesis)
Hypothesis 2 The DFA has prompted CRAs to produce credit ratings, which are more
in line with alternative indicators of credit risk (disciplining hypothesis)
Note that Hypothesis 1, H1, corresponds to Dimitrov et al. (2015) risk avoidance
4In general, CRAs claim that their ratings are “through the cycle”, i.e. do not reflect the state of the
business cycle, but rather focus on firm fundamentals. There is some literature, which supports this view
(Altman and Rijken, 2006; Amato and Furfine, 2004; Löffler, 2013). However, as shown in Figure 2.3,
there appears to be a cyclical pattern in the rating level.
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hypothesis. As such, it is concerned with rating levels. If it holds true, we should observe
lower rating levels after the introduction of the DFA, holding firm-specific credit risk
and macroeconomic conditions constant. The second hypothesis, H2, provides a novel
perspective on the impact of the DFA on credit ratings using rating changes. I estimate
likelihoods of up- and downgrades based on changes of firm-specific credit risk to pinpoint
which credit risk measures play an increased role in the rating decisions of CRAs after the
regulatory overhaul. Rating changes are interesting from two perspectives: Anticipation
of rating changes and reactions to rating changes.
Under H2, the disciplining hypothesis, I should observe changes to the lead-lag rela-
tionship between market-risk measures and credit ratings. With increased liability, CRAs
might want to align their ratings faster with market-implied measures to avoid accusa-
tions of unjustified optimism. One would therefore expect that higher order lags of the
market-implied risk measures have a lower impact on current rating changes.
2.2.2 Methodology
2.2.2.1 Credit Risk Measures
I employ several well-known credit risk measures as benchmark for agency ratings to elicit
a potential effect of the regulatory overhaul. Specifically, I use the Merton (1974a) model,
the risk neutral PDs implied by Credit Default Swaps (CDS) spreads, and the Campbell
et al. (2008) failure score. As all three measures capture the same quantity as the issuer
rating does - the probability that the rated firm is unable or unwilling to honour its obli-
gations - and because they are unaffected by the DFA, they can serve as a counterfactual
to agency ratings. These properties have been thoroughly evaluated in the literature. Wu
et al. (2010) provide a comparative analysis of all of these measures. Hilscher and Wilson
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(2016) and Bauer and Agarwal (2014) confirm the superior performance of the failure
score over credit ratings. Further, these measures are also highly practice-oriented.
Equity-implied default probabilities are calculated using the Merton (1974a) model.
According to the model, equity can be interpreted as a call option on equity and priced
accordingly. In this context, the book value of liabilities (Xt) represents the strike price of
the call option. The equity value is only positive if the value of assets (VA,t) exceeds the
book value of liabilities. Solving the model for the probability that equity has no value
yields the following equation:5
Equity PD = N
(
− ln
VA,t
Xt
+ (µ− 0.5σ2A)T
σA
√
T
)
Note that the actual volatility of assets, σA, is not directly observable. I adopt the
iterative method of Vassalou and Xing (2004) to pin down σA. The equity-implied proba-
bility of default is given through the cumulative normal density function, which is applied
to the negative of the distance-to-default. T is the time horizon of the default probabil-
ity. For all measures in this chapter, I normalise the PDs to describe the one-year-ahead
default probability.
CDS-implied default probabilities are calculated by adopting Duffie (1999)’s constant
hazard rate model. Assume that the probability of default in each period t is equal to
p(t) = 1− e−λt, with λ being the hazard rate. If fairly priced, the insurance against credit
risk in form of the CDS should be equal to the expected loss. Writing the recovery rate
as RR and the risk-free interest rate as r, the CDS spread can be written as:
CDS spreadt =
∑t
0 e
rt(eλ(t−1) − eλt)∑t
0 e
−(λ−r)t (1−RR)
5A more detailed description of the model is provided by Vassalou and Xing (2004).
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Observing the CDS spread, one can back-out the underlying hazard rate and thereby
the default probability. I set the recovery rate (RR) equal to the conventional level of 40%
and solve for λ numerically. CDS spreads are available for different tenors, restructuring
clauses and seniorities. To mitigate the effect of liquidity on the spread, I pick the five
year, senior CDS spreads with the modified restructuring clause as it represents the most
liquid tenor, restructuring and seniority combination. Again, I annualize the implied CDS
PD to make this measure comparable with the other models.
The failure score (F-Score) proposed by Campbell et al. (2008) is based on a large
database on defaults, which are used to calibrate a logistic regression model with tradi-
tional accounting ratios and stock market data as explanatory variables. Note that this
predictor reflects real-world PDs rather than the risk-neutral probabilities captured by
asset prices. As I do not have access to the default data, I have to rely on a calibration of
the model provided by Hilscher and Wilson (2016). All of the used accounting ratios and
stock variables are well-documented and can easily be re-constructed using COMPUSTAT
and CRSP databases. Hilscher and Wilson (2016) estimated the model of Campbell et al.
(2008) for a set of rated, North American firms and a sample period ranging from 1986 -
2013.6 As my sample is comprised of very similar firms and the summary statistics of the
independent variables are similar to those of Hilscher and Wilson (2016), the obtained
default probabilities are not a perfect, but a valid proxy for the real-world default proba-
bility. In the remainder of the chapter, the resulting probability of default is referred to as
CHS PD. Appendix .1 contains a detailed description of the construction of this default
measure and the summary statistics.
6More specifically, the calibration of column 4, rated-only in Table 2 of Hilscher and Wilson (2016) is
used.
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2.2.2.2 Identifying rating policy changes
I relate agency ratings to these benchmarks in an ordered logistic regression model to
determine whether the introduction of the DFA prompted CRAs to assign lower issuer
ratings relative to the benchmark. The rationale behind the benchmarking is the follow-
ing: Unlike the agency ratings, the market-based risk measures are not affected by the
regulation. If the regulation does indeed influence the assigned rating levels, the mapping
of PDs into ratings should change. By using market perceptions of risk rather than mere
balance sheet variables, I am able to control for trends in the default risk common to
both ratings and my set of PDs, but not to the balance sheet variables. For example,
lower ratings might reflect a more negative outlook on future development that is not yet
captured by balance sheet variables. Further, more stringent ratings might not be the
results of a tighter regulation, but rather of a general shift of the judgement of default
risk. Therefore, looking at the evolution of ratings vis-à-vis other measures of default
risk is of paramount importance to test my research hypotheses. To foster comparability
with the literature, I use a similar specification as Dimitrov et al. (2015). Formally, the
regression equation for the rating levels reads as follows:
Numerical Ratingi,t+1 = α + β × DFAt + γ × PDi,t + ρ×Ki,t + φ×Xt + i,t. (2.1)
Numerical Rating is a numerical transformation of the alphanumeric credit ratings
with AAA=21, . . . , CC=1 for every firm i in period t. DFA is a dummy which takes the
value of one for every observation after July 2010 and zero otherwise. PDi,t is one of the
three above specified credit risk measures. I estimate one separate version of Equation
2.1 for every credit risk measure. Ki,t is the same set of firm control variables used by
Dimitrov et al. (2015). The vector of macroeconomic control variables X includes the
natural logarithm of the GDP, the VIX and the level of the S&P500. The coefficient of
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interest is β. If β is negative and significant, rating levels are lower after the DFA than
before. As one firm might experience several rating changes in the sample, the standard
errors are clustered at the firm level.7 Unit of observation in this regression is firm-
quarter. Though ratings are available at monthly frequency, the accounting ratios are not,
I estimate Equation 2.1 using quarterly data. Ratings are collapsed to quarterly frequency
by using the level of the first month in the quarter. To address possible endogeneity
concerns, I use the forwarded value of the numerical rating as dependent variable.
Lastly, I investigate the impact of the DFA on the policy of CRAs in more detail using
monthly data on upgrades and downgrades. The methodology closely follows the standard
literature on rating predictability, i.e. the lead-lag relationship between credit ratings
and other risk measures (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2010; Güttler and Wahrenburg, 2007;
Milidonis, 2013). To test predictability, I regress the rating changes on lagged changes in
the market-based risk measures (∆Impliedi,t−k). Formally, the model is captured by the
following equation:
Rating Changei,t =
6∑
k=1
κk × vRating Changei,t−k +
6∑
k=1
µk ×∆Impliedi,t−k
+
6∑
k=1
pik × DFAt ×∆Impliedi,t−k + ωi,t
(2.2)
where Rating Changei,t is the change in the issuer rating by S&P of firm i in year-
month t. The dependent variable can take five values. If the rating is lifted or reduced
by two or more notches, Rating Changei,t is set to 2 and -2, respectively. Changes by one
notch translate into a value of 1 for an upgrade and -1 for a downgrade. If the rating
7Clustering the standard errors at the year-month level or at the rating grade before the downgrade
generates marginally stronger results.
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remains unchanged in month t, Rating Changei,t is set to zero.8
∆Impliedi,t−k is the absolute change in the implied PD measure. To control for
possible autocorrelation in the dependent variables, the lags of Rating Changei,t are in-
cluded. To elicit possible changes to the lead-lag relationship, the interaction of DFAt
and ∆Impliedi,t−k are added. If markets anticipate rating changes - or, alternatively,
CRAs follow market sentiments - the implied PDs should increase before a downgrade
and decrease before an upgrade. Hence, µk is expected to be negative. The coefficients of
interest are pik. If the interactions of the implied risk measure and the post DFA dummy
DFA are significant and negative, the predictability of rating changes has increased. In
essence, equation 2.2 tests the predictability of up- and downgrades by changes in the
marked-implied risk measures, while controlling for possible autocorrelation in the depen-
dent variable. Note that unlike in 2.1, all the data items which are required to estimate
Equation 2.2 are available at monthly frequency. Hence, the unit of observation of Equa-
tion 2.2 is firm-month rather than firm-quarters . As before, standard errors are clustered
at the firm-level.
2.2.3 Data
2.2.3.1 Sample Construction
My dataset combines credit ratings by Standard & Poor’s (S&P) with balance sheet data,
stock data and CDS spreads. Monthly ratings and quarterly balance sheet data are taken
from COMPUSTAT. Stock data was provided by CRSP, CDS spreads by Markit. All data
was downloaded via the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). My sample period
spans from 2006 to 2014. Due to data availability of issuer ratings in COMPUSTAT,
8Looking only at actual downgrades centres the analysis on false negatives, i.e. rating changes that
happen but are not predicted by the model, while excluding false positives, i.e. predicted, but non
occurring rating changes.
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the analysis is confined to North America. The sample is constructed as follows: First,
all available firm-month rating observations were downloaded and merged with stock and
balance sheet data. I drop all firm-month observations for which not all balance sheet and
stock items were available. Notably, I thereby exclude all private firms from the sample
and keep only publicly traded companies. Second, I add CDS spreads from Markit. Since
CDS spreads are only available for a relatively small subsample, I keep observations with
no CDS data, but provide the baseline results for both, the full sample and the reduced
CDS sample. Finally, I drop firms with less than 12 observations, i.e. less than one year
of observations, as well as all financial firms from the sample.
The full sample consists of 1,595 firms and 20,271 year-quarter observations, i.e.
roughly 13 quarters or 3 years of data per firm. The CDS sample includes 448 firms
and 9,613 year-quarter observations. The higher average number of observations per firm
in the CDS sample can probably be attributed to the fact that firms with outstanding
CDS contracts tend to be larger and therefore be better covered in databases and may
have been existing for a longer time.
2.2.3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics of key variables. For better readability, implied PDs
are reported in basis points. The average numerical rating over the entire sample period
is approximately 11.37, which corresponds to an alphanumerical rating grade between
BBB+ und BBB. Figure 2.1 depicts the distribution of observed ratings levels, Figure
2.2 the distribution of rating changes. Most of the firms have a rating between BB-, the
upper bound of the non-investment grade ratings, and AA-. Note that there are only a
few observation at both ends of the rating scale. The equity-implied PD is approximately
6.57 basis points. Note that the distribution of equity-implied PDs is heavily skewed to
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the left and that the median equity-implied PD equals zero.9 The average CDS-implied
PD is 62.32 basis points. Unlike the equity-implied PDs, the CDS-implied PDs exhibit
a less skewed distribution. The median CDS-implied PD is 13 basis points, roughly one
quarter of the mean. CHS PD - the PD calculated using the methodology of Campbell
et al. (2008) - is larger than both, the equity-implied PD and the CDS-implied PD with
an average of 197.2 basis points for the full sample.
As a preliminary test, I report the pre- and post-DFA means of each variable. The
average rating increases slightly from 11.18 to 11.57, indicating a lower average default
risk. The implied PDs indicate a similar movement in default risk and dropped signifi-
cantly. The strongest drop is registered for Equity PD and CHS PD, which are decreased
by factor four. The drop in the CDS-implied PD is less pronounced. In order to de-
tect a downwards bias in assigned ratings, adjustment to the ratings must be of smaller
magnitude than the changes in the implied PDs.
To better understand the movement and co-movement of ratings and my benchmark
PDs, Figure 2.3 plots their evolution over the sample period. During the financial crisis,
the average rating drops by around 4% but recovers to the pre-crisis level by the end
of 2011. The market-implied risk measures inversely mirror the development, but with a
higher variability (Figure 2.3b). The average CHS PD and CDS PD rise to approximately
160% of the pre-crisis level in 2008 but drop sharply afterwards. Though the decline of
the CHS PD is faster than the decline of CDS PD, the levels converge at the end of the
sample period. Equity PD appears to lag behind the evolution of CHS PD and CDS PD.
After an initial sharp drop, the Equity PD starts and keeps increasing as the other PD
9It is well known that the application of the cumulative normal density function used to calculate
Equity PD leads to a miscalibration of this measure. In general, the distance-to-default tends to assume
very high values (zero PDs) for relatively risk-free firms, but can drop considerably during equity market
downturns even for very safe firms. For these reasons, the Merton (1974a) model usually delivers low
PDs (Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Hillegeist et al., 2004).
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measures drop.10 The positive yet imperfect correlation between PDs suggests that all
of my benchmark measures do capture - at least partly - the default risk of the issuer.
Eye-balling of Figure 2.3c suggests that the changes in the rating level as well as the PD
measures are correlated with the macroeconomic environment. Rating levels are low, if the
GDP and the S&P500 are low and increase with the implied market volatility, captured
by the VIX. This illustrates that the macroeconomic control variables are important in
the context of this study and have to be treated with care.
To establish the implied PDs as valid counterfactual, I visualize the relationship be-
tween agency ratings and PDs in Figure 2.4. The figure depicts the average implied PD
for each rating grade. To account for global time-varying effects, I follow Hilscher and
Wilson (2016) and subtract the median rating grade PD of each month from the firm-
specific PD. Figure 2.4 confirms that the relationship between ratings and CDS is stronger
than the relationship between ratings and equity-implied PDs. The overlap between the
PDs of the different rating grades is lower for CDS PD than for Equity PD. In particular,
there appears to be no or little difference between Equity PD for investment-grade firms.
Similarly, CHS PD exhibits starker differences between rating grades below the invest-
ment grade threshold. Despite the overlap, there appears to be an ordering of average
PDs that reflects the rating grades. I conclude that the market-based measure are valid
counterfactuals for the agency ratings.
10Explanations for this lagging behavior might be given by the distributional assumptions of the Merton
(1974a) model and the iterative estimation procedure. Due to the assumption of the cumulative normal
density function it takes a sustained decrease of equity prices to push relatively safe firms towards the
default point. Moreover, as I use one year of equity returns to initiate the iterative estimation procedure,
the high volatility observed during the financial crisis in 2008 passes through several iterations, leading
to the increase of PDs in the aftermath of the crisis.
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2.2.4 Results
2.2.4.1 Rating Level
Table 2.2 presents the results of the level regressions of Equation 2.1. The columns
report the coefficients for different sets of control variables and samples. In column 1, no
additional market-based PD is added, so the specification is equivalent to the Dimitrov
et al. (2015) main model for issue ratings (see their Table 3). In column 2 and 3, Equity
PD and CHS PD are added as additional controls. As CDS spreads are only available
for a relatively small subsample, I verify that the baseline results do also hold in this
subsample and estimate Equation 2.1 without additional PDs for this sample (column 4).
Eventually, I add CDS PD as a control variable in column 5. The coefficient of DFA, β in
Equation 2.1, is shown in the first row. In each specification, β is negative, i.e. suggests
lower rating levels after the DFA. Quantitatively, the coefficient ranges between -0.310
to -0.417 depending on the added control variables and is larger than the -0.171 found
by Dimitrov et al. (2015).11 Transformed into odds, the coefficients of 0.310 and 0.417
suggest that the odds of obtaining a lower rating are between 1.36 and 1.51 times greater
after the DFA. All of the firm control variables and the market-based risk measures have
the expected sign or are not significant. McFadden’s pseudo R2 ranges between 0.209 and
0.305, which describes a good fit for an ordered logistic regression (McFadden, 1977).
A key assumption behind the ordered logistic regression - the so-called parallel regres-
sion assumption - is that the effect of the independent variables is the same across the
different outcome levels. Put differently, one assumes that the effect of the regressors is
the same for each of the possible outcomes. For example, the effect of an increase of 1
bp in CDS PD on the probability of an upgrade has to be the same for firms rated AA+
11Dimitrov et al. (2015) use an inverse transformation of the alphanumerical rating scale, i.e. AAA=1,
. . . , CC=21. Hence, to make their coefficient comparable to my estimates, I have to switch its sign from
0.171 to - 0.171.
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and BBB+. For the particular setting of ratings, this assumption translates into equal
distances between the rating grades. However, especially at the investment-speculative
grade cut-off, this assumption is not entirely plausible. Further, as CRAs are more likely
to be sued for an optimistic rather than a pessimistic model, they might adjust their
policy primarily for lower rating grade (Goel and Thakor, 2011). I therefore conduct
the so-called Brant Test. Technically, the Brant Test estimates a series of binary logistic
regression models with the same set of regressors as in Equation 2.1. The dependent
variables in those regressions are dummy variables that take a value of one if the rating
is above a certain threshold and zero otherwise. The obtained coefficients are then tested
for similarity.12
The coefficients of DFA in each of the binary logistic regressions are shown in Table
2.3. The Brant Test suggests that the parallel regression assumption is violated in all
regressions in Table 2.2 at the 1% level, i.e. the effect of the DFA is not equal for all
rating grades. While the effect of DFA is strongly negative for most rating levels, it
switches the sign for very low and very high rating grades. However, as the number of
observations at the extreme ends of the ratings scales is low, these coefficients should be
treated with care. The coefficients tend to be more negative for low rating grades. This
suggests that lower-rated rated issuers are less likely to be upgraded compared to higher
rated issuers. Though there appears to be a jump at the investment grade threshold
(BBB- to BB+), jumps in the coefficient of DFA between adjacent rating notches are
not uncommon. To summarize, though the parallel regression assumption is violated and
the effect of DFA is quantitatively different across rating notches, the qualitative result,
rating levels are lower after the DFA, remains unchanged. The stronger effect at the lower
rating grades hints towards the prevalence of the risk avoidance hypothesis.
12For more details see Long and Freese (2014).
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Robustness tests and alternative specifications
The identification of the effect of the DFA hinges on the assumption that any pre/post
differences in the rating levels, which are not explained by the set of regressors, can be
attributed to the DFA. There is a number of developments which might have caused ad-
ditional changes in the relationship between credit ratings and alternative risk measures.
Most prominently, the pre-DFA period includes the financial crisis, whereas post-2010,
the economy bounced back. To minimise the impact of such contaminating events, a
three-pronged approach is taken. First, Equation 2.1 is estimated using a reduced sample
of four instead of eight years centred around the DFA. Second, instead of the post-DFA
dummy, I re-estimate Equation 2.1 with year-quarter dummies. This procedure is im-
plemented by replacing the DFA dummy in Equation 2.1 with t dummy variables, one
for every quarter.13 Looking at the coefficients of the year-quarter dummies provides an
alternative view on the potential effects of the DFA. If the DFA does indeed shift rating
levels downward, the coefficients for the year-quarter dummies should drop to significant
negative levels just after the introduction of the DFA or exhibit a downwards-sloping
trend from the DFA onwards. I repeat this procedure for each of the implied PDs to elicit
abnormal movements of the implied PDs and compare them to the movement of ratings.
Third, like Dimitrov et al. (2015), I test the effect of a series of placebo treatments by
shifting the commencement date of the DFA to the past and future.
Overall, the robustness tests cast considerable doubt on the detected relationship
between rating levels and the DFA. Results for the shortened sample period are presented
in Table 2.4. If the sample period is shortened, DFA becomes small and insignificant once
any of the market-based measures are added as control variables. Figure 2.5 visualizes
13Note that adding fixed-effects to a non-linear model might result in biased estimates due to the
incidental parameter problem. In brief, the incidental parameter problem states that adding fixed effects
to a non-linear model might bias the estimators (Greene, 2004). Though this bias primarily arises if fixed
effects for firms are added or in short panels, these results should be treated with care.
88
the estimated coefficients of the year-quarter dummies with confidence intervals for each
quarter in the sample. Panel (a) of Figure 2.5 shows the results for the baseline rating
model, the remaining panels show the coefficients for the implied PDs. For the rating
levels and Equity PD, one can observe a pronounced spike in the coefficients during the
crisis period and an inverse movement of the coefficients for the CHS PD. For CDS PD,
the coefficients remain fairly constant after an initial increase. For each measure, the
movement of the coefficients in the post-DFA period compared to the crisis period is
muted. This raises the concern that DFA in the baseline specification captures a crisis
effect rather than an effect of the new regulation. Finally, the placebo tests show that
every hypothetical start date before July 2010 generates a negative coefficient of DFA
(See Table 2.5). This might partially be attributable to anticipation as a first draft of the
DFA was published in July 2009 and a revised version in December 2009. Indeed, the
coefficient of DFA suggests, that the strongest differences arise if these dates are chosen
as start date of the post period. However, a negative coefficient for the July 2008 start
date - before any possible anticipation of the regulatory overhaul - suggests that other
effects drive, at least partly, the differences in ratings levels.
Further specification concerns are of a more technical nature. First, adding the implied
PD to the set of regressors might lead to multicollinearity. As the regressors explain
default risk captured by credit ratings, they should also explain market-based measures
of default risk. To check whether my results are driven by over-fitting, I re-estimate
Equation 2.1 with just the market-implied PDs and macro controls. As shown in Table
2.6 (Panel A), the coefficients of DFA drop significantly. For instance, it decreases from
-0.417 to -0.111 if only Equity PD is used as a regressor compared to the specification
with the additional independent variables of Dimitrov et al. (2015). Note however, that
the pseudo R2 drops to 0.0477 and thereby below the threshold for a good fit (McFadden,
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1977). For CDS PD the drop in the coefficient of DFA is less pronounced (-0.381 to
-0.258) but still substantial. The fit of the model with CDS PD is still reasonable with
a pseudo R2 of 0.12. I conclude that multicollinearity might lead to an overstatement of
the effect of the DFA, but does not change the results qualitatively. A further advantage
of using only the implied PD measures and dropping the quarterly accounting ratios is
that I can use firm-months as unit of observations instead of firm-quarters. Changing
the unit of observations decreases the coefficient of DFA drastically. For Equity PD and
CHS PD, the coefficient drops below 0.1 in absolute terms and even turns insignificant
for CHS PD. Again, the CDS model provides the best fit and the coefficient drops from
-0.258 to -0.164 (p-value: 0.096). I infer that, though the qualitative results carry over
to the monthly specification, the magnitude in some cases is reduced to near economic
inconsequentiality.
Second, I use a different variable to control for the business cycle. Namely, I swap the
natural logarithm of nominal GDP used by Dimitrov et al. (2015) for the GDP growth
rate. As shown in Figure 2.3c, the natural logarithm of the GDP shows a general upwards
trend - with the exception of the dip in 2008. Using the GDP growth rate, which does
not exhibit an upwards trend, as a control for the business cycle rather than the log
GDP appears to be more natural. If the GDP growth rate is used, the coefficient of DFA
turns positive or insignificant in each specification - except if Equity PD is included as
independent variable (See Table 2.6, Panel B).
Third, I account for market sentiments in the implied PD measures by regressing them
on the macro control variables and using the residuals as independent variable in 2.1. The
results are virtually unchanged.14 Overall, the specification tests hint towards a strong
sensitivity of the results to modelling choices. Especially the dependence on a particular
14Results are not reported for the sake of conciseness. Crucial coefficient change at most after the third
decimal place.
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definition of the business cycle and sample length cast doubts over the effect detected in
the baseline specification.
2.2.4.2 Rating Changes
In the following, I present the results regarding rating changes. Table 2.7 shows the
estimation results for the changes model (Equation 2.2). Because increasing risk should
yield decreasing ratings, the obtained coefficients should be negative. Odd columns report
the results for the full sample. Even columns hold the results for a reduced, changes-only
sample obtained by dropping all observations without changes. The first two columns
present the results for the Equity PD. This variable has very low predictive power for
rating changes. The obtained coefficients are small, mostly positive and most of the times
they are insignificant. The first regressions yield very low pseudo R2 (1.04% for the full
sample and 4,91% for changes only sample), but fall in the range of comparable studies.15
The results for CHS PD (columns 3-4) and CDS PD (columns 5-6) are stronger and
more in line with the expectations. All coefficients are negative or insignificant. The
significance of higher order lags suggests that rating changes are indeed anticipated by
the market up to five months in advance. Interactions between DFA and the PD-measures
are negative and significant for the second lag of CHS PD and the fifth lag of CDS PD.
The negative sign of these interactions suggests that a movement of the PD measure is
more likely to trigger a rating change after the reform. In other words, the agency ratings
appear to be more in line with market risk assessment after the introduction of the DFA.
However, if the sample is split in pre- and post-DFA periods, the R2 is larger in the pre-
than in the post-period. Moreover, in unreported binary logistic regressions with upgrades
15Though the R2 are in the region of Milidonis (2013) and Güttler and Wahrenburg (2007), they are
below the threshold for a well-specified ordered logistic model, which according to McFadden (1977)
shows R2 of about 20%.
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and downgrades as dependent variables rather than a common rating change variable, I
find that the model predicts downgrades better than upgrades in terms of R2, but none of
the interaction coefficients is significant.16 Overall, the evidence for an effect of the DFA
on rating changes is weak. Only two significant interaction terms indicate that CRAs
have adjusted their policy to be more in line with alternative credit risk measures, while
the majority of interaction terms remains insignificant.
2.2.4.3 Interpretation of Results
The DFA as a legal reform of the financial market was supposed to strengthen the integrity
of credit ratings as an important institution in financial markets. This chapter examined
the effects of this reform on S&P issuer ratings. In the first part of the chapter, I find
that - even after controlling for market assessment of default risk - issuer ratings appear
to be lower after the DFA than before. However, this finding is not robust to specification
changes: Shortening the sample period or using a different set of macroeconomic control
variables as well as significant effects of placebo treatments cast questions, whether the
baseline effect actually captures the impact of the DFA. The evidence for a changed
predictability of agency ratings is weak, but suggests that agencies are more sensitive to
changes in the market-implied PDs, even though the overall fit of the model deteriorates
after the DFA.
This section cannot address all questions to complete satisfaction and leaves questions
open for future research. First, the question how and whether the sensitivity of the
specifications detected in the battery of robustness tests carries over to bond ratings and
questions the results of Dimitrov et al. (2015). Second, the anticipation of rating changes
should studied at daily frequency. As the section uses only monthly rating changes, the
16Results not reported for the sake of conciseness.
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short-term adjustments of market sentiments around rating changes cannot be studied.
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2.3 Rating Reports
The DFA might not only affect rating levels, but also qualitative information released
by the agencies in rating reports. In fact, this effect is partly mechanical, because the
DFA increased the disclosure requirement for CRAs. However, these additional disclosure
requirements concern primarily technical details, such as the applied methodology or
possible conflicts of interest. More importantly, the increased liability might alter the level
of disclosure and framing of information which are private to the agencies or represented
some sort of judgement. As in the previous chapter, the effect of increased liability on
the information content is not clear-cut. On the one hand, CRAs might publish more
and/or more precise information to justify their rating decision. On the other hand,
CRAs might adopt defensive language to give as little leverage as possible to potential
law suits. The first alternative corresponds to the disciplining hypothesis postulated in the
previous chapter, the latter to the risk avoidance hypothesis. In this chapter, I analyse the
qualitative information released by CRAs with their rating decision. For each decision
- not only down- and upgrades, but also reviews, outlook changes, confirmations and
assignments - CRAs publish a brief report outlining their reasoning behind the decision.
I analyse a sample of more than 14,000 of those rating reports from Moody’s with natural
language processing tools to test for possible effects of the DFA on the wording and
thereby, by proxy, on the information content of ratings reports. My sample includes not
only reports on North American firms, but also reports on European issuers.17 Note that
the sample used in this chapter is entirely distinct from the one of the previous chapter.
An example of a rating report is provided in Appendix .2. On September 3, 2014,
Moody’s downgraded Frontier Communication Corporation, an American telephone com-
17I cannot differentiate between reports on Canadian and US firms. This might bias my results down-
wards as the ratings by Canadian subsidiaries of CRAs might not be affected by the DFA.
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pany. The report opens with a brief summary of the action, that was taken, followed by a
listing of the effects of the action on the different ratings. The most important part of the
report is the rating rationale, an explanation of the reasons behind the action taken. The
rationale contains information on the current development of Frontier Communications
(e.g. “Frontier has posted modest broadband subscriber growth over the past several quar-
ters”) as well as a forward-looking analysis of possible developments (e.g. “. . . Frontier will
continue to face price pressure. . . ”). These statements are not merely descriptive, but re-
flect assessments of these information by Moody’s. For example, Moody’s considered the
broadband subscriber growth as “modest”, not as “weak” or “average”. Similarly, Moody’s
considers a scenario of continuing price pressure as highly likely. This forecast could be
framed more carefully by adding “most likely” or “probably”. The toolbox of natural
language processing allows me to detect and quantify such nuances in the wording and
thereby enables me to examine changes in the wording over time.
The literature on the informational value of the wording of analyst reports is limited
and, to the best of my knowledge, non-existing for rating reports. Most closely, this
chapter relates to Huang et al. (2014), who examine the effect of the wording of sell-
side analyst reports on abnormal stock performance around the publication date. The
authors classify each sentence of the report along two dimensions. The first dimension
is the polarisation of the sentence: Positive, negative or neutral. Second, the sentences
are classified as either forward-looking or not forward-looking. The key finding is that
wording sentiments do matter and that price reactions are magnified, if the sentiment
is expressed in a forward-looking manner. In a broader sense, the chapter connects to
the literature on the information content of corporate filings, see among others Kothari
et al. (2009). The literature can be divided by their text classification approach. The first
group uses machine learning algorithms - for instance Huang et al. (2014) and Li (2010).
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In such an algorithm, a number of sentences in the sample are randomly selected and
classified by hand. These classifications are then fed to the machine learning algorithm
to classify the remaining sentences based on the similarity to the pre-classified sentences.
The second group - including Kothari et al. (2009) - uses a dictionary-based technique,
which assigns a sentiment to each word and classifies the text according to the frequency
of certain word groups.
This chapter adds to the literature by looking at the so-far unexplored rating reports
and using these reports to elicit effects of regulation on the information disclosure by
CRAs. I find that the wording of the reports is more forward-looking and nuanced, but
more vague for speculative-grade reports. As markets do value a more forward-looking
wording but dislike vagueness, the overall effect of the DFA on the informational value is
not clear-cut.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. First, the methodology of
detecting and quantifying changes is explained. The second section describes the download
procedure of the rating reports and provides summary statistics. In the third section, a
quantitative analysis of the impact of the DFA on the wording and the market reaction
to the wording are examined.
2.3.1 Methodology
2.3.1.1 Language Classification
To detect changes in the language of rating reports, I employ several text analysis methods.
Overall, I adapt two categories of classification measures: Frequency-based and sentiment-
based measures.18 Frequency-based measures examine the number and range of words
18For an introduction into practical text analysis see Miner et al. (2012) and Jockers (2014).
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used in a text, for example measures of length and lexical complexity. Lexical complexity
measures the range of different words used. They estimate the spectrum of word used,
but they do not capture the “sophistication” of the words used. For example, the addition
of the words “arcane” and “secretive” would affect the lexical complexity measures in
the same way, though “arcane” is arguably a more sophisticated or complex word. The
first frequency-based measure employed in this article is the word count of the report,
measured by the number of words in the rating report. A longer report should - ceteris
paribus - contain more information than a short one. For example, CRAs might provide
more information to substantiate their decision or outline future scenarios in more detail.
The second set of frequency-based measures contains two definitions of lexical complexity.
All measures of lexical complexity relate the number of different words used (“tokens”19)
to the total words of the text, but differ in the scaling of those components. Scaling is
necessary as the number of different words used is decreasing in the length of the text.
The reason behind the naturally decreasing lexical complexity is simple: Some words,
such as articles or pronouns, occur naturally and repeatedly in each text and cannot be
replaced by synonyms. As the literature does not identify a single superior definition of
complexity, I use a simple and readily interpretable, but possibly biased measure, the type-
token ratio (TTR) alongside a more modern, unbiased measure, the so-called “measure
of lexical diversity” (MTLD). TTR is defined as the number of different words used in a
text (V ) divided by the total number of words (N ): TTR = V
N
× 100. TTR is bounded
between 100
N
and 100. Larger values indicate a higher complexity. MTLD accounts for the
text length by splitting the text into so-called factors. A factor is defined as a sequence
of words for which the TTR of that factor is above a certain threshold.20 The MTLD is
then calculated as the total number of words divided by the number of factors. As for
19Broadly speaking, the linguistics literature refers to words as tokens. In the context of this article, I
use the terms interchangeably.
20Most of the literature uses a TTR threshold of 76. I uphold this standard.
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the TTR, higher values of MTLD indicate a more complex text.21
However, the length or complexity of a rating report is likely to be an imperfect mea-
sure of the informational value of the reports as words do differ in their strength and
connotation. Consider the following example: “Company A has been downgraded, be-
cause orders might decrease.” and “Company A has been downgraded, because orders
will decrease.” Though both sentences have the same length and complexity, they differ
significantly in their informational value as “might” and “will” suggest different levels of
certainty. CRAs can modulate the precision of their predictions by varying their language,
while leaving the lexical complexity unchanged. Such subtle differences in sentiments are
not captured by the frequency-based measures. Therefore, I resort to the Loughran and
McDonald (2011) dictionary, which provides a sentiment classification of words. In this
context, a “sentiment” of a word is a particular connotation or subjectivity that capture
the attitude of the text. For example, “brilliant” is likely to express a positive attitude
whereas “apocalyptic” expresses probably a negative attitude. As the usage of words is
highly situational, I use the specialised finance dictionary of Loughran and McDonald
(2011) that provides sentiments of words along eight dimensions: Negative, positive, un-
certainty, litigious, modal, superfluous, interesting and constraining. Two categories are
of particular interest in this chapter: Uncertainty and modal. The class “uncertainty”
collects words, which express ambiguity and vagueness (e.g., “approximate", “depend” or
fluctuate"). Modal words describe, inter alia, probabilities.22 Words classified as modal
can fall into three sub-classes: strongly modal (e.g., “always”, “definitely” or “never”),
moderately modal (e.g., “can”, “generally” or “usually”), and weakly modal (e.g., “almost”,
“could”, “might” or “suggests”). In addition to the Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictio-
21Intuitively, a more complex text has less factors as the TTR is not dropping and thereby a higher
MTLD. Note that the theoretical upper bound MTLD is the number of words. It is achieved if only one
factor can be observed, i.e. if the TTR never drops below the threshold.
22Other usages include obligations, permission, habits or tenses. However, with the exemption of the
use in tenses, the alternative usages should be uncommon in rating reports.
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nary, I use the classification of forward-looking words provided by Li (2010) and Huang
et al. (2014). Words of this class are associated with the description of possible future
developments and include words such as “envision”, “anticipate” or “project”. Rating re-
ports with more forward-looking words should contain more information and be therefore
more informative for forward-looking financial markets. Note that the classes are not
mutually exclusive, i.e. a word can belong to several classes. For instance, “perhaps”
and “maybe” are tagged as expressing uncertainty as well as being weakly modal.23 To
quantify the sentiment of the rating reports, I calculate the percentage share of words
from every particular category (uncertainty, modal and forward-looking) and examine
the development of this share over time. For instance, a report of 400 words and 10 words
from the uncertainty category, uncertainty would equal 10
400
× 100 = 2.5 pp.
2.3.1.2 Empirical Identification
The identification of possible changes in the wording of rating reports proceeds in three
steps. First, I explore differences over time in a simple regression framework with dummies
for the post regulation period (DFA). It is conceivable that the DFA did not only affect
ratings in North America (NA), but the global rating policy of the agencies. If this
holds true, one should observe a change in the wording of the NA and European reports
and not only of the NA ones. In a second step, the regression framework is extended
to a difference-in-difference model by adding the interaction of a North America dummy
(NA) and the post DFA dummy. Under the assumption that the new regulation affects
only NA ratings, the coefficient of the interaction captures the treatment effect of the
new regulation. Using the European reports as a counterfactual thereby serves as an
additional control for unobserved, time-varying effects that are common to European and
23Out of the 297 words in the category “uncertainty”, 26 are also weakly modal and two are moderately
modal. None is strongly modal.
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North American entities. In the third step, as the effect of increased liability is conceivably
asymmetric, the effect on lower-rated rated issuers is examined in more detail. Lowly rated
issuers are more likely to default and an erroneous rating decision has conceivably higher
repercussions. Consequently, rating agencies have stronger incentives to frame the report
more carefully for lower-rated rated issuers (Goel and Thakor, 2011). I therefore look
at reports on ratings in the speculative grade region in greater detail by introducing a
three-way interaction between the NA dummy, the DFA dummy and a speculative grade
dummy (spec). The full-blown cross-sectional regression framework of step three reads as
follows:
Texti = αt + β × NAi + γ × DFAt + δ × speci
+ η × DFAt × NAi + θ × DFAt × spec + κ× NAi × speci
+ λ× DFAt × NAi × speci + i,
(2.3)
where Texti is either a frequency-based or sentiment-based measure of rating report
i. The unit of observation is a single rating report.24 αt are year-quarter fixed effects,
NA is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for American rating reports and zero
for European reports. As before, DFAt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one
for post-July 2010 reports and zero otherwise. X is a vector of control variables. To
control for the macroeconomic environment, I include GDP growth and the inflation rate.
Standard errors are two-way-clustered at the rating action and the year-quarter.25 For
step one and two, the respective interactions are dropped from Equation 2.3.
The coefficients of interest varies from step to step. In the first step without any
24Some reports refer to rating actions on the same issuer. However, as for most of the firms only one
or two reports are in the sample, the within-firm variation cannot be exploited.
25The standard errors are adjusted as suggested by Cameron et al. (2011). Hence, I report the most
conservative estimates. Clustering the standard errors only at the rating action or year-quarter level
yields stronger results, but does not change the overall picture.
100
interactions, the coefficient of interest is γ, because it describes the difference in pre- and
post-DFA averages. Under the assumption that Moody’s adjust its rating policy not only
in the US, but everywhere, γ describes the treatment effect of the DFA. In the second
step, under the implicit assumption that the DFA affects only rating reports in NA, the
treatment effect is captured by η. Specifically, η describes the pre-post change in the
difference between NA and Europe of the text outcome variable. In the third step - if
rating agencies only adjusted their wording for speculative grade ratings in NA - λ is
the coefficient of interest. It describes how the difference between the wording of rating
reports on speculative grade ratings in NA and Europe is altered by the DFA.
To test the parallel trend assumption, Equation 2.3 is estimated with interactions of
year-quarter dummies with the NA dummy. The coefficients of these interactions capture
the treatment effect individually for every year-quarter instead of an average treatment
effect for the entire post-DFA period. If changes in pre-post differences are indeed driven
by the DFA, one should observe a pronounced movement of the coefficients around the
commencement date of the act. Formally, the following equation is estimated:
Texti = αt + β × NAi + γ × Postt +
T∑
t=1
µt × quarter× NAi + i. (2.4)
For each of the text outcome variable Texti, I plot the sequence of µt for the 15 trailing
and 15 leading quarters to visually examine the parallel trend assumption.
Finally, I relate the stock market reactions to rating announcements with the wording
of the associated rating reports. In a first step, I calculate the abnormal stock returns of
the related issuer around the publication date of the report. I employ a standard market
model and the event study methodology following Fama et al. (1969). I use an estimation
window of 200 trading days closing 20 days before the publication of each report. The
market return is approximated by the value-weighted return of the CRSP index. Formally,
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the market model reads as follows:
Ri,t = αi + βi ×Rm,t + i,t, (2.5)
where Ri,t and Rm,t denote the stock return of company i at trading day t and the
return of the value-weighted CRSP index on trading day t, respectively. Abnormal returns
are calculated as AˆRi,t = Ri,t − αi + βi × Rm,t and cumulative abnormal returns as the
sum of the abnormal returns around the event date: CARi,t =
∑l
k=−j AˆRk,t. The nature
of the setting constrains the choice of the event window. As this chapter focuses on the
informational value of the report rather than the action, the event window opens with the
publication of the report, i.e. j = 0. To avoid contamination with unrelated, overlapping
events, I choose a narrow event window of three days, i.e. the event window closes two
days after the publication (j=2). Note that CARj,t is a directional measure in the sense
that the sign indicates whether the new information is positive or negative. However,
the primary interest of this chapter lies in the magnitude of the reaction and not in its
direction. As the textual measure itself is not directional - an ambiguous language should
reduce the information content of both downgrades and upgrades - I use the absolute
value of the cumulative abnormal returns CARabs rather than the directional CARs.26 In
the second step, the absolute CARs are regressed on the wording variables derived above.
Formally, I use the following cross-sectional regression framework:
CARabsi = α + αi + β × Texti + γ × action+ δ × speci + i, (2.6)
where CARabsi is the absolute cumulative abnormal return of the related issuer j and
26Consider for example the case of strong modal words. For reports on downgrades, a high fraction
of strong modal words should lead to a more negative reaction. In contrast, if positive information -
such as upgrades - are framed using a very strong language, CAR should be larger. Therefore, I use the
absolute value of CAR as a measure for the magnitude of the reaction to the rating report as baseline
specification.
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Texti the text measure of the report. To control for apparent differences in CARs of the
different rating actions, action-type fixed effects are included. Year-quarter fixed effects
(αi) absorb time-varying unobservable as well macroeconomic effects. In addition to this
baseline specification, I estimate Equation 2.6 for downgrades and upgrades separately.
In this subsamples, I do not have to take the absolute value of the CARs, because the
expected direction of the CAR is the same for all reports in this sample.
2.3.2 Data
2.3.2.1 Sample Construction
Rating reports are publicly available on Moody’s homepage. I obtain and process the
reports in a three-step procedure. In the first step, the links to the single reports have to
be collected. The collection starts with assessing Moody’s homepage and setting search
criteria, such that the results are narrowed down to reports on NA or European corporates.
As Moody’s does not allow for a bulk download of these reports and the homepage must
be physically accessed to display the results, I resort to iMacros to navigate to the desired
page and download the HTML code of this page in an automated process.27 The links
to the individual reports in the code are then isolated using R. In the second step, the
HTML code of the single reports is downloaded using the wget function.28. In the third
and final step, the HTML code containing the rating reports is parsed into R and the rating
rationale is isolated. In particular, I remove disclaimers, notes on the methodology and
disclosures, as these parts might mechanically be affected by the DFA due to increased
disclosure requirements. Appendix .3 provides more detailed description on the three
steps.
27More particular, I use the Firefox Plugin of iMacros. A more detailed description of iMacros can be
found on http://imacros.net/
28The function is invoked via the Mac OS terminal. A description of the function can be found at
https://www.gnu.org/software/wget/.
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The title and text body of the reports are used to classify the report. First, I extract
the rating action from the title. This is possible, since Moody’s uses a narrow range of
words in its title and a rigid structure. Each title starts with “Moody’s”, followed by a
verb that signals the rating action. For example, the title always contains “downgrade”
or “lowers”, if the report describes a downgrade. Likewise, “raises” and “lifts” are used for
upgrades.29 Second, I classify a report as concerning a speculative or investment grade
issuer. I conduct a word search in the text body for the alphanumeric rating grade in
the main body. If the report contains any alphanumeric combination between Aaa and
Baa3, it is classified as concerning an investment grade issuer. Likewise, it is classified
as concerning a speculative grade issuer, if it contains any rating symbol Ba1 and C.30
Appendix .3 describes the classification algorithm in greater detail.
Matching the reports to stock data proves difficult, because the report does not contain
an identifier other than the company name. Using the company name as an identifier
is problematic, since databases differ significantly in the usage of abbreviations in the
company name. For example, Moody’s uses “LP” as abbreviation for a limited partnership,
whereas CRSP uses “L.P.”. Therefore, prior to merging, such abbreviations and type
indicators are removed. Using these reduced company names, I am able to match 3,875
reports, roughly 35% of all NA reports, to a company in CRSP.31
29See Appendix .3 for a full list of the trigger words.
30To avoid misclassification, I require a leading and trailing space around each combination. To avoid
confusion of the rating grade A with the capitalised indefinite article “A”, I require that A is not preceded
by punctuation mark.
31The matched sample is roughly representative for the full sample. The share of upgrades, outlooks
and reviews is higher in the matched sample. Assignments, downgrades and confirmations are more
frequent in the full sample. All differences lie in a range of five percentage points. The 3,875 reports
concern 828 issuers.
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2.3.2.2 Summary statistics
I choose a sample period of 33 quarters centred around the commencement of the DFA
in 2010q3, i.e. four years before and after the commencement of the DFA. Overall, the
sample includes 14,738 rating reports. 11,018 of those reports describe actions taken in
NA and 3,720 actions taken in Europe.32 The reports are, according to the type of action,
classified into six categories: Assignment, confirmation, outlook, review, downgrade and
upgrade. Assignments of ratings, i.e. the issue of a rating for a previously un-rated entity,
account for the largest share of reports (4,238 reports). The second most common rating
action in the sample are downgrades (3,602), which outweigh upgrades (1,835). Placing
a rating under review (1,495 reports) or changing the outlook of a rating (2,951) are
more common than confirmations of already assigned ratings (617). 2,527 of the reports
concern a investment-grade rating and 10,172 reports a speculative grade rating. 1,464
reports mention both, an investment grade and a speculative grade rating.33
Table 2.8 provides summary statistics for the textual measures in the upper panel.
On average, a rating report is approximately 400 words long.34 Out of those 400 words,
12 words or 2.9 percent of the word count express uncertainty. The entire class of modal
words accounts for 2.32 percent of the words, with strong modal words (Modal 1 ) being
the largest subgroup with 1.45 percent. Weak modal words occur only three times less
32I exclude 448 corrections and addenda to reports from the sample but keep the report they refer to
in order to avoid double counting. Further, I drop any report that concerns a particular issue rather than
issuers (2,536 reports).
33There are several explanations for such double-classifications. First, the rating might change from
an investment grade notch to a speculative grade notch (or vice versa). In this case, the alphanumeric
notch abbreviation of both grades occur and the report is consequently tagged as investment grade and
speculative grade report. Second, an issuer might have several outstanding issues with different ratings.
Third, the classification process itself might be noisy. 715 reports did not contain any alphanumeric
rating grade in the text body.
34Note the minimum of fifty words per report. Some of the reports could not properly be downloaded,
processed or read in R. In those case, non or only a fraction of the words could be read. I therefore drop
any report with less than fifty words. This criterion eliminates 86 reports, less than one percent of the
sample. Including these reports weakens the results only marginally.
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frequent with 0.55 percent. Forward-looking words according to Huang et al. (2014) are
more frequent than any class defined by Loughran and McDonald (2011). On average,
5.82 percent of the words used in a report are forward-looking.
The lower panel of Table 2.8 lists summary statistics of the cumulative abnormal
returns. Overall, the market reaction to a rating report is negative with a CAR of -
0.19 pp. As expected, the reaction to a downgrade is negative (-1.05 pp) and marginally
positive for upgrades (0.02 pp). This is in line with the literature that find a strong
response to downgrades but little reaction to upgrades (See among others Hand et al.
(1992)). The market reacts positively to assignments (0.15 pp), confirmations (0.04 pp)
and outlook changes (0.02 pp). Reviews of ratings are perceived as negative (-0.22 pp)
by the market.35 Note that outlook changes and reviews are not directional in the sense
that they can either indicate a more likely upgrade or downgrade.36
Table 2.9 shows the correlations between the key textual variables. As outlined above,
the word count is negatively correlated with TTR but exhibits nearly zero correlation with
the alternative lexical complexity measure, MTLD. Thus, MTLD alleviates the problem
of a mechanical negative relationship between length and complexity. Concerning the
different word groups, several interesting observations can be made. First, the correlation
between weak and strong modal words is almost zero. This suggests that weak and strong
modal words are not a priori substitutes, i.e. Moody’s did not use strong modal words to
replace weak modal words and vice versa. Second, the correlation between strong modal
words and uncertainty is negative. As strong modal words suggest high levels of certainty,
the positive sign is expected. Third, the occurrence of forward looking words is positively
35The average market reactions are small. This is not entirely surprising as my event window does
not capture stock movements in anticipations of rating changes. One of my major concerns was that the
reports were made public a few days after the decision. However, Moody’s asserted that the publication
date of the report and the decision is the same.
36My classification procedure does not allow for a consistent detection of the “direction” of the outlook
or review change.
106
correlated with the frequency of all modal measures and uncertainty. As all three classes
- strong and weak modal, and uncertainty - express varying degrees of uncertainty, the
positive correlation could be due to probabilities attached to different scenarios expressed
by the forward-looking words. Put differently, if Moody’s wants to provide more forward-
looking information, they have to use modal words of sorts to describe the possibility
attached to each scenario. Another reason for non-zero correlation might be that the
overlap between the classes is mechanical: As described above, the classes are not disjunct.
If a word occurs in both classes, a positive correlation is expected. For modal words, there
is no overlap between strong and weak modal words, whereas there is considerable overlap
between uncertainty and weak modal words.
Figure 2.6 depicts the evolution of the textual variables over time. Panel (a) shows the
average word count per article. The number of words per report remained fairly stable
in NA with around 400 words. Reports on European issuers are longer on average and
increase over the observation period from 440 words in 2006q3 to roughly 500 words in
2014q3. The word count drops shortly after the DFA, but bounces back in the subse-
quent quarters. The TTR increases immediately after the DFA for European and NA
issuers, indicating an increased lexical complexity. However, the alternative measure of
complexity, MLTD, does not detect such a shift. Therefore, the increase in TTR can
probably be attributed to the drop in length as shorter texts tend to mechanically ex-
hibit a higher TTR. Strong and weak modal words follow an apparently similar upwards
trend in both regions. Uncertainty fluctuates strongly before the DFA, but remain stable
afterwards. There is a jump in the quarter of the DFA, but the movement is similar for
NA and Europe and lies well within the variations observed in the pre-DFA period. As
the other variables, Forward exhibits a similar pre-DFA trend but after the DFA, the
fraction of forward-looking words in European reports drops sharply. Hence, changes in
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the difference of forward-looking words is attributable to a decrease in Europe rather than
an increase in NA.
2.3.3 Results
2.3.3.1 Changes to the wording
Tables 2.10 and 2.11 show results of Equation 2.3. For each dependent variable, I estimate
each of the three specifications described above. First, the regression includes only NA
and DFA dummies. Second, the NA × DFA interaction is added. Third, the triple
interaction NA×DFA× spec and the lower order interactions are added.
As suggested by eye-balling, NA reports are shorter and all reports are longer after
the DFA. However, the DFA does not have any unique effect on NA or speculative grade
reports as the interaction of NA and DFA is insignificant. After the DFA, rating reports
contain more complex wording, especially the reports on NA entities. These findings
hold true for both measures of complexity, TTR and MLTD. For both, the post-DFA
dummy and its interaction with the NA dummy is positive and significant. TTR is
approximately 0.3 standard deviations higher after the DFA, MLTD increases by 0.44
standard deviations. In the specification with the NA×DFA interaction, the coefficient
of DFA halves for TTR and turns insignificant for MLTD. I conclude that the increase
of complexity is primarily driven by reports on NA issuers. The triple interaction is not
significant, i.e. the effect is not unique to speculative grade issuers.
Regarding forward-looking words, no general change after the DFA can be detected.
However, reports on NA issuers contain a higher fraction of forward-looking words. The
NA × DFA interaction is positive and significant at the 1% level, whereas DFA in the
specification without interactions is insignificant. In terms of magnitude, the coefficient of
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0.99 of the interaction translates into an increase by 0.46 standard deviations. Again, the
triple interaction NA×DFA× spec is insignificant. Recall that the pre-post differences
are likely to be driven by a drop in Forward in European reports rather than an increase
in NA reports (See Figure 2.6).
For uncertainty, neither of the three specifications detects an effect of the DFA. Inter-
estingly, the positive coefficient of spec in the specification without interactions suggests
that rating agencies use a more ambiguous language in reports on issuers in the speculative
grades.
Finally, I examine the effect of the DFA on modal words. For the sake of conciseness,
I focus only on strongly and weakly modal words (Modal 1 and Modal 3 ) and ignore the
group of moderate modal words. Results of the intermediate group of moderately modal
words lie between those of strong and weak modal words. Strong modal words are less
common in speculative grade reports, whereas weak modal words are more common in
these reports. However, DFA is not significant at any conventional level for both the
fraction of weak and strong modal words. However, for both, the NA×DFA interaction
is positive and significant. This suggests that after the DFA, reports on NA issuers
contained more weak and more strong modal words. The general increase in the usage of
modal words could reflect a more detailed discussion of future scenarios or a more careful
description of the probability of the scenarios. Most interestingly, the triple interaction
NA×DFA× spec is negative for strong modal words (-0.38, p-value: 0.04) and positive
for weak modal words (0.31, p-value: <0.00). Hence, rating reports on NA issuers in the
speculative grade contain less precise and more weak modal words after the regulatory
overhaul. Note that the coefficients are of comparable magnitude. From this similarity,
it can be deduced that strong modal words have been replaced by weak modal words.
Moody’s appears to have used a more defensive wording for low rating grades.
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In Figure 2.7, I visually test the parallel trend assumption and verify that the DFA
is a possible explanation of pre/post differences (see Equation 2.4). For each textual
outcome variable, I plot the sequence of µk around the DFA. If the regulatory reform
does indeed affect the wording, µk is expected to change around the commencement of
the DFA in 2010q3. Both complexity measures appear to increase after the DFA. For
MLTD, a pronounced jump in 2010q3 can be observed whereas the increase in TTR is
more gradual. For strong modal words and uncertainty, µk changes only little around
the DFA. Contrarily, µk for weak modal and forward-looking words exhibit a strong
increase right after the DFA. I conclude from the jumps that the reform is indeed a likely
explanation for pre/post differences.
2.3.3.2 Market reactions
Results for the regression of the market reaction on textual variables are presented in
Table 2.12 to 2.14. Table 2.12 holds the results of the non-directional regressions with
CARabs as dependent variable, Tables 2.13 and 2.14 show the results of the directional
regressions for the upgrade and downgrade sample.37
First, I test whether the DFA affects the market reaction to rating reports. As dis-
cussed, increased liability might decrease the informational value of rating decisions. Un-
der the risk avoidance hypothesis, rating actions should become less informative as agen-
cies might downgrade issuers as a precautionary measure and might be more reluctant
to upgrade issuers to avoid law suits for underestimation of credit risk. Therefore, the
market reaction should be lower in absolute terms. Indeed, Dimitrov et al. (2015) find
this pattern for bond returns. In my sample, I can confirm this finding for abnormal
stock returns. The results in Table 2.12 show that the overall magnitude of the reaction
37I re-run the estimation with winsorized CARs. Using the 1% or 5% winsorized CARs does not alter
the results.
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to rating reports CARabs is lower after the DFA.
Furthermore, the positive coefficient of DFA in Tables 2.13 and 2.14 has very different
interpretations. For downgrades, this indicates that CAR is less negative, i.e. the market
reaction to downgrades is more muted after the DFA. In contrast, a positive coefficient
of DFA in the upgrade sample implies that reactions to upgrades are “more positive”,
i.e. the market reaction is stronger. This confirms the prevalence of the risk avoidance
hypothesis from a stock market perspective. To verify that the level differences can indeed
be attributed to the DFA, I use a similar procedure as before and regress the CAR
on year-quarter dummies. If the DFA affects the CAR, the coefficients of the year-
quarters should change around 2010q3, the commencement quarter of the DFA. Figure
2.8 depicts the sequence of coefficients for the full sample, downgrades and upgrades.
Neither specification exhibits a pronounced jump or a switch in trends, which suggests
that DFA is not necessarily the driver behind the differences in pre/post reactions to
rating actions.
Lexical complexity, measured by TTR and MLTD, does not affect the market response
to rating reports. The coefficients are virtually zero and not significant at conventional
levels. A higher fraction of forward-looking words increases the non-directional, absolute
CAR. A coefficient of 0.09 (p-value = 0.02) translates into an increase in CARabs by 0.12
standard deviations for a standard deviation increase in forward. Against the expectation,
a higher uncertainty increases the market reaction. It was expected that the market
reaction to a report should be smaller in absolute terms, if the wording of the reports is
more uncertain. However, a one standard deviation increase in uncertainty leads to an
increase in CARabs by 0.09 standard deviations. In line with the expectation, a higher
fraction of strong modal words (Modal 1 ) boosts CARabs. Put again in terms of standard
deviations, an increase of Modal 1 by one standard deviation increases CARabs by 0.03
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standard deviations. The fraction of weak modal words (Modal 3 ), does not impact
CARabs. Overall, despite the significance, the quantitative effect is small, if measured by
standard deviations.
For the upgrade and downgrade sample, I explore the directional effects of the textual
measures. For downgrades, none of the variables affects the CAR. The market reaction
to upgrades is more positive for reports with more strong modal and forward-looking
words. Again the effect is small in terms of standard deviation. A one standard deviation
increase in Modal 1 and Forward increases the CAR by 0.1 and 0.08 standard deviations
respectively. One interpretation of the disparities between up- and downgrades could be
that the market does interpret downgrades as binary signal whereas upgrades are judged
more carefully. On a more general note, it can be concluded that the wording of a report
is a proxy for its informational value.
To test whether the reports are perceived differently after the DFA, I estimate Equa-
tion 2.6 with interactions of the textual measures and the DFA dummy. None of the
interactions is significant and the coefficients of DFA do not change their sign. I conclude
that the DFA impacts the way reports are worded, but not the way reports are perceived.
Further, a test whether the interactions between the fractions of the different word classes
affects the CARs yields no results. Put differently, the effect of e.g. forward-looking words
is not conditional on the fraction of strong modal words.
2.3.3.3 Interpretation of results
The results hint towards more forward-looking and nuanced, yet more conservative word-
ing of the reports after the DFA. A higher lexical complexity might reflect a more precise
or situational use of words. Modal words, words expressing uncertainty and forward-
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looking words are more common in NA reports after the DFA relative to their European
counterparts. Overall, the increase of words of those classes could reflect a stronger focus
on future scenarios and a possible development of the issuer. This would lend support to
the discipling hypothesis under which ratings are made more informative. Recall that for
speculative grade issuers, strong modal words appear to be substituted by weak modal
words, i.e. the level of precision of the language is reduced. This asymmetric effect lends
support to the risk avoidance hypothesis.
However, not all of the word classes are relevant to the market. Of particular impor-
tance are strong modal words and forward-looking words. Higher abnormal returns for
reports with a high fraction of strong modal and forward-looking words indicate that these
reports contain more information than others. Combined with the finding of an increasing
fraction of strong modal words, this suggests that the DFA increased the informational
value of reports via the wording in general, but reduced information content in reports
on speculative issuers. Like Dimitrov et al. (2015), I find that abnormal returns to rating
actions are muted after the DFA. Though the DFA affects the informational value of the
reports positively via the wording, this effect does not offset the general trend.
2.3.4 Limitations and Extension
The research on the wording of rating reports is still in its infancy and offers rich envi-
ronment for future research. A potential route of future research is the analysis of the
time-series variation of the wording. As detected by Alp (2013), rating standards vary
considerably over time in reaction to regulation and economic conditions. This chapter
focuses on a relatively narrow sample period of eight years, but older reports are available.
Further, the analysis could be extended to reports from other agencies, such as Fitch or
S&P. Several interesting questions could be addressed. First, one could examine whether
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the wording of reports of different CRAs for a particular issuer is similar. Split ratings
- different ratings of a firm from different CRAs - are a well-documented phenomenon
(Ederington, 1986; Baghai et al., 2014; Bongaerts et al., 2012). One possible avenue for
future research is the extent to which such split ratings translate into different sentiments
in the rating report. Second, the wording could be affected by the competitive environ-
ment of the ratings market (?). Future research could examine how the entry of Fitch to
the rating markets affected the wording of the reports. Rating agencies might use more
favourable wording in a contested sector to appease the issuer.
The first limitation is the absence of firm-level controls in the main reports sample.
As the rating reports do not contain a firm identifier other than the name, merging the
reports with stock and balance sheet data is difficult. Recall, that I am only able to merge
stock data to a small subsample of the reports. However, adding stock and balance sheet
data to the full sample would open additional routes for future research. For example
one could analyse how the wording of the reports varies in the complexity of the firm
or a sector. For instance, it is expected that reports for more opaque firms are longer
and more important to the market. For my small sample, such explorations did not yield
meaningful results.
Another limitation of the analysis the reliance on the dictionary and sentiments pro-
vided by Loughran and McDonald (2011) and Huang et al. (2014). As Loughran and
McDonald (2011) themselves point out, the connotation of a word might be different in
an alternative setting. The reports have been written based on a limited set of words and
a very technical language which might be different from the language of the 10-k reports,
which are used to calibrate the dictionary of Loughran and McDonald (2011). An alterna-
tive method which would not rely on a pre-defined dictionary would be a machine-learning
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algorithm as in Huang et al. (2014).38
2.4 Conclusion
This chapter examines the effect of the DFA on issuer ratings. A crucial aim of the
new regulation was to improve the informational value of ratings. However, the existing
literature - namely Dimitrov et al. (2015) - finds that the regulation did not achieve this
aim. On the contrary, ratings have been found to be biased downwards and rating actions
are perceived less informative after the DFA. This chapter paints a more nuanced picture.
It confirms the finding of Dimitrov et al. (2015) for issuer ratings, though this result is
highly specification-dependent.
Concerning the rating reports, I document a more forward-looking and nuanced word-
ing after the DFA. For reports on speculative grade issuers, I find a substitution of strong
modal by weak modal words, i.e. CRAs use a less precise languages for those reports that
are most likely to trigger a law suit against them. I interpret these finding as evidence
that CRAs do release more information in their reports but frame those information more
carefully. The analysis of the CARs has shown that the market reacts to different word-
ings, especially to forward-looking and precise language. Hence, the overall effect of the
DFA on the informational value is ambiguous. For highly rated issuer, the effect is likely
to be positive as the reports contain more forward-looking information, for lower-rated
rated issuer the less precise language probably reduces the informational value.
38A pre-requisite of the machine learning algorithm is the isolation of sentences in the reports. However,
the splitting into sentences in R was error-prone. For example, decimal separators were recognized as
punctuation marks. Other programs and languages, such as Python or C, provide a better splitting
algorithm.
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Tables
Table. 2.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Full Sample Pre DFA Post DFA sig
Numerical rating 20,271 11.37 11.18 11.57 *** 3.24 0 21
Equity PD 20,271 6.57 10.99 1.84 *** 154.91 0.00 8565.99
CHS PD 13,156 197.20 409.63 104.40 *** 920.73 1.04 10000.00
CDS PD 9,613 62.32 70.32 54.41 *** 108.67 0.95 3454.31
OPERATING 20,271 3.45 0.03 0.03 *** 2.13 -3.84 12.04
LT LEVERAGE 20,271 30.69 30.80 30.58 18.79 0.00 104.82
TD LEVERAGE 20,271 33.85 34.11 33.57 ** 19.13 0.00 111.09
LOG MARKET 20,271 8.12 7.91 8.34 1.60 3.41 11.76
Beta 20,271 1.14 1.12 1.16 *** 0.56 -0.03 2.90
SIGMA 20,271 0.38 0.45 0.31 *** 0.24 0.11 1.59
INTEREST COVERAGE 20,271 7.37 7.33 7.41 *** 18.46 -5.31 216.53
VIX 20,271 21.43 24.36 18.30 *** 9.74 10.89 58.74
SP500 20,271 1350.22 1221.92 1487.68 *** 280.14 757.13 2012.91
GDP (log) 20,271 9.63 9.58 9.69 *** 0.07 9.53 9.78
GDP growth 20,271 1.18 0.39 2.02 *** 1.84 -4.06 2.96
Numerical rating is the transformation of the alphanumeric rating scale, with AAA=21,...,D=1. Equity PD
is the implied PD in the Merton model. CHS PD is the PD calibrated from Campbell et al. (2008) and
Hilscher and Wilson (2016). CDS PD is the PD priced into CDS spreads. OPERATING is the operating
margin, i.e. operating income before depreciation divided by total sales. LT LEVERAGE, the long-term debt
leverage, is defined as total long-term debt divided by book value of equity. TD LEVERAGE is the total
debt leverage, i.e. total debt divided by book value of equity. LOG MARKET is the natural logarithm of
the market capitalisation, calculated as the number of shares outstanding times the share price at the end of
a quarter. Beta is the CAPM beta estimated using the CRSP value-weighted index as benchmark. SIGMA
is the standard deviation of daily stock returns within a quarter. INTEREST COVERAGE is obtained by
dividing income before extraordinary items by the interest expenses. VIX is the CBOE Volatility Index, the
implied volatility of the SP500 over the next 30-day period. SP500 is the index value of the SP500 index.
VIX and SP500 are both available on daily frequency and are collapsed to quarterly frequency by taking the
average. GDP (log) is the natural logarithm of nominal GDP. GDP growth is the growth rate of the nominal
GDP.
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Table. 2.2: Rating Levels before an after the Dodd-Frank Act
Numerical Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
DFA -0.376*** -0.417*** -0.310*** -0.383*** -0.381***
(<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00)
Equity PD -0.00581***
(<0.00)
CHS PD -0.324***
(<0.00)
CDS PD -5.647***
(<0.00)
OPERATING 10.26*** 9.275*** 6.316** 14.56*** 5.186
(<0.00) (<0.00) (0.02) (<0.00) (0.12)
LT LEVERAGE -4.571*** -4.667*** -3.566*** -9.258*** -6.753***
(<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00)
TD LEVERAGE 1.391 1.776** 0.756 5.091*** 4.765***
(0.11) (0.04) (0.45) (0.01) (0.01)
LOG MARKET 1.056*** 1.010*** 1.056*** 1.182*** 0.841***
(<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00)
Beta -0.214*** -0.0940 -0.325*** -0.360*** -0.255**
(<0.00) (0.12) (<0.00) (<0.00) (0.03)
SIGMA -3.392*** -2.753*** -2.732*** -3.575*** -0.865***
(<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00)
INTEREST COVERAGE 0.00237 0.00111 0.00574 0.00918 0.0112*
(0.40) (0.70) (0.28) (0.10) (0.06)
Observations 20,271 20,271 13,156 9,613 9,613
Sample Full Full Full CDS CDS
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CDS Liquidity Controls No No No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.209 0.219 0.217 0.214 0.305
This table shows the results of the ordered logistic regression for numerical ratings, Equation (2.1). The
baseline model is equivalent to the model proposed by Dimitrov et al. (2015). In each case, the dependent
variable is the numerical transformation of the alphanumeric S&P issuer rating. CHS PD is the PD
calibrated from Campbell et al. (2008) and Hilscher and Wilson (2016). CDS PD is the PD priced into
CDS spreads. To make the coefficients more traceable, the common logarithms of the PDs are used as
independent variables. OPERATING is the operating margin, i.e. operating income before depreciation
divided by total sales. LT LEVERAGE, the long-term debt leverage, is defined as total long-term debt
divided by book value of equity. TD LEVERAGE is the total debt leverage, i.e. total debt divided by
book value of equity. LOG MARKET is the natural logarithm of the market capitalisation, calculated
as the number of shares outstanding times the share price at the end of a quarter. Beta is the CAPM
beta estimated using the CRSP value-weighted index. SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily stock
returns in a quarter. INTEREST COVERAGE is obtained by dividing income before extraordinary
items by interest expenses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. P-values are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels.
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Table. 2.3: Parallel Regression Assumption
Coefficient of DFA
Additional Controls
Rating above None Equity PD CHS PD CDS PD
B- -0.119 -0.303 -0.037 0.590
B -0.638 -0.544 -0.753 0.777
B+ -0.643 -0.592 -0.741 -0.202
BB- -0.588 -0.598 -0.811 -0.546
BB -0.568 -0.531 -0.714 -0.482
BB+ -0.724 -0.606 -0.827 -0.596
BBB- -0.508 -0.405 -0.629 -0.405
BBB -0.358 -0.125 -0.458 -0.253
BBB+ -0.371 -0.235 -0.444 -0.618
A- -0.440 -0.306 -0.617 -0.679
A -0.268 -0.389 -0.446 -0.320
A+ -0.418 -0.880 -0.416 -0.860
AA- -0.075 -0.380 0.069 -0.705
AA -0.099 0.045 0.125 -0.556
AA+ 0.018 0.010 0.301 -0.829
The table shows the coefficients of the DFA dummy in the
set of logit regressions for the parallel regression test. In each
regression the dependent variable is a dummy that a rating is
above the rating grade specified in the first column. The first
row shows the coefficients of the regressions without market
counterfactual. In column 2-4, I include the equity-implied,
CHS PD, and the CDS-implied PD as additional controls.
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Table. 2.4: Shorten Sample Period
Numerical Rating
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6)
DFA -0.120*** -0.049 0.056 -0.072 -0.021
(0.01) (0.30) (0.26) (0.20) (0.81)
Equity PD -0.006***
(<0.00)
CHS PD -0.323***
(<0.00)
CDS PD -5.736***
(<0.00)
Observations 10,683 10,683 9,221 5,021 5,021
Sample Full Full Full CDS CDS
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CDS Liquidity Controls No No No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.214 0.221 0.215 0.215 0.303
This table shows the results of the ordered logistic regression for numerical ratings, Equation
(2.1), using a reduced sample period from July 2008 to July 2012. In each case, the dependent
variable is the numerical transformation of the alphanumeric S&P issuer rating. CHS PD is the
probability of default calibrated from Campbell et al. (2008) and Hilscher and Wilson (2016).
CDS PD is the probability of default priced into CDS spreads. To make the coefficients more
traceable, the common logarithms of the PDs is used as independent variables rather than
the actual PDs. The same set of firm controls as in Table 2.2 are included but not reported.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%,
5%, 10% level.
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Table. 2.5: Hypothetical Commencement of the Dodd-Frank Act
Coefficient of the Post-Treatment Dummy
Additional implied PD
Hypothetical Start Date Equity PD CHS PD CDS PD
2008 July -0.431*** -0.590*** 0.161 -0.213*** -0.375***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.01) (0.00)
2009 July -1.066*** -1.190*** -0.892*** -0.881*** -0.755***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2009 December -1.013*** -1.056*** -0.880*** -0.938*** -0.682***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2010 July -0.376*** -0.417*** -0.310*** -0.383*** -0.381***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2011 May 0.0459 -0.143*** 0.0244 -0.0372 -0.291***
(0.32) (0.00) (0.66) (0.49) (0.00)
2011 July 0.138*** -0.202*** 0.0549 0.125** -0.316***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.41) (0.04) (0.00)
2012 July 0.317*** -0.0557 0.440*** 0.499*** 0.171**
(0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04)
Sample Full Full Full CDS CDS
This table shows the coefficient of the DFA dummies from different hypothetical commencements of
the DFA. The hypothetical starting date is specified in the first column, the remaining columns show
the coefficients for different sets of control variables specified in the header. Note that the coefficient
of commencement date July 2010 correspond to the coefficients in Table 2.2.
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Table. 2.6: Specification Tests
Panel A: PD-only Regression & Monthly Frequency
Numerical Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DFA -0.111*** -0.0701* -0.119* -0.0821 -0.258** -0.164*
(0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.16) (0.01) (0.09)
Equity PD -0.0108*** -0.0106***
(<0.00) (<0.00)
CHS PD -2.500*** -2.407***
(<0.00) (<0.00)
CDS PD -7.211*** -6.859***
(<0.00) (0.259)
Observations 24,944 72,672 13,818 37,664 7,394 20,752
Frequency Quarterly Monthly Quarterly Monthly Quarterly Monthly
Firm Controls No No No No No No
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CDS Liquidity Controls No No No No No No
Pseudo R2 0.0477 0.0442 0.120 0.113 0.244 0.233
Panel B: Alternative Control for the Business Cycle
Numerical Rating
(1’) (2’) (3’) (4’) (5’)
DFA 0.0180 -0.203*** 0.215*** 0.184*** 1.244***
(0.71) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
Equity PD -0.00591***
(0.00)
CHS PD -0.286***
(0.01)
CDS PD -5.166***
(0.00)
Observations 20,271 20,271 13,156 9,613 9,613
Sample Full Full Full CDS CDS
Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CDS Liquidity Controls No No No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.212 0.223 0.220 0.216 0.298
In the upper panel, the results Equation 2.1 without firm controls, i.e. just the PD measure and market controls
are shown. In odd columns, the unit of observations are firm-quarters. In even columns, the unit of observations
is firm-months. In the lower panel, I control for the macroeconomic environment using the GDP growth rate
rather than the log of the nominal GDP. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. P-values are reported
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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Table. 2.7: Lead-Lag Relationship between S&P Issuer Ratings and Implied PDs
Numerical Rating Numerical Rating Numerical Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Equity PD ∆CHS PD ∆CDS PD
t-1 0.001 0.006 t-1 -2.789*** -2.310*** t-1 -4.728*** -7.197***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.584) (0.833) (0.626) (1.479)
t-2 0.004** 0.004 t-2 0.072 -0.128 t-2 -0.892 -2.627**
(0.002) (0.005) (0.658) (1.281) (0.825) (1.310)
t-3 0.000 0.003 t-3 -2.086*** -1.874* t-3 -2.289*** -1.801
(0.002) (0.008) (0.549) (0.983) (0.755) (1.648)
t-4 -0.006*** -0.021*** t-4 -1.630** -3.260** t-4 -3.862*** -8.000***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.674) (1.530) (0.652) (1.699)
t-5 -0.001 0.002 t-5 -1.671*** -1.893* t-5 -1.856*** -0.355
(0.001) (0.005) (0.626) (1.150) (0.685) (1.849)
t-6 -0.003* -0.009** t-6 -1.609*** -3.792** t-6 -3.251*** -4.301***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.574) (1.750) (0.626) (1.436)
∆Equity PD × DFA ∆CHS PD × DFA ∆CDS PD × DFA
t-1 -0.004 -0.012 t-1 1.317* -0.013 t-1 -1.787 -2.687
(0.003) (0.008) (0.755) (1.229) (1.269) (3.009)
t-2 -0.008*** -0.019** t-2 -2.928*** -4.084*** t-2 -1.994 -4.267
(0.003) (0.009) (0.774) (1.478) (1.583) (3.369)
t-3 -0.002 -0.009 t-3 -0.232 -0.467 t-3 -0.629 -2.014
(0.002) (0.012) (0.682) (1.114) (1.640) (3.562)
t-4 0.006*** 0.021** t-4 1.293 2.608 t-4 1.389 4.383
(0.002) (0.009) (0.794) (1.788) (1.348) (3.154)
t-5 -0.003 -0.008 t-5 -0.058 -1.279 t-5 -2.975** -10.746***
(0.002) (0.008) (0.710) (1.326) (1.438) (3.305)
t-6 0.003 0.008 t-6 -0.768 0.380 t-6 1.424 -0.515
(0.002) (0.009) (0.690) (1.981) (1.378) (3.074)
Observations 62,027 1,653 53,791 1,147 26,745 535
Sample Full Changes only Full Changes Full Changes
Pseudo-R2 0.0104 0.0491 0.0242 0.0990 0.0443 0.159
The table shows the results of Equation 2.2. Unit of observations are firm-month. Odd columns contain results for the full sample ("Full"), even
columns the results for the reduced sample ("Changes only"). In the reduced sample, only firm-month in which the rating changed are considered.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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Table. 2.8: Changes in the Frequency-based Measures
Panel A: Textual Variables
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Word Count 14,738 403.12 176.56 50 2870
TTR 14,738 47.65 6.71 17.04 82.95
MLTD 14,113 88.29 23.44 24.22 225.70
Uncertainty 14,738 2.90 1.29 0 10.11
Modal 1 14,738 1.45 1.08 0 8.26
Modal 2 14,738 0.32 0.47 0 5.06
Modal 3 14,738 0.55 0.54 0 5.59
Forward 14,738 5.83 2.14 0 20.20
Spec 14,738 0.79 0.41 0 1
GDP growth 14,738 0.95 1.93 -4.29 3.61
Inflation 14,738 2.08 1.15 -0.27 3.71
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Overall 3,875 -0.19 5.72 -33.35 32.28
Overall (absolute) 3,875 3.7 4.3 0.0 33.3
Assignment 925 0.15 3.86 -24.11 16.77
Confirmation 156 0.04 4.84 -27.56 19.03
Downgrade 783 -1.04 7.31 -33.35 29.31
Outlook 881 0.03 5.04 -24.33 32.28
Review 537 -0.22 8.11 -30.98 27.27
Upgrade 593 0.02 3.94 -22.38 17.42
Word Count is the number of different words in the report. TTR, the type-token-
ratio is the ratio of different token (words) and total words. MLTD, the "measure
of textual lexical diversity developed by McCarthy and Jarvis (2010), calculates the
complexity dynamically rather than relying on aggregate words counts. For each
variable, a higher value indicates a more complex language. Modal 1 and Modal 3
are the fractions of strong (e.g. "always" or "never") and weak (e.g. "almost" or
"might") modal words in the reports as described in Loughran and McDonald (2011).
Uncertainty is the fraction of words in the report that Loughran and McDonald (2011)
classify as expressing uncertainty. Forward is the fraction of forward-looking words
as classified in Huang et al. (2014). Panel B shows the cumulative abnormal returns
in percentage points for the overall sample and a breakdown by the different rating
action.
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Table. 2.9: Correlation Matrix of Lexical Variables
Word Count TTR MLTD Uncertainty Modal 1 Modal 3 Forward
Word Count 1
TTR -0.73 1
MLTD 0.05 0.42 1
Uncertainty -0.06 0.08 0.10 1
Modal 1 0.01 0.04 0.06 -0.05 1
Modal 3 -0.10 0.15 0.17 0.77 <0.00 1
Forward -0.05 0.09 0.13 0.28 0.46 0.38 1
The table shows the pairwise correlation coefficients.Word Count is the number of different words in the
report. TTR, the type-token-ratio is the ratio of different token (words) and total words. MLTD, the
"measure of textual lexical diversity developed by McCarthy and Jarvis (2010), calculates the complexity
dynamically rather than relying on aggregate words counts. For each variable, a higher value indicates
a more complex language. Modal 1 and Modal 3 are the fractions of strong (e.g. "always" or "never")
and weak (e.g. "almost" or "might") modal words of the total word count in the report. Uncertainty is
the fraction of words in the report that Loughran and McDonald (2011) classify as expressing uncertainty.
Forward is the fraction of forward-looking words as classified in Huang et al. (2014).
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Table. 2.10: Changes in the Wording I
Frequency TTR MLTD Forward
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
spec 36.53 36.53 15.36 -1.12*** -1.12*** -0.30 -2.21 -2.17 -0.93 -0.21** -0.21** -0.33***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) (0.41) (0.15) (0.17) (0.29) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00)
NA -64.98*** -61.74*** -69.86*** 0.10 -0.41 0.64** 2.00* -1.83 1.55 0.16 -0.22*** -0.16
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.57) (0.24) (0.03) (0.09) (0.12) (0.42) (0.35) (0.01) (0.11)
DFA -36.46*** -29.90* -54.50 1.97*** 0.93*** 0.74* 10.45*** 2.48 1.13 0.22 -0.54 -0.79
(0.00) (0.05) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.44) (0.77) (0.28) (0.30) (0.19)
DFA×NA -8.54 1.82 1.36** 1.40*** 9.98*** 7.70* 0.99*** 1.03**
(0.62) (0.97) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.02)
DFA× spec 36.81 0.27 1.73 0.38**
(0.30) (0.65) (0.17) (0.04)
NA× spec 14.59 -1.44*** -4.27* -0.04
(0.41) (0.00) (0.09) (0.73)
DFA×NA× spec -20.78 -0.17 2.28 -0.15
Observations 14,738 14,738 14,738 14,738 14,738 14,738 14,113 14,113 14,113 14,820 14,820 14,820
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.623 0.624 0.63 0.270 0.273 0.27 0.087 0.091 0.09
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Action FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table presents the results of equation 2.3. TTR, the type-token-ratio is the ratio of different token (words) and total words. MLTD, the "measure of textual
lexical diversity developed by McCarthy and Jarvis (2010), calculates the complexity dynamically rather than relying on aggregate words counts. For each variable,
a higher value indicates a more complex language. Forward is the number of forward-looking words as classified in Huang et al. (2014) Post is a dummy variable that
takes a value of one of post July 2010 observations and zero otherwise. NA is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for reports on North American companies
and zero for European ones. spec takes a value of one for reports that mention a below investment grade notch, i.e. a rating below Baa3. We include macro controls
(real GDP growth and inflation), year-quarter fixed effects, action FE and a dummy for ratings of notes rather than issuer ratings. Unit of observation is a rating
report. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are two-way clustered at the year-quarter and the rating action level. To account for a potentially low number
of cluster, the standard errors are adjusted as suggested by Cameron et al. (2011). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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Table. 2.11: Changes in the Wording II
Modal 1 Modal 3 Uncertainty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
spec -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.10 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.10 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.19
(0.00) (0.00) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11)
NA 0.25*** 0.16** 0.19*** -0.01 -0.13*** -0.03 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.10
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.83) (0.00) (0.56) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21)
DFA -0.02 -0.20 -0.26 0.17* -0.08 -0.13 0.07 0.02 0.12
(0.84) (0.24) (0.30) (0.06) (0.16) (0.16) (0.56) (0.84) (0.48)
DFA×NA 0.23** 0.52*** 0.33*** 0.06 0.06 0.03
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.62) (0.23) (0.84)
DFA× spec 0.11 0.05 -0.14
(0.47) (0.69) (0.57)
NA× spec -0.07 -0.10 0.29***
(0.39) (0.14) (0.00)
DFA×NA× spec -0.38** 0.31*** 0.09
(0.04) (0.00) (0.63)
Observations 14,738 14,738 14,738 14,738 14,738 14,738 14,738 14,738 14,738
R-squared 0.111 0.111 0.11 0.149 0.150 0.15 0.105 0.105 0.11
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Action FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table presents the results of equation 2.3. Uncertainty is the number of words in the report that Loughran and
McDonald (2011) classify as expressing uncertainty. Modal 1 and Modal 3 are the number of strong (e.g. "always" or
"never") and weak (e.g. "almost" or "might") modal words in the reports . Post is a dummy variable that takes a value
of one of post July 2010 observations and zero otherwise. NA is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for reports
on North American companies and zero for European ones. spec takes a value of one for reports that mention a below
investment grade notch, i.e. a rating below Baa3. We include macro controls (real GDP growth and inflation), year-quarter
fixed effects, action FE and a dummy for ratings of notes rather than issuer ratings. Unit of observation is a rating report.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are two-way clustered at the year-quarter and the rating action level. To
account for a potentially low number of cluster, the standard errors are adjusted as suggested by Cameron et al. (2011).
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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Table. 2.12: Market Reaction to Rating Reports - Full Sample
CARabs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DFA -5.24*** -5.24*** -5.24*** -5.29*** -5.24*** -5.28*** -5.30***
(<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00)
TTR <-0.00
(0.90)
MLTD <-0.00
(0.62)
Uncertainty 0.14**
(0.02)
Modal 1 0.10**
(0.04)
Modal 3 0.08
(0.21)
Forward 0.09**
(0.02)
Observations 3,875 3,875 3,809 3,875 3,875 3,875 3,875
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Action FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table presents the results of Equation 2.6: CARabsi = α+αi+β×Texti+γ×action+ δ×speci+ i,t.
Modal 1 and Modal 3 are the number of strong (e.g. "always" or "never") and weak (e.g. "almost" or
"might") modal words in the reports. Uncertainty is the number of words in the report that Loughran
and McDonald (2011) classify as expressing uncertainty. Forward is the number of forward-looking words
as classified in Huang et al. (2014). I include year-quarter and action fixed effects. Unit of observation is a
rating report. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the year-quarter level. To
account for a potentially low number of cluster, the standard errors are adjusted as suggested by Cameron
et al. (2011). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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Table. 2.13: Market Reaction to Downgrades
CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DFA 15.08*** 15.07*** 14.21*** 15.05*** 14.86*** 14.93*** 14.54***
(<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00)
TTR -0.07
(0.20)
MLTD 0.03*
(0.05)
Uncertainty 0.07
(0.82)
Modal 1 0.19
(0.25)
Modal 3 0.17
(0.60)
Forward 0.12
(0.46)
Observations 783 783 780 783 783 783 783
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table presents the results of Equation 2.6: CARi = α+αi+β×Texti+γ×action+δ×speci+i,t. Modal
1 and Modal 3 are the number of strong (e.g. "always" or "never") and weak (e.g. "almost" or "might")
modal words in the reports. Uncertainty is the number of words in the report that Loughran and McDonald
(2011) classify as expressing uncertainty. Forward is the number of forward-looking words as classified in
Huang et al. (2014). I include year-quarter and action fixed effects. Unit of observation is a rating report.
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the year-quarter level. To account for a
potentially low number of cluster, the standard errors are adjusted as suggested by Cameron et al. (2011).
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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Table. 2.14: Market Reaction to Upgrades
CAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
DFA 6.88*** 6.82*** 6.27*** 6.81*** 6.78*** 6.82*** 6.70***
(<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00)
TTR -0.06*
(0.06)
MLTD 0.02*
(0.07)
Uncertainty 0.10
(0.30)
Modal 1 0.38***
(0.01)
Modal 3 0.08
(0.60)
Forward 0.14*
(0.06)
Observations 593 593 562 593 593 593 593
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table presents the results of Equation 2.6: CARi = α+ αi + β × Texti + γ × action+ δ × speci + i,t.
Modal 1 and Modal 3 are the number of strong (e.g. "always" or "never") and weak (e.g. "almost" or
"might") modal words in the reports. Uncertainty is the number of words in the report that Loughran and
McDonald (2011) classify as expressing uncertainty. Forward is the number of forward-looking words as
classified in Huang et al. (2014). I include year-quarter and action fixed effects. Unit of observation is a
rating report. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis and are clustered at the year-quarter level. To
account for a potentially low number of cluster, the standard errors are adjusted as suggested by Cameron
et al. (2011). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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Figures
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Assigned Ratings
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The figure plots the fraction of the different rating grades of the total firm-month observations in
percentage points.
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Figure 2.2: Rating Changes over Time
80
60
40
20
0
20
40
60
2006m1 2008m1 2010m1 2012m1 2014m1
Upgrade
Downgrade
The graphs plots the number of upgrades and downgrades per month. The black bars describe the
number of downgrades, the grey bars the number of downgrades.
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of S&P Issuer Ratings, Implied PDs and Macro Controls
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(b) Implied PDs
1
1.
01
1.
02
1.
03
1
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
1.
8
2006m1 2008m1 2010m1 2012m1 2014m1
SP500 VIX GDP (right scale)
(c) Macro Controls
The figures depict the evolution of S&P issuer rating, implied PD and macro controls over time.
All variables are normalised to 2006m1 or 2007m1 values. Due to limited data availability for CDS-
implied PDs, the plot for the implied PDs starts in 2007m1. All variables - with the exceptions of
the ratings - are logged.
132
Figure 2.4: Credit Risk over Credit Rating Grades
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(c) CHS
This figure plots the percentiles of the de-medianed 12-month CHS failure probability, equity- and
CDS-implied probabilities of default, annualized (10th, 25th, median, 75th, 90th of the distribution),
by S&P credit ratings. The failure probability is the annualized and is de-medianed using the overall
monthly median failure probability.
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Figure 2.5: Year-quarter Effects around the DFA
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This figure plots coefficients of the year-quarter dummies added to Equation 2.1 without DFA and any
PD measure on the y-axis. For the PD measures as dependent variable, the coefficients κ originate
from the following equation: PDi,t = α + κ × YQt + ρ ×Ki,t + i,t, where YQt is a vector with the
year-quarter dummies. The vertical line indicates 2010q3, the quarter of the commencement of the
DFA. The y-axis shows the year-quarters relative to the DFA.
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Figure 2.6: Evolution of Textual Variables over Time
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(f) Forward
The figures depict the evolution of quarterly average over time. The values for North American
reports are shown in red, the European ones in blue. Word Count is the number of different words in
the report. TTR, the type-token-ratio is the ratio of different token (words) and total words. CTTR
is the same ratio but the nominator is the log of different words. MLTD, the “measure of textual
lexical diversity developed by McCarthy and Jarvis (2010), calculates the complexity dynamically
rather than relying on aggregate words counts. For each variable, a higher value indicates a more
complex language. Modal 1 and Modal 3 are the number of strong (e.g. “always” or “never") and
weak (e.g. “almost” or “might") modal words in the reports. Uncertainty is the number of words in
the report that Loughran and McDonald (2011) classify as expressing uncertainty. Forward is the
number of forward-looking words as classified in Huang et al. (2014). The variants of these variables
labelled scaled are the ratio of number of words of that category and Word Count.
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Figure 2.7: Parallel Trend Assumption for Textual Variables
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The figure shows the sequence of µt, the coefficients the interactions of the NA-dummy with the year-quarter dummies in equation 2.4 on the y-axis. Negative (positive)
values on the x-axis indicate quarters before (after) the commencement of the Frank-Dodd Act in 2010Q3. The vertical line highlights the commencement of the DFA
in 2010q3. The dashed lines describe the 95% confidence interval. Word Count is the number of different words in the report. TTR, the type-token-ratio is the ratio of
different token (words) and total words. MLTD, the “measure of textual lexical diversity developed by McCarthy and Jarvis (2010), calculates the complexity dynamically
rather than relying on aggregate words counts. For each variable, a higher value indicates a more complex language. Modal 1 and Modal 3 are the number of strong (e.g.
“always” or “never") and weak (e.g. “almost” or “might") modal words in the reports. Uncertainty is the number of words in the report that Loughran and McDonald
(2011) classify as expressing uncertainty. Forward is the number of forward-looking words as classified in Huang et al. (2014).
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Figure 2.8: Parallel Trend Assumption for Abnormal Returns
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The figure shows the sequence of µt, the coefficients of the year-quarter dummies of CARi = αt +
γ × action +∑Tt=1 µt × quarter + i on the y-axis. Negative (positive) values on the x-axis indicate
quarters before (after) the commencement of the Frank-Dodd Act in 2010Q3. In Panel (a), the full
sample is used and the dependent variable is the absolute cumulative abnormal return following the
publication date. Panel (b) and (c) are based on the downgrade and upgrade subsample, respectively.
The dependent variable is the unaltered CAR. The vertical line highlights the commencement of the
DFA in 2010q3. The dashed lines describe the 95% confidence interval.
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.1 Campbell et al. (2008)’s Default Probability
This appendix describes the contruction of CHS PD and borrows significant parts
from Campbell et al. (2008). I first construct the regressors used by Campbell et al.
(2008) and Hilscher and Wilson (2016) based on the description of Campbell et al.
(2008), second I use a set of coefficients estimated by Hilscher and Wilson (2016) to
obtain CHS PD.
The regressors are defined as follows:
RSIZEi,t = log
Firm Market Equityi,t
Total S&P500 Market Valuei,t
EXRETi,t = log(1 + Ri,t)− log(1 + RS&P500,t))
NITAi,t =
Net Incomei,t
Total Assetsi,t
TLTAi,t =
Total Liabilitiesi,t
Total Assetsi,t
NIMTAi,t =
Net Incomei,t
Firm Market Equityi,t + Total Liabilitiesi,t
TLMTAi,t =
Total Liabilitiesi,t
Firm Market Equityi,t + Total Liabilitiesi,t
CASHMTAi,t =
Cash and Short Term Investmentsi,t
Firm Market Equityi,t + Total Liabilitiesi,t
MBi,t =
Firm Market Equityi,t + Total Liabilities
Total Assetsi,t
As Campbell et al. (2008), I use the COMPUSTAT Data44 for total assets, Data69
for net income, and Data54 for total liabilities. To measure the volatility of a firm’s
stock returns, we use a proxy, centred around zero rather than the rolling three-month
mean, for daily variation of returns computed:
SIGMAi,t−1,t−2 =
252 ∗ 1
N − 1
∑
k∈(t−1,t−2,t−3)
r2i,k
 12
PRICE is the log of price per share winsorized above $15. All regressors are
winsorized at the 1% level. However, winsorizing is not crucial for my results.
The coefficients used to transform to predict the failure probability are taken from
column 4 in Table 2 of Hilscher and Wilson (2016). In this specfication, the sample
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consisted only of rated firms and the ranges from 1986 to 2013. Out of all reported
specifications in Campbell et al. (2008) and Hilscher and Wilson (2016), this sample
overlaps most with my sample. Specifically, I use the following calibration to calculate
to odds ratio:
Failure Scorei,t =− 12.68− 23.50× NIMTAAVGi,t + 2.74× TLMTAi,t − 12.19× EXRETAVGi,t
+ 1.33× SIGMAi,t − 0.29RSIZEi,t − 2.09× CASHMTAi,t
+ 0.09×MBi,t + 0.17× PRICEi,t
Eventually, CHS PD is calculated as CHS PDi,t = exp (Failure Scorei,t). To vali-
date the construction of the variables, Table 15 provides a comparison of the summary
statistics of my full sample with those of Campbell et al. (2008). A comparison with
Hilscher and Wilson (2016) would have been preferred since their calibration is used
for the calculation of CHS PD, but they do not provide summary statistics of those
variables in their sample. Firms in my full sample appear to be somewhat more prof-
itable in terms of NIMTA and EXRET. They are also larger, measured by RSIZE, and
exhibit a higher Market-to-Book ratio. The larger size of the firms in my sample could
also be the driver behind the lower volatility (SIGMA). As I only consider rated firms,
which are conceivably larger than unrated ones, the difference in size is expected. The
standard deviations in my sample are also comparable to those of Campbell et al.
(2008). Overall, the differences between the samples appear to be small and do not
hint towards a miscalculation of any variables.
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Table. 15: Comparison of Summary Statistics
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Campbell et al. (2008)
Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
NIMTA 0.000 0.006 0.023 -0.069 0.028
TLMTA 0.445 0.427 0.280 0.036 0.923
EXRET -0.011 -0.009 0.117 -0.243 0.218
RSIZE -10.456 -10.570 1.922 -13.568 -6.773
SIGMA 0.562 0.471 0.332 0.153 1.353
CASHMTA 0.084 0.045 0.097 0.002 0.358
MB 2.041 1.557 1.579 0.358 6.471
PRICE 2.019 2.474 0.883 -0.065 2.708
Panel B: Summary Statistics of the full sample
Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max
NIMTA 0.011 0.017 0.032 -0.159 0.079
TLMTA 0.473 0.457 0.204 0.045 0.983
EXRET 0.000 0.002 0.031 -0.121 0.096
RSIZE -8.341 -8.343 1.637 -12.804 -4.549
SIGMA 0.386 0.320 0.241 0.112 1.593
CASHMTA 0.059 0.038 0.064 0.000 0.391
MB 2.412 1.829 1.342 0.341 7.123
PRICE 2.534 2.708 0.438 0.377 2.708
The table presents the summary statistics of Campbell
et al. (2008) and the respective counterparts of their
variables in my sample. All variables are defined as
described above.
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.2 Sample Rating Report
Moody’s downgrades Frontier to Ba3
New York, September 03, 2014 – Moody’s Investors Service (“Moody’s”) has down-
graded Frontier Communications Corporation’s (“Frontier”; or the company‘”) Corpo-
rate Family Rating (“CFR”) to Ba3 from Ba2 primarily as a result of the increased
leverage from debt incurred to finance the $2 billion acquisition of AT&T’s Connecti-
cut wireline assets. As part of this rating action, Moody’s has also lowered Frontier’s
Probability of Default Rating ( “PDR”) to Ba3-PD from Ba2-PD and assigned Ba3
ratings to each of the two tranches of senior unsecured notes issued today, which
will be used to finance the acquisition. Additionally, Moody’s has affirmed Frontier’s
SGL-1 speculative grade liquidity rating. This concludes Moody’s review initiated on
December 17, 2013. The outlook is stable.
Moody’s has taken the following rating actions:
Frontier Communications Corporation . . .
. . . Corporate Family Rating, downgraded to Ba3 from Ba2
. . . Probability of Default Rating, downgraded to Ba3-PD from Ba2-PD
. . . Senior Unsecured Notes, downgraded to Ba3 (LGD4) from Ba2 (LGD4)
. . . Senior Unsecured Shelf, downgraded to (P)Ba3 from (P)Ba2
. . . Speculative Grade Liquidity Rating, affirmed at SGL-1
. . . Outlook, changed to Stable from Rating under Review
. . . New Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned Ba3 (LGD4)
. . . New Senior Unsecured Regular Bond/Debenture, Assigned Ba3 (LGD4)
RATINGS RATIONALE
Frontier’s Ba3 CFR reflects its large scale of operations, its strong and predictable
cash flows and high margins. These factors are offset by the company’s challenged
competitive position versus cable operators, its declining revenues and the possibility
that the company may not have the flexibility or discipline to continue to adequately
invest in network modernization.
The change to Ba3 from Ba2 reflects Moody’s view that Frontier’s debt-financed ac-
quisition of AT&T Inc’s local wireline business in the state of Connecticut will result
in leverage above 3.75x (Moody’s adjusted) until at least 2017. Moody’s had previ-
ously identified leverage of 3.75x as the upper limit of Frontier’s Ba2 rating. Further,
Moody’s views the debt-financed acquisition as a departure from Frontier’s prior con-
servative financial policy and discipline which, in Moody’s view, was focused on debt
reduction. Moody’s believes that the acquisition will improve Frontier’s scale, adding
an estimated $1.25 billion of revenue for FYE2014, nearly 1.4 million additional house-
holds and about 1 million additional residential and commercial customers. The ac-
quisition will also add an asset with high broadband penetration to Frontier’s coverage
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area. However, Moody’s believes that the incremental EBITDA and cost synergies will
not materially reduce leverage for the next several years.
Frontier has posted modest broadband subscriber growth over the past several quar-
ters, yet revenues continue to fall as voice revenues decline faster than the growth
from broadband. Over a longer time horizon, the headwind from voice disconnects
will moderate and Frontier may return to growth. Further, we believe that Frontier’s
margins will remain strong because does it not offer a facilities-based triple play bun-
dle and does not have to absorb the low margin pay TV product. However, we also
believe that Frontier’s network architecture limitations and lower broadband speeds
may limit its ability to take market share and could force the company to compete
more aggressively on price. Because of this, we believe that Frontier will continue to
face price pressure in both its residential and small business customer segments.
Moody’s could lower Frontier’s ratings further if leverage were to exceed 4.25x (Moody’s
adjusted) or free cash flow turns negative, on a sustained basis. Also, the ratings could
be lowered if the company’s liquidity becomes strained or if capital spending is reduced
below the level required to sustain the company’s market position.
Moody’s could raise Frontier’s ratings if leverage were to be sustained comfortably
below 3.75x (Moody’s adjusted) and free cash flow to debt were in the mid single
digits percentage range.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Global Telecommunications In-
dustry published in December 2010. Other methodologies used include Loss Given De-
fault for Speculative-Grade Non-Financial Companies in the U.S., Canada and EMEA
published in June 2009. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a
copy of these methodologies.
Frontier is an Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier headquartered in Stamford, CT.
Following the company’s merger with a company spun out of Verizon Communica-
tions’ northern and western operations (Spinco) in a reverse Morris Trust transaction,
Frontier became the fifth largest wireline telecommunications company in the US.
REGULATORY DISCLOSURES
For ratings issued on a program, series or category/class of debt, this announcement
provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to each rating of a subsequently is-
sued bond or note of the same series or category/class of debt or pursuant to a program
for which the ratings are derived exclusively from existing ratings in accordance with
Moody’s rating practices. For ratings issued on a support provider, this announcement
provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the rating action on the support
provider and in relation to each particular rating action for securities that derive their
credit ratings from the support provider’s credit rating. For provisional ratings, this
announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the provisional
rating assigned, and in relation to a definitive rating that may be assigned subsequent
to the final issuance of the debt, in each case where the transaction structure and
terms have not changed prior to the assignment of the definitive rating in a manner
that would have affected the rating. For further information please see the ratings tab
on the issuer/entity page for the respective issuer on www.moodys.com.
For any affected securities or rated entities receiving direct credit support from the
primary entity(ies) of this rating action, and whose ratings may change as a result of
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this rating action, the associated regulatory disclosures will be those of the guarantor
entity. Exceptions to this approach exist for the following disclosures, if applicable
to jurisdiction: Ancillary Services, Disclosure to rated entity, Disclosure from rated
entity.
Regulatory disclosures contained in this press release apply to the credit rating and,
if applicable, the related rating outlook or rating review.
Please see www.moodys.com for any updates on changes to the lead rating analyst
and to the Moody’s legal entity that has issued the rating.
Please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for additional
regulatory disclosures for each credit rating.
Mark Stodden
Vice President - Senior Analyst
Corporate Finance Group
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
U.S.A.
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653
John C Diaz
MD - Corporate Finance
Corporate Finance Group
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653
Releasing Office:
Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
U.S.A.
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653
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.3 Sample Construction Rating Reports
Rating reports were obtained from Moody’s homepage (https://www.moodys.com).
Under the tab “Ratings & Research", Moody’s publishes, inter alia, credit opinions,
issuer reports and rating news. Ratings reports fall under the category of ratings
news and, unlike most other publications are freely available to the public. The search
is further narrowed down by confining the region to “North America” and “Europe”
and consider only “Corporates” and “Financial Institutions” (i.e. excluding structured
finance, the public sector and project-related ratings). Finally, we look only at reports
in English.
The results of this search are return on a series of webpages, each containing ten
reports satisfying the set conditions. Figure A.1 shows a screenshot of this page. The
first challenge is access each of the pages that contain the results. Note that result
pages must be physically be visited in a browser to contain the links to the reports. If
the results pages are downloaded without browser, for example by directly parsing the
result pages to wget, the html code does not contain the links. I therefore resorted to
iMacros, a Firefox plugin, to access and save the result pages individually. This ap-
proach exploits the structure of the addresses of the result pages. A typical result page
looks as follows: https : //www.moodys.com/researchandratings/viewall/issuer −
research/rating− action/[...]/0/i/[...]/− /rra The “i” in the URL indicates the num-
ber of the results page. For example, the ten first rating reports are contained on
results page one and i = 1, the second batch of rating reports are listed on results page
two and i = 2. Therefore, the following simple loop over i in iMacros accesses each
results page and saves the html code:
1. VERSION BUILD=8970419 RECORDER=FX
2. TAB T=1
3. URL GOTO=https://www.moodys.com/[...]/rating-action/[...]/0/!LOOP/[...]
4. SAVEAS TYPE=HTM FOLDER=/path/FILE=!LOOP
where !LOOP is the loop variable.
The such obtained html codes are imported into R using the “readLines"-command.
Lines containing a link to a report are identified by the href attributes at the beginning
of the line. Figure A.2 provides an example for the bit of the code that contains a link
to report. By looping over the saved result page html codes, the links to all reports
are collected as comma separated value s (csv).
In the second step, the wget function is invoked via the Mac OX Terminal using
the following command: “wget -i download-file-list.txt", where “download-file-list.txt”
is the list of the links to all the reports obtained in step 1. This command downloads
all the webpages with the reports and stores them locally.
Finally, I isolate the actual rating report from the html code and non-report text
items like disclaimers in the following procedure. In this process, the common structure
of all rating reports and the similar wording is exploited. Each element of the structure
can be identified by a particular word sequence as described below.
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Figure A.1: Downloading the Reports, Step 1
Figure A.2: Downloading the Reports, Step 2
1. Title, identified by “Rating Action:"
2. Date, identified by “Global Credit Research"
3. Summary, no unique identifier
4. Ratings Rationale, identified by “RATINGS RATIONALE"
5. Methodology, identified by “The principal methodology used"
6. Regulatory disclosure, identified by “REGULATORY DISCLOSURES"
7. Addresses, identified by “Corporate Finance Group"
8. Disclaimer, identified by “All rights reserved."
A rating report might not contain each of the elements but the sequence of ele-
ments is always the same. Therefore, the following procedure uses the aforementioned
structure to isolate the ratings rationale:
1. Removal of the html commands using the “bracketX"-function of the qdap pack-
age. This function removes all string that are enclosed in angled brackets, i.e.
all html commands.
2. Isolation of the title of the report. The line containing the title of the report can
be identified by the sequence “Rating Action:". If no title line can be identified,
the report is dropped from the sample. In each html file that contains the
sequence “Rating Action:", this sequence uniquely identifies a line, i.e. there is
no ambiguity about the title. All lines preceding the title line are dropped.
3. Removal of the summary. The justification of the rating change is always placed
under the headline “RATINGS RATIONALE". By dropping all lines before the
line containing “RATINGS RATIONALE".
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4. Removal of methodology, disclosure, addresses and disclaimer by dropping all
lines behind the identifying sequences outlined above.
Once the rating rational is isolated, the rating action is classified by rating action
and rating grade. The type of rating action is identified by the wording of the title.
Moody’s uses a fixed set of words associated with each rating action. Downgrades are
identified by the verbs “downgrades” and “lowers", upgrades by “upgrades", “raises”
and “lifts". Rating actions are classified as “outlook” changes or “reviews” if the title
includes “outlook” or “under review", respectively. Moody’s might affirm ratings amid
important corporate events, such as mergers or substantial issues. Such affirmations
are identified by “affirms” or “confirms". Finally, Moody’s might issue a new rating,
e.g. for a bond issue. The title of new assignments includes either “rates” or “assigns".
Note that the different rating actions are not necessarily exclusive. For example, a
downgrade might be accompanied by change of the outlook. For the classification by
rating grade, the ratings rationale is scanned for the alphanumeric rating grades. For
each rating grade, I code a dummy that takes the value of one if the alphanumeric
code occurs and zero if not.
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APPENDIX A
CREDIT INSTITUTIONS, OWNERSHIP AND BANK
LENDING IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES
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A.1 Introduction
The transition of banking sectors in Central and Eastern Europe in the first 15 years of
transition was nothing short of remarkable. When the Communist regimes fell, none of
the transition countries had a functioning financial system that could provide intermedi-
ary services. Most observers at the time assumed that the development of market-based
banking systems would take many years. However, by the early years of the 21st century,
the transition of banking sectors in Central and Eastern Europe (though not in many
countries of the former Soviet Union) was largely complete. For the most part, the coun-
tries in the region have market oriented banks that utilize modern banking technologies
and are largely independent of direct government influence.
Why and how did this remarkable success story take place? Early in the transition
period, observers attributed the improvements to banking reforms - recapitalizations and
privatization - and, importantly, the early entry of foreign banking (Bonin et. al., 1998
and 2005; Bonin and Wachtel, 1999). Foreign bank entry though it was resisted at first,
began in the mid-1990s and was a catalyst for change. In this view, the rapid transition of
the banking sector can be attributed to foreign owners who brought modern technology,
market oriented decision making, independence from vested interests and competition.
By 2000, foreign banks owned a majority of bank assets in virtually every transition
country and almost all of the assets in several countries. Credit expanded very rapidly
in the region in the years prior to the global financial crisis. There are many reasons for
this but importantly the foreign ownership of banks facilitated and spurred these credit
booms. If the domestic deposit base was small or growing slowly, foreign owned banks were
able to fund their expansion with cross border flows (see De Haas and van Horen 2016).
Foreign banks could shift liabilities to their foreign subsidiaries with loans deposits, make
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equity investments and facilitate flows from other home country entities. Moreover, the
expansion of credit in the transition countries had one particular characteristic, lending
to households expanded much more rapidly than lending to any other sector.
The global financial crisis challenged the idea that foreign banks were in every respect
a positive influence. All of a sudden, the parent banks from large countries were under
intense pressure to deleverage and increase liquidity. They could reduce or even pull back
financing to their transition country subsidiaries. In this view foreign bank ownership
could magnify the impact of the global real sector shock on the transition countries.
Foreign ownership which had been a catalyst for financial sector development for a decade
was now, perhaps, the source of fragility. Financial systems in transition countries were
particularly vulnerable to the crisis shock. Surprisingly, there were only two transition
countries with systemic bank crises in 2009 - Latvia and the Ukraine - and two more with
near systemic problems - Hungary and Russia.
The experience of the last 15 years - a credit boom that created financial fragilities
which amplified the crisis shock - indicates that foreign bank ownership might be a mixed
blessing. The question is essentially an empirical one and we will see below that the
evidence in the literature, though mixed, tends to absolve the foreign banks. Foreign banks
may have amplified the transmission of the crisis shock to transition countries but in most
instances they retained their commitment to these secondary home markets and foreign
subsidiaries. More importantly, we argue that the banking sectors in transition economies
withstood the crisis shock because they had developed their own solid institutions - an
effective supervisory structure and legal framework.
There is more to the story behind the success of banking in transition countries than
foreign ownership. The quality of institutions in the financial sector plays a major role
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in fostering the development of the banking sector. The significance of legal institutions,
regulatory structures and the institutional infrastructure for financial relationships was
overlooked in the early transition years. This is not surprising because economists did
not pay much attention to the role of institutions in economic growth until the late 1990s.
For example, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) argued that better
creditor rights are associated with better developed credit markets in a large cross-section
of countries. This law and finance literature developed quickly to show how improved
legal structures are associated with better financial development (Djankov, McLiesh and
Shleifer (2007)), fewer loan covenants (Qian and Strahan (2007)) and better corporate
investment decisions (Giannetti (2003)).
The story of banking in transition countries is as much the story of institution building
as it is a story of foreign ownership. Our view of transition banking is that institutions are
key. Modern market oriented banking systems emerged when institutional structures were
in place. This included a reliable legal framework for the conduct of banking business,
a framework for regulation and the conduct of monetary policy and the end of direct
or implicit government influence on banking activity. Foreign banks were interested in
entering the markets when these conditions were in place.
To summarize, most transition countries experienced credit booms which were followed
by the global financial crisis shock. The presence of foreign banks which was pervasive by
this time might have exacerbated credit booms and the impact of the crisis. Nevertheless,
the banking sectors in transition countries were very resilient. Our hypothesis is that
the degree of resilience to the boom and crisis shocks related primarily to the quality of
domestic institutions and policy decisions.
The transition in Central and European from a command to a market economy has
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been an important laboratory for the so-called law and finance literature which was emerg-
ing toward the end of the 1990s. Literature on the region examined specific legal arrange-
ments relevant to financial development. For example, Dahan (2000), Pistor (2004) and
Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer (2000) described how creditor rights have been introduced in
these countries. Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2010) documented the changes in creditor
rights that occurred in the transition countries as the World Bank and the EBRD advised
countries to adopt legislation. They construct indicators of the strength of collateral law
and bankruptcy law and relate them to the growth of lending. Their results indicate that
better creditor rights are associated with more lending and the existence of good collat-
eral law has a stronger impact on lending than the strength of bankruptcy protections,
probably because collateral law is a prerequisite for introducing protections to creditors
in bankruptcy proceedings. In related work, Haselmann and Wachtel (2010) showed that
legal differences result in differences in loan composition. Good collateral law results in
more private credit formation and more lending to SMEs as opposed to large firms. Fi-
nally, good creditor rights seem to be especially important for foreign banks and therefore
more of them will enter if creditor rights are good.
In addition to the legal framework for lending, banks rely on credit information in
order to make credit judgments. Credit information effects lending for several reasons
(see Japelli and Pagano 1993). First, if banks have more information on borrowers,
they are better able to access the credit worthiness and price loans accordingly. Second,
information sharing reduces the market power of banks over borrowers as information is
"stored" outside the bank. Information sharing might have a more pronounced effect in
countries with weak creditor protection since enforcement of the contract is costly.
The empirical literature lends support to the hypothesis that information sharing
increases lending, and decreases credit spreads and default rates. Jappelli and Pagano
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(2002) and Djankov et al. (2007) find a positive correlation between information sharing
and lending to the private sector and a negative correlation with default rates. Brown et
al. (2009) confirm this finding with firm-level data for Eastern Europe: firms in countries
with more information sharing have easier access to credit and pay lower interest rates.
The effect is larger for countries with weak creditor protection suggesting that credit
registers can serve as a substitute for underdeveloped legal systems.
In this chapter we provide a brief survey of banking in the transition economics. The
discussion takes us through the first decade - the 1990s - when commercial banks emerged,
and the 2000s, the era of foreign bank ownership. Our emphasis in on the structure of
banking - the emergence of foreign banking - and the role of institutions.
It is difficult to distinguish the influence of good institutions from the influence of
foreign bank ownership because they emerged at the same time and clearly influenced each
other. However, the crisis provides a quasi-experimental context for evaluating the role
of ownership and institutions. We present some suggestive econometric results that test
whether foreign ownership and good institutions enable banking systems to withstand the
crisis shock. Specifically, we will show that a well-functioning credit information systems
can help dampen the impact of financial crisis on the financial sector.
The crisis originated in the American mortgage markets so it can be viewed as an
external or exogenous shock for the transition countries. The shock resulted in an increase
in uncertainty about the future of the real economy and a general increase in credit risks.
If credit information systems help overcome such uncertainties by providing idiosyncratic
information on individual borrowers we would expect that markets that have a better
creditor information system would be more resilient to the shock.1
1As already noted, many transition countries were experiencing a credit boom prior to the crisis so
the crisis might to have some extent been endogenous to the region. We would still expect countries with
better credit institutions to bounce back from the shock more rapidly.
152
Our empirical investigation examines the volume of lending and its composition among
the major sectors: households, non-financial corporations and government. The extent of
information asymmetry and uncertainty around the crisis event varies for different types
of borrowers. It should be larger for SME borrowers as compared to large borrowers and
for corporate borrowers compared to the government. We use data on credit institutions
from the World Bank and find that the quality of institutions, especially the coverage of
credit information systems affects post-crisis loan volume.
A.2 Transition Banking: The First Decade
In the early years of transition, banking sectors consisted of state owned banks that were
competing with newly privatized banks and new entrants in a system largely devoid of
effective regulation. The state owned banks, at the behest of the government, continued to
lend to loss-making state owned enterprises and even privatized banks continued lending to
their old customers, which led to the rapid growth of bad loan portfolios. New entrants,
so-called Greenfield banks, took advantage of loose oversight to take on risky and too
often shady deals. The collapse of trading relationships with the Soviet Union and the
absence of any other markets led to large transition recessions while at the same time the
liberalization of prices and large government deficits resulted in episodes of hyperinflation.
The first transition development was the creation of banking institutions where none
had existed before (see Hasan, Bonin andWachtel 2015). Some centrally planned economies
had advanced industrial enterprises which were in some instances internationally compet-
itive but none had banks that resembled those in developed countries. The planning
framework had no place for banks or financial intermediaries. Capital was allocated by
plan and the role of the banks, usually a national mono-bank, was just to provide a pay-
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ments system and accounting mechanism for transactions among enterprises. Thus, a first
step in transition was to create banks by separating the mono bank into a central bank
and one or more state owned commercial banking entities.2
Commercial banks were created before functioning regulatory structures were in place
and before the relationship between state owned enterprises and banks were restructured.
As a result, every one of the transition countries experienced at least one banking crisis
in the early 1990s that required the re-nationalization of banks that had been privatized,
widespread losses to depositors and the recapitalization of state owned banks by the
government. These experiences point to the importance of institution building, in this
case both the structure of banks and the regulatory framework.
At the start of transition, governments were reluctant to allow foreign ownership of
banks as a matter of national pride. The banking system - the overseer of the nation’s
money - was an important symbol of sovereignty; the monetary system was viewed as a
national treasure that should not be subject to foreign control. By the mid-1990s attitudes
began to change with the realization that foreign strategic investors in banks were, like
any other foreign direct investment, a fixed investment (in this instance bank capital)
and a source of technology transfers (see Claessens et al. (2001)). The first such deal
was the sale of Budapest Bank, a state owned bank with a serious bad loan problem, to
GE Capital in 1995. That opened the floodgates and by 2000, a majority of bank assets
were in foreign owned institutions in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia,
and the three Baltic countries. The only exceptions in central and Eastern Europe were
Slovakia, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia; by 2005, Slovenia was the lone exception where
2This simplification abstracts from the differences among transition countries. Yugoslavia, for example,
established somewhat independent commercial banks in the 1950s; Hungary always had a foreign trade
bank and savings bank. Similarly, there were differences in the way commercial banks were created.
Bulgaria granted every office of the central bank a universal banking license in 1990 while neighbouring
Romania created one state owned commercial bank.
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government policy limited foreign participation in banking.3 Small countries such as
Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Croatia seem to maintain their sovereignty even as over
90% of bank assets are in entities controlled by foreigners.
Foreign banks brought modern banking technology and products and introduced arm’s
length relationships between banks and their loan customers.4 Further, improved banking
practices spilled over from the foreign owned institutions to the domestic banks including
state owned institutions. However, the emphasis on the catalytic effect of foreign bank
ownership overlooks the role of institutions. Foreign entry would not have occurred with-
out improvements in the institutional structure. The introduction of banking laws and
regulatory structures were often due to foreign influences starting in the 1990s. USAID,
the World Bank, EBRD, EU Phare all provided support and expertise for writing legisla-
tion (see Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer, 2000). Foreign influence increased when six transition
countries began accession talks with the EU in 1998.
Basic institutions such as a banking law, accounting standards and regulatory authori-
ties were introduced in the 1990s. However, it often took some time before an arm’s length
relationships developed between regulators and the banks. Further, it took additional time
for the legal structures used in banking to emerge, including reliably functioning court
systems for commercial disputes, credit information systems and laws regarding the use
and taking of collateral.
In Hungary, the first country to welcome foreign bank ownership, legislation in 1992 in-
troduced modern banking law, international accounting standards and a new bankruptcy
3Slovenia suffered a serious banking crisis in 2013 and then began to relax ownership restrictions.
4For example, the banking systems skipped the use of paper checks and were early adopters of electronic
payments systems. On the asset side, banks imported credit scoring models from their parents.
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law.5 The sale of Budapest Bank took place in late 1995, after the legal reforms.6 In the
Czech Republic, an ambitious program of voucher privatisation of enterprises started in
1991, before corporate governance reforms and capital market regulations were in place.
The program was soon enveloped in scandals involving bank sponsored privatization funds
and lending to bank controlled enterprises. By 1998 bad loans were about one-quarter
the size of Czech GDP. Enterprise and legal reforms started around 1999 as the Czech
Republic entered serious negotiations with the EU on accession. Bank restructuring and
reprivatisation began soon thereafter. In 1999 foreign banks owned about one-quarter of
Czech bank assets and two-thirds in Hungary. By 2005, foreign ownership was about 90%
in both countries. Foreign ownership in both instances followed institutional reforms.
A.3 Transition Banking After 2000
In the decade prior to the financial crisis, GDP growth in the transition economies was
faster than growth in developing Asia (with the exception of India and China) and credit
markets deepened substantially. The credit expansion was largely driven by capital in-
flows, particularly bank flows from Western Europe and external debts (borrowing by
banks and by sovereigns). There were a number of reasons why the flows were large
including the global savings glut, confidence in the transition economies generate by EU
accession and the expectation that Euro adoption would follow, demand generated by
structural reforms.
The credit boom and the shift in the composition of lending from non-financial busi-
5Foreign entry developed much more slowly in the former Soviet Union (other than the Baltics) where
legal and regulatory institutional developments lagged those in Central and Easter Europe.
6The sale was controversial because the government agreed to take back bad loans that might be
uncovered after the sale.
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ness to households in the 12 transition countries in our sample are shown in Figure 1.7 In
all of the countries shown the share of lending going to households has increased over the
last decade and in many instances the share is as large at the share going to non-financial
businesses. The foreign banks brought credit scoring models which were easily applied to
household lending but not readily adopted for lending to enterprises. Further the banks
had only recently cleaned up loan losses and reduced lending to large unprofitable state
owned enterprises. Lending to enterprises, particularly newer or smaller enterprises, is
often relationship based. Household lending took off before bank - enterprise client rela-
tionships had time to develop. Commenting on developments in Polish banking, Wiesiolek
and Tymoczko (2015, p. 315) conclude that:
The model of banking which involved promoting loans for households (mostly hous-
ing loans) on a large scale was imported from headquarters before a culture of coop-
eration with enterprises had sufficient time to emerge. As a consequence, households
rather than enterprises have become the most important clients of banks . . . .
Another feature of lending was that by 2008 lending denominated in foreign currencies
exceeded 50% of all loans in some countries (e.g. Hungary, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania;
see Bonin (2010).
By the time of the crisis, foreign banks were a pervasive presence in all the countries
in our sample except Slovenia and the Ukraine.8 The differential impact of the crisis
does not seem to be related to the foreign bank share of assets or loans which are in
most instances little changed after the crisis. There are small declines which might reflect
tighter lending standards in the post-crisis period by foreign banks.
GDP dropped sharply in almost every country when the crisis started and in most
instances it rebounded after a year. Movements in private credit after the crisis differed
7The 12 transition countries are Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Ukraine.
8The foreign share of bank assets in each country in 2008 is shown in Table 1.
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from place to place. For example, in Poland, there was a short sharp decline in credit
that was quickly reversed and credit was back on trend by 2010. In Slovakia the impact
of the crisis on GDP was small and credit continued to grow. However, in Romania and
Hungary the credit slowdown was long lasting and five years after the crisis, credit had
not reached it prior peak. In Hungary, Slovenia, the Ukraine and the Baltic States credit
growth in the post-crisis years has been negative.
The share of lending going to households increased before the crisis and then tended
to level off at about 40% of all lending in most countries. In most countries, the share of
lending going to government and to financial corporations together was below 20% so any
increase in the household share was at the expense of lending to non-financial business.
Lending to households was concentrated in mortgage lending in Poland and Hungary in
particular. In Hungary, the largest type of lending was mortgages dominated in foreign
currency which led to both maturity and currency mismatch on bank balance sheets and
a banking system that was particularly vulnerable during the crisis. The only counties
where the share of lending to the non-financial business sector has increased since the crisis
are Romania, Slovakia and Hungary all of which experienced declines in total lending.
The impact of the financial crisis on the transition countries was severe as demand for
their exports dropped quickly after the crisis shock. Further, there was immediate concern
that financial crises would ensue as capital inflows halted suddenly. From the very start
of the crisis there was concern that banking customers in the transition economies where
most financial services were provided by foreign banks would suffer. Popov and Udell
(2012) use survey data on small and medium enterprises in the region to investigate the
transmission of the crisis shock through credit supply to SMEs. They find that SMEs
report larger credit constraints in areas where the local banks’ parents were more severely
affected by the crisis. According to De Haas et al. (2015), the contraction in credit by
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foreign bank subsidiaries in transition countries occurred earlier and was deeper than that
of domestic banks during the crisis years of 2008 and 2009. These studies indicate that
the developed country financial crisis was quickly transmitted to the transition countries
through a foreign bank ownership channel.
The fear of transmission of the financial crisis to the transition economies led immedi-
ately to a broad international policy response known as the Vienna Initiative. The Vienna
Initiative was an unusual private-public, multilateral response to the crisis. As the global
crisis was deepening in January 2009, the international financial institutions (including
the EBRD, IMF and the EIB) and the private foreign parent banks in the region reached
an agreement to cushion the effects of the shock. The banks agreed to maintain their
exposures to the transition countries and recapitalize banks as necessary while the IFIs
offered support of 33 billion Euros to maintain bank stability. Among the larger transition
countries, Hungary, the Ukraine, Poland and Romania all opened lending arrangement
with the IMF. These efforts contributed to the post-crisis recovery of banking and credit
creation in the region.
The discussions that led to the Vienna Initiative began in November 2008.9 There
was good reason for concern that the global crisis would be transmitted to and magnified
in the region because of the extensive foreign ownership. Thinking about foreign bank
ownership which had been widely supportive since the late 1990s was quickly reversed.
In the IMF’s retrospective view:
Many western banks in emerging Europe operate their subsidiaries as if they are
branches, with risk management centralized at the group level and local supervisors
relying on parent banks? home supervisors to monitor the changes in the risk profile
of their foreign affiliates. Foreign-owned banks can often evade regulatory measures,
9The large foreign banks originated the idea of a coordinated approach, which resulted in the Vienna
Initiative, in a letter expressing concern for the financial stability of the region sent to the European
Commission in November 2008.
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including by switching from domestic to cross-border lending or by switching lend-
ing from banks to non-banks, such as leasing institutions (owned by foreign-owned
banks). Foreign-owned banks are also less likely to be influenced by domestic mon-
etary policy measures, such as the raising of domestic interest rates. Often, these
banks are systemically important in the host country although only a small part of
the overall bank group. (Bakker and Klingen, 2012, pp. 21-22).
The evidence is that the Vienna Initiative was successful; De Haas et al. (2015)
found that banks that participated in the Vienna Initiative were less likely to contract
credit in the region than banks that did not participate. This is particularly important
because De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2014) found that around the world multinational bank
subsidiaries curtailed credit growth during the crisis much more than domestic banks.
Nonetheless, Epstein (2014) argues that it was the business models of the banks them-
selves rather the Vienna Initiative intervention that mitigated the effects of the crisis.
The foreign parent banks in the regions were committed to their longer-term objectives of
maintaining market share and reputation in their "second-home" markets. Further Bonin
and Louie (2105) show that the six large multinational banking groups with transition
subsidiaries maintained their commitment to the region during both the global financial
crisis and the Eurozone crisis.
For more than a decade, differences in banking performance among transition countries
was often attributed to the beneficial presence of foreign banks. The crisis experience
dispelled that notion; there was evidence that foreign ownership transmitted or magnified
the crisis shock. Nevertheless, most countries in the region demonstrated a great deal of
resilience in face of the crisis shock albeit with the help of the Vienna Initiative. Bonin
(2010) notes that countries with and without extensive foreign ownership were affected
by the crisis and argues that other factors were at work. For example, Slovenia, with
little foreign ownership but serious macro-economic imbalances suffered a banking crisis.
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Hungary on the other hand with extensive foreign ownership was severely affected by
the crisis. In order to stem capital outflow and maintain financial sector stability, the
Hungarian central bank had to raise its base lending rate by 300 basis points at the end of
2008. However, the problem in Hungary was the extent of lending in foreign currency and
bank portfolios with both maturity and currency mismatch. Bank regulators probably
and mistakenly assumed that foreign bank parents would absorb all risks. This is as much
a failure of domestic bank supervision and poor risk management by banks. In the post-
crisis period, Hungarian authorities have tried to develop macro-prudential policy tools
to prevent a recurrence. A few south eastern European countries, particularly Croatia,
used macro prudential tools prior to the crisis to rein in a credit boom with some limited
success.10 Poland performed well during the crisis despite extensive foreign ownership.
Poland’s banking system was less concentrated than elsewhere and more competitive with
diverse foreign ownership and little foreign currency lending. Lending in the Ukraine
declined and more recently some Russian banks have replaced risk-adverse owners from
the West. Banking experience after the crisis was diverse and seems to have more to do
with domestic policy and the quality of regulation than the extent of foreign ownership.
In the next section we discuss how institutional characteristics effect the banking
system’s ability to withstand a crisis shock. Our hypothesis is that the crisis shock
increased uncertainty about lending; it should have a lesser effect when good institutional
structures provide a shock absorber.
10A variety of interventions were used to curb types of lending or reduce capital inflows. See Dimova
et al (2016).
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A.4 Credit Information Systems in Transition Coun-
tries
The literature on law and finance cited earlier emphasizes the importance of legal insti-
tutions. Clearly defined property rights, contract law, a commercial code and a court
systems that can adjudicate disputes fairly, quickly and without corruption are essential
for a modern business economy. There are many nations around the world where many
of these things are missing but they are in place in most of the transition countries partly
as a result of reforms that were required to secure EU membership. The World Bank’s
Doing Business surveys introduced in 2003 have become a standard source for measures
of the general context for business activity (see Besley (2015)). Generally, the transition
countries score well on the Doing Business indicators. The average overall doing business
distance to the frontier (a value of 100 representing best practices) for the 12 countries in
our empirical analysis was 74.5 in 2014, only a few points below the average for OECD
countries.
The two principal roles of banks are the provision of deposits used as the transactions
medium and the financial intermediation by providing credit to deficit units. The ability
to provide credit efficiently relies on the existence of institutions that support lending
operations. For our empirical investigation, we are particularly interested in the data on
credit institutions from the Doing Business Surveys.11 There are data on the existence and
functioning of both public credit registries and private credit bureaus that maintain data
bases on payment history and credit outstanding for both enterprises and individuals. All
of the 12 transition countries in our empirical analysis have one or the other and five have
both. The existence of credit information is just the first step, it has to be available and
11For a description of the World Bank’s methodology regarding data on getting credit see:
http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/getting-credit.
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usable to lenders.
The World Bank Doing Business reports also provide an summary index, the "Depth
of Credit Information", which is based on responses to questions regarding the availability
of credit information and another summary index, the "Strength of Legal Rights" which
measures legal rights of lenders in regard to collateral and in bankruptcy.12 Table 1 shows
the 2008, pre-crisis, value of the indicators and also the asset-weighted market share of
foreign banks for the 12 countries in our empirical analysis below.
The quality of credit information systems differs among countries. Some countries,
such as Lithuania and Bulgaria, scored well on the "Depth of Credit Information" index
while Latvia, Slovenia and the Ukraine have scores of zero indicating the absence of
any formal credit information systems. Cross-country variation is the "Strength of Legal
Rights" index, though substantial, is less pronounced. In 2008, index values range from
4 out of 10 in Slovakia to 10 out of 10 in Latvia and an overall average of approximately
7. Interestingly, the indicators are uncorrelated. The correlation between the 2008 values
of two indices is 0.15. Most notably, Latvia has a weak credit registry with very little
coverage and a maximal score on the "Strength of Legal Rights" index. In addition, both
indices have only a weak correlation with the foreign bank share.13 The correlation of
the foreign bank asset share in 2008 with the depth of credit index is 0.21 and with the
strength of legal rights index it is 0.01.
Coverage by registers and bureaus varies among those countries, which have such an
institution in place. Coverage is measured as the number of entities in the database
12The questions in each index are found under the aforementioned link.
13The foreign bank lending shares were calculated by combining the "Bank Ownership Database" (see
Claessens and Van Horen (2015) with Bankscope data. The highest consolidation level in Bankscope and
the ownership data base were merged by index number or by name. Unmatched banks were dropped if
their loans was below 1% in every year. Ownership of the others was determined from annual reports,
press articles and self-descriptions on the homepages.
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plus the number of credit inquiries for which there was no entry, all as a ratio to the
adult population. For private credit bureaus in 2008, the coverage ranges from 3% in the
Ukraine to 72% in Croatia with an overall mean of 28%. Coverage by public registers
ranges 1% in Slovakia to 31% in Bulgaria with an overall mean of 4%.14
The credit information systems are not the only potentially relevant institutional struc-
tures in which the countries differ. We also find variation regarding the enforcement of
contracts (measured by length in days required and the costs of enforcement as per cent
of the claim) and the insolvency system (measured by the recovery rate and the costs of
the procedure as a per cent of the estate).
We turn next to an empirical examination of the influence of these indicators on bank
lending and the resilience of lending to the crisis shock.
A.5 Empirical Analysis
We use a panel data for our 12 transition countries for the period 2004-14 to examine
the effects of institutional quality and the extent of foreign ownership on the volume of
bank lending. The global financial crisis presents an opportunity to examine how good
institutions cushion the effects of the shock. We treat the global financial crisis as an
exogenous shock and examine how lending is affected during the crisis.15 Specifically, we
relate the pre-crisis characteristics of the financial sector to the strength of lending after
14Some of the large differences can be attributed to the scope of the register or bureau. In some
countries with low values coverage is restricted to firms.
15The crisis originated in the US and was quickly transmitted around the world. See also Behn,
Haselmann and Wachtel (2016).
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the crisis shock. The regression framework for the analysis is shown by:
log(Loan Volume)i,t = αi + αt + δ ∗ Institutioni,2008 ∗ Crisist
+ θ ∗ Controlsi,t + i,t
(A.1)
The dependent variable is the log of the volume of loans to a particular sector in current
Euros in country i in year t. The coefficient of particular interest is δ, the coefficient on
the interaction of the crisis indicator, Crisist which has a value of one post-2008 and a
measure of institutional quality, Institutioni,2008, in the pre-crisis year (2008). A positive
δ indicates that institutional quality cushioned the effect of the financial crisis on loan
volume.
Other variables on the right hand side are fixed effects for both countries and years
and macro and banking sector controls. To control for economic development, we include
real GDP growth and inflation from the IMF World Economic Outlook. We control for
possible effects the Vienna Initiative with a variable that reflects the influence of the
policy initiative in each country. We identify the banks in each country that participated
in the Vienna Initiative or are owned by a bank that participated in the Vienna Initiative.
The control variable is the asset-weighted share of these "Vienna-Parent"-banks in each
country.16
Estimates of equation (1) are in Table 2. Since the existence of asymmetric information
might vary considerably between different sectors, institutions may play a very different
role for different borrowers. In order to learn about this we present separate regressions
for lending to households, non-financial businesses and the government sector, as well as
total lending. We present results for the coverage of credit institutions and for the foreign
bank share. Other measures of institutional quality did not have any significant impact.
16The bank asset data are from Bankscope.
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Estimates use OLS and the standard errors are clustered by country.
To identify the effect of the institutional variables on lending, we use the crisis shock
as a quasi-experiment. That is, we examine whether there is a differential reaction in
lending in response to the shock depending on the quality of institutions, e.g. the extent
of coverage of the credit register. As noted earlier, the failure of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008 and the subsequent strain on the global financial system did not origi-
nate in Eastern Europe and can therefore be considered exogenous. The coefficient δ in
equation (1) describes how much of the shock was absorbed by the institutional variable.
Intuitively, δ describes how lending in countries with good pre-crisis institutions fared
compared to countries with poor institutions.
In order to measure the effectiveness of credit institutions we apply the coverage of
private credit bureaus as explanatory variable in panel A and the coverage of public credit
registers in panel B. With regards to aggregate lending, we find that well-functioning
credit information institutions measured as public registers are able to cushion the effects
of the crisis. More specifically, once the crisis shock hit the Eastern European economies,
aggregate lending decreased by 12 percent less as a response to the shock in a country
where the coverage of the public credit register is by 10 percentage points higher relative
to another country. When we measure the quality of credit institutions by the coverage
of private credit bureaus we do not find a significant impact on aggregate lending.
Looking at the different sectors reveals a more distinct pattern. High bureau cover-
age increases lending to households post crisis whereas high register coverage increases
lending to non-financial corporations. Reason for this asymmetric effect is possibly the
different scope of bureaus and registers: bureaus tend to focus on individuals whereas reg-
isters primarily collect information on firms. We conclude that the availability of creditor
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information mitigated the effects of the financial crisis.
In Panel C, we look at the effect of foreign banks on the post crisis reaction. We find
that the presence of foreign banks did not shield countries from the effect of the crisis.
On the contrary, the negative interaction coefficients suggests that countries with a high
presence of foreign banks recovered more slowly after the crisis shock.
We also test a series of other institutional measures - for example the duration of the
insolvency procedure or the costs of contract enforcement - but none of these variables
has a systematic influence on the post-crisis reaction of lending.
A.6 Conclusion
Early studies of transition banking starting in the late 1990s tended to emphasize the
importance of foreign bank entry. The literature on the law and finance nexus was just
emerging at that time and the importance of institutional development in transition bank-
ing was not appreciated at first. In addition, measurement of institutional quality is dif-
ficult and the World Bank data on specific institutional characteristics was not collected
until after 2003. Economics tends to emphasize things that can be measured. Changes in
ownership provided concrete data while institutional change is harder to measure. With
the limited data available, our regression framework gives some broad indication of the
role of institutions on lending in transition countries and shows that institutions - partic-
ularly credit institutions - can mitigate the effects of the crisis. During the global financial
crisis, foreign ownership was a burden mitigated by Vienna Initiative, while good credit
institutions were a cushion.
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Figure A.1: Household and Business Lending and GDP, 2004-2014
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Figure A.1: Household and Business Lending and GDP, 2004-2014 - continued
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The figure depicts the development of loans to households, non-financial corporations and nom-
inal GDP normalized to 1 in 2004. The data is from the European Central Bank (ECB) and, if
not available from the ECB, from the national central banks. For non-Euro currencies, the loan
volume is converted into EUR using the average exchange rate in that month. The development
for Slovakia and Croatia are not shown due to limited data availability in 2004.
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Table. A.1: Institutional and Bank Data in 2008
Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Ukraine
Credit Information
Depth of Credit Information Index 6 3 5 5 5 0 6 5 4 4 0 0
Credit Bureaus 5% 72% 65% 21% 10% 0% 7% 50% 25% 40% 0% 3%
Credit Registers 31% 0% 5% 0% 0% 4% 9% 0% 5% 1% 3% 0%
Strength of Legal Rights Index 9 7 6 6 7 10 5 8 9 8 4 9
Bankruptcy & Insolvency Law
Enforcement Length (Days) 564 561 653 425 335 279 210 830 537 565 - 387
Enforcement Costs (% of Claim) 24% 14% 33% 17% 15% 16% 24% 19% 20% 26% 19% 44%
Recovery Rate 32% 30% 21% 39% 38% 35% 49% 34% 29% 45% 47% 9%
Insolvency Costs (% of Estate) 9% 15% 15% 9% 15% 13% 7% 15% 9% 18% 8% 42%
Foreign Banks
Share of Foreign Bank 84% 91% 85% 98% 84% 66% 92% 76% 88% 99% 31% 51%
Share Vienna 41% 54% 45% 89% 40% 48% 64% 15% 56% 20% 43% 6%
The 2008 value is displayed. Depth of Credit information, Coverage private bureau, Coverage public register, and Strength of Legal Rights Index are
taken from the annual Worldbank "Doing-Business" Survey. Depth of Credit Information is an index ranging from 0 to 8. Likewise, the Strength of
Legal Rights Index from 0 to 12. Larger index values indicate more and deeper information on borrower in the credit register or better protection of
lenders and borrowers. Enforcement Length (Days) is the time to resolve a dispute, counted from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit in court
until payment. This includes both the days when actions take place and the waiting periods between. Enforcement Costs (% of Claim) are the cost
in court fees and attorney fees, where the use of attorneys is mandatory or common, expressed as a percentage of the debt value. Recovery Rate
calculates how many cents on the dollar secured creditors recover from an insolvent firm at the end of insolvency proceedings. Insolvency Costs (%
of Estate) are the average cost of insolvency proceedings. Share of Foreign Bank is the asset-weighted market share of foreign banks. Share Vienna
is the fraction of banks whose parents participated in the Vienna Initiative. Description of the credit information, and bankruptcy and insolvency
law partly taken from the Worldbank "Doing Business" report.
170
Table. A.2: The Effect of Credit Information and Foreign Bank Ownership on Lending
Panel A: Bureau Coverage
Loans to
Total Households Business Government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis * Bureau 0.002 0.007*** 0.002 0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.011)
Observations 121 121 121 121
R-squared 0.81 0.94 0.86 0.31
Panel B: Register Coverage
Loans to
Total Households Business Government
(1’) (2’) (3’) (4’)
Crisis * Register 0.012*** 0.001 0.013*** 0.044***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008)
Observations 121 121 121 121
R-squared 0.83 0.92 0.88 0.42
Panel C: Foreign Banks
Loans to
Total Households Business Government
(1”) (2”) (3”) (4”)
Crisis * Foreign -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.007** -0.007**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 121 121 121 121
R-squared 0.81 0.92 0.87 0.33
The table reports δ of equation 1: log(Loan Volume)i,t = αi + αt + δ ∗
Institutioni,2008 ∗Crisist+θ ∗Controlsi,t+ i,t. Each specification includes
country and year fixed effects and macro control variables (as described
in the text). Loans to Businesses exclude loans to financial corporations.
Bureau is the number of individuals and firms listed in the largest credit
bureau as percentage of adult population. Register is the number of
individuals and firms listed in the credit register as percentage of adult
population. Foreign is the asset-weighted market share of foreign banks.
Crisis is a post-crisis dummy which is equal to one post 2008. Standard
errors are adjusted for clustering at the country level and reported in
parenthesis. Note: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, **
at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
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APPENDIX B
LIQUIDITY AND PRICE DISCOVERY IN THE CDS
MARKET
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B.1 Introduction
Credit default swaps (CDS) are one of the most successful financial innovation of the
last decades. Even though the size of the CDS market nearly halved in the aftermath
of the financial crisis, the global outstanding volume is still approximately one fourth of
the US bond market.1 The basic mechanism of a CDS is that of an insurance against
default of an entity: If the reference entity of the CDS contract defaults, the holder of a
CDS receives a payment. Therefore, a CDS can be understood as an insurance against
the credit risk of a certain company. Credit risk or, put differently, the probability of
default of a firm is not uniquely priced in CDS, but also in equity prices. As shown by
Merton (1974a), equity can be understood as a put option on the assets with a strike
price of the nominal value of debt. If the value of the firm’s assets fall below the nominal
value of debt - if the firm is in default - equity is wiped out. Hence, the value of equity
depends on the probability of default.2 Thereby, CDS and equity are priced based on
a similar set of fundamentals of the firm. Therefore, one expects that new information
about the reference entity is simultaneously priced in the CDS and equity market since
otherwise arbitrage opportunities might arise. However, there is an extensive literature
on the lead-lag relationship between CDS and equity returns documenting delayed pricing
of new information in the CDS spreads.
Our aim is to examine whether the lead-lag relationship varies over time or across
entities and how CDS liquidity and trading affects the price discovery process. In general,
we expect that information is more timely priced into CDS spreads if the market is
more liquid and when the trading activity is high. To this end, we merge weekly data
1According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, the total US outstanding
bond market debt was 39,885 bn USD in the forth quarter of 2013. The gross notional of single-name
CDS was 10,731 bn USD.
2Carr and Wu (2011) describes the strong similarities between an out-of-the-money American put
option and a CDS.
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of outstanding CDS volume and transactions with daily CDS and equity returns. Our
sample consists of 530 entities, the observation period spans from 2011 to 2013. To assess
the price discovery of CDS vis-à-vis equity, we adopt the methodology of Hilscher et al.
(2013) and regress current CDS returns on lagged equity returns. Our results are in line
with earlier research as far as we document an information flow from equity to CDS on
an aggregate level. Looking on the entities individually, we find that the aggregate results
are driven by only half of the firms in the sample. For the other half, equity returns do
not predict CDS returns. In addition, we document a stark variation of the information
flow not only between entities but also over time. Though liquidity and trading appears
to affect the price discovery process, the effect is highly specification depended and no
single variable can be pinned down that drives the process.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: The second section reviews the
relevant literature. Section 3 describes the the methodology and the dataset. Results are
presented in section 4. The robustness of the results is tested in the fifth section. The
sixth and final section concludes.
B.2 Literature
This chapter connects to three strands of literature. First, we extend the literature on the
price discovery in related security markets, namely the CDS and equity market. Second,
we connect to the literature on CDS trading in as far as we examine the effect of trading
on price discovery. Third, we build on the extensive literature on the non-credit risk
components of CDS spreads to form our hypothesis.
The literature on the lead-lag relationship finds that equity returns predominantly lead
CDS returns. Notable exceptions are Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Qiu and Yu (2012),
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who find that information flow from CDS to equity - especially for reference entities with
a high probability of default and on days with a credit events. The leadership of CDS
over equity in the price discovery process is interpreted as insider trading by informed
dealer banks on the CDS market, which have private information on the creditworthiness
of an entity. Later studies, namely Norden and Weber (2007), Hilscher et al. (2013), Forte
and Lovreta (2013), and Augustin et al. (2014), find evidence that information flow from
the equity to the CDS market. Though the findings of those papers point in the same
directions, the methodologies vary. Forte and Lovreta (2013) use a structural model to
extract credit spreads from equity and CDS rather than using returns. Exploiting the co-
integration relationship between the CDS- and equity-implied credit spreads, they employ
a vector autocorrection model to calculate information shares à la Hasbrouck (1995) and
Gonzalo and Granger (1995). Norden and Weber (2007), and Hilscher et al. (2013) use
an approach which does not rely on structural models to extract credit spreads. Instead
of credit spreads, they analyse the lead-lag relationship between equity and CDS returns
in a linear regression model. Regarding the price discovery of CDS vis-Ãă-vis the bond
market, the existing literature - to the best of our knowledge unanimously - find that
CDS lead the price discovery (Blanco et al., 2005; Palladini and Portes, 2011; Mayordomo
et al., 2014; Forte and Pena, 2009; Augustin et al., 2014). Higher standardization of CDS
contracts compared to bonds is identified as main reason for the price discovery leadership.
Subrahmanyam et al. (2014), and Boehmer et al. (2015) show that the possibility
of CDS trading has an impact beyond the mere introduction of a possibly redundant
asset. Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) demonstrate that firms become more likely to file
for bankruptcy once CDS on them become available. Boehmer et al. (2015) shows that
the equity market quality - returns show a stronger autocorrelation and the price process
is more noisy - deteriorates if CDS contracts on the firm are traded. A more policy-
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orientated discussion of the impact of CDS trading and its role in the financial crisis can
be found in Stulz (2010).
The literature on the drivers of the lead-lag relationship is limited. Forte and Lovreta
(2013) finds some variation in the price discovery using a sample of 92 European firms
from 2002-2008. In their sample, the stock market dominates the CDS market more
strongly during a period of financial distress, whereas the CDS market has the same
or even higher information share during tranquil times. A high CDS bid-ask spread
reduces the information share of CDS . Likewise, Hilscher et al. (2013) and Augustin
et al. (2014) show that the relationship between CDS and equity is stronger for entities
with a higher credit rating - a finding in line with the prediction of Merton (1974a),
that asserts that the sensitivity of an option to changes in the value of the underlying is
increasing in the moneyness of the option. In addition, Hilscher et al. (2013) link price
discovery to investor inattention. As investors have only limited attention and trade in
the CDS market primarily for liquidity reasons and have little open positions, they will
pay less attention to the CDS market than to the equity market. Indeed, Hilscher et al.
(2013) find that around earning announcement - when CDS traders are likely to pay more
attention - information are much faster incorporated into CDS spreads. Narayan et al.
(2014) find that the stock market leads the CDS market, especially for investment grade
firms. Furthermore, the authors document some heterogeneity between different sectors
and over time using the Gonazalo-Granger information share methodology of measuring
contributions to price discovery.3 For industrials, the stock market contributes 70% of
the information to the price discovery process, while the average for all firms lies around
60%. Even for the sector with the lowest contribution of the stock market, health care,
the contribution of the stock market of 52,9% is higher than the contribution of the CDS
3See Yan and Zivot (2010) for a discussion of the differences of co-integration-based price discovery
measures.
176
market. The results from estimating the contribution to the price discovery with sample
with different market capitalization suggest, that firms with a higher market capitalization
generally exhibit a higher contribution of the stock market.4. We extend this literature by
explicitly examining differences in the price discovery process within and between entities
as well as the impact of a series of CDS liquidity and trading measures.
The trading activity of CDS contracts has received only limited attention in the liter-
ature. One of the first paper examining the structure of the CDS market is Chen et al.
(2011). They find that most reference entities exhibit a very low trading activity and that
trading tends to be clustered in time and is possibly event-driven. We confirm the finding
of Chen et al. (2011) and document a high within entity variation of CDS trading. The
network structure of the CDS market is explored by Peltonen et al. (2014). First, they
find that the CDS market is structured similar to the interbank market, i.e. exhibit a
“small world” structure. Second, the network structure varies between entities in terms
of size, activity and concentration. Oehmke and Zawadowski (2016) examine the linkage
between the CDS and bond market. CDS provide an alternative trading venue for hedg-
ing and speculation in the underlying bond. This venue is more frequently used if bond
market of that entity is fragmented and negative CDS-bond basis, i.e. if the CDS spread
is below the bond spread. Finally, Gündüz et al. (2013) provides insights on how the
order flow affects the CDS spreads. Their finding is twofold. First, they document that
CDS spreads increase (decrease) if trader buy (sell) protection. Second, dealers appear to
have significant pricing power as they demand higher prices from buy-side investors than
from other dealer. Overall, the literature finds that the CDS market is far from being a
perfect market but is rather categorized by market frictions and time-varying trading.
4Note that the description in the article of Narayan et al. (2014) of the size groups is not clear cut.
The main body of the article suggests that lower bin number indicate a higher market capitalization,
whereas the table description states that the bin labelled “Size 1” contains the “smallest sized firms, while
the largest sized firms are in size 10” (Narayan et al., 2014, Page 174)
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A large body of literature analyses non-credit risk components of CDS spreads. Over-
all, the literature is unanimous in acknowledging a substantial liquidity component in
CDS spreads. Bongaerts et al. (2011) provide a model an equilibrium asset pricing which
explicitly considers the over-the-counter features of the CDS market. The model is used
to decompose CDS returns into credit risk, liquidity premium and other components. For
CDS of all rating categories and CDS bid-ask spread levels, liquidity explains a substantial
part of CDS returns. Hence, the authors conclude, CDS cannot be used as a frictionless
measure of default risk. Similar to Bongaerts et al. (2011), Tang and Yan (2013) find
that approximately one third of a the change in the CDS spread can be explained by
supply-demand imbalance and CDS liquidity. Arakelyan and Serrano (2012) find that the
number of contributors has a positive effect on CDS spreads, i.e. a CDS spread increase
coincides with an increase in the number of contributors. As a superior measure of CDS
illiquidity, the authors single out the number of contributors, i.e. the number of dealer
banks and CDS broker that submit books which are used to calculate the CDS spread .
The interaction of liquidity and spread changes are examined by Qiu and Yu (2012).They
find that liquidity is generally higher if the transaction demand is higher. However, liq-
uidity provision - measured by the number of quote providers - is reduced in the advent
of a credit event. In other words, the non-credit risk component is likely to be larger in
times, when one wants a clean measure of credit risk.
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B.3 Data & Methodology
B.3.1 Dataset
B.3.1.1 CDS Position and Transaction data
The Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC), a US-based clearing house, pub-
lishes the outstanding positions as well as the associated transaction data for the 1,000
entities with the highest outstanding positions on a weekly basis from October 2008 on-
wards. By its own account, DTCC captures 98% of the global CDS transactions. We
collect DTCC data from April 2011 to December 2013. DTCC provides two measures
for the market size for a reference entity: Net and gross notional amounts. The gross
notional amount equals the sum of all outstanding CDS contracts. This measure is likely
to be diluted by industry practices and overestimates the size of the CDS market: Often,
CDS traders do not terminate a contract when they want to reduce a position but take an
offsetting position. Offsetting trades bloat the gross notional amount even though they
reduce the actual net CDS positions. The offsetting trades are excluded in the second
measure of market size, the net notional amount. In the net notional, only contracts of net
protection buyers are counted. Intuitively, the net notional amount can be understood as
the maximum amount of payments which had to be made in case of credit event (Oehmke
and Zawadowski, 2016). We - like Oehmke and Zawadowski (2016) - use therefore the
net notional amount rather than the gross notional amount as a cleaner measure of size
for the individual reference entity. All reference entities which are not among the 1000
reference entities over the entire observation period are dropped to allow for a focus on
the within-entity variation.
For each entity, the DTCC provides weekly information on new trades, assignments
(transfer of existing contracts to a third party), terminations of existing contracts and
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matured contracts.5 In addition, to the aforementioned transaction data, the DTCC pub-
lishes data on risk transfers from August 2010 onwards. Risk transfers excludes transac-
tions which did not result in a change in the market risk position of the market participants
and are not market activity. In particular, trade compressions - aggregation of existing
contracts into fewer contracts that keep the net risk position of each party unchanged -
and replacements of expiring contracts does not enter the risk transfers.6 Risk transfers
include primarily new trades between two parties, termination and assignment of existing
contracts. Risk transfers (Transfer) include therefore information which are not included
in the other transaction measure since one does not know ex ante whether, e.g. a new
trade was made to replace a maturing one (which would not result in a change in the risk
position) or whether a market participant opened a new position. To account for the dif-
ferent dimension of transactions, we select two of the available transaction measures with
different interpretations. First, we use risk transfers. Risk transfers can be best under-
stood as a turnover variable which measures by how much actual risk positions changed.
If no change in risk positions occurs, CDS quotes might not or only sluggishly be up-
dated and, hence, not reflect all information as there is no need for dealer banks to adjust
their spreads. Note that we do not observe whether a risk transfer results in a increase
or decrease in the total outstanding risk. Our second measure, the maturing volume of
CDS Matured is more linked to inattention than to turnover. If a CDS contract matures
and the investor wants to leave his risk position unaltered, a new CDS contract must be
agreed upon. Most likely, the investor and the dealer will use all available information to
price the new contract, i.e. they allocate more of their scarce attention his CDS portfolio.
We expect that CDS returns are more informative and reflect new information faster in
5A detailed explanation of the size and transaction data can be found in DTCC (2011). Before
February 2013, transactions were only reported if there occurred more than 50 trades in a particular
week. This restriction was dropped in February 2013 and from then on all transaction independent from
the number of trading instances are reported.
6This procedure is similar to netting of CDS positions. But unlike to netting that weights contracts
against each other, trade compression actually alters the contracts, e.g. by terminations.
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periods of high risk transfers and maturing volume. To make the measures comparable
across entities, we scale both, Transfer and Matured by the Net Notional.
B.3.1.2 CDS Spreads and liquidity measures
We match the DTCC data with CDS spreads and liquidity variables from Markit, a
financial service provider primarily owned by dealer banks. Markit is widely used by CDS
market participants and academia, because its data is considered to be of higher quality
than data of alternative providers (Qiu and Yu, 2012; Mayordomo et al., 2014). CDS
spreads are available for different tenors, seniorities and restructuring clauses.7 In our
study, we use the five year tenor of senior, unsecured debt since it is the most liquid tenor-
seniority combination (Chen et al., 2011). Concerning the restructuring clause, we use
the “no restructuring” clause” (XR) for US entities, the “modified-modified restructuring”
(MM ) clause for European entities and the “full restructuring” (CR) clause for entities
in Asia, Australia and New Zealand.8 Note that the CDS spreads provided by Markit
are quoted spreads rather than transaction prices. CDS returns CDS are calculate as
the difference in the natural logarithm of the spread. Positive returns an increase in the
spread and thereby in the market perception of the default risk of the entity.
From April 2011 onwards, Markit provides four daily liquidity measures: the number
of quotes, the number of active dealer, composite depth and the bid-ask spread. To
make the CDS bid-ask spread (CDS BAS ) comparable across entities, we normalized the
absolute bid-ask spread by the CDS spread.9 In an over-the-counter market, high bid-ask
spreads could have several reasons. First, the bid-ask spread could be driven by high
7The restructuring clause of a CDS contract defines which events - e.g. actual default, delayed pay-
ments or restructuring of debt - constitute a default and thereby trigger a payment.
8Our choice corresponds to regional preferences of Thompson Reuters Datastream. Likewise, Slive
et al. (2013) use the “no restructuring” clause for US Dollar contracts and “modified-modified” for contracts
denominated in Euro.
9Markit actual provides longer time series but they are not available in the database of the Bundesbank.
181
inventory costs. Since - as Chen et al. (2011) pointed out - dealer tend not to hedge new
CD positions immediately, a high bid-ask spread could be used to compensate dealers
for high inventory costs. Second, dealer could set high bid-ask spreads to deter informed
trader à la Acharya and Johnson (2007). In either case, a high bid-ask spread makes
timely pricing of new information in CDS spreads less likely.
Quotes count (QC) is the number of unique quotes for an entity at a given day. A
quote is defined as a different bid and/or ask value from the same source within the
same hour, or a same bid and ask value from the same source within different hours. A
new quotes signals the arrival of new information. Therefore, a high frequency of quotes
indicates that the dealers rapidly react to new information and adjust their quotes to avoid
arbitrage strategies. A low frequency of quotes could be explained by high transactions
costs which prevent arbitrage strategies and thereby the demand for CDS contracts in the
first place. Overall, we expect that observations with a higher number of quotes exhibit
a lower information flow from equity to CDS.10
The dealers count (DC) is the number of distinct dealer making a quote for an entity
at a given day. We use dealers count as a measure of market distortion due to limited
competition and overall liquidity provision. One would expect that a higher competition
between dealers fosters timely pricing of new information in the CDS market. Several
mechanism are conceivable. Under higher competition dealer might be forced to reduce
bid-ask spreads and attract more traders to the CDS market. Alternatively, dealer - which
are in most cases large banks - might have private information and use these information
to price CDS (Acharya and Johnson, 2007; Qiu and Yu, 2012). Both described channels
have the same implication: the higher the number of dealers, the lower is the informational
dominance of the equity market compared to the CDS market.
10Note that quotes are not binding. Commonly, they only serve as a starting point for negotiations for
transaction prices (Biswas et al., 2014).
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Composite depth (Depth) is the number of the of contributors whose books of record
are used to calculate the five year price (Markit,2014). Contributors could not only be
dealer but also non-dealer investment banks or CDS broker (Qiu and Yu, 2012). The
number of contributors is higher for a) larger firms and firms with a larger stock turnover,
b) firms just at the cut-off between investment- and speculative-grade and c) firms with
more banking relationships (Qiu and Yu, 2012). Intuitively, the higher number of contrib-
utors for reasons a) and b) can be attributed to a higher hedging demand and uninformed
trading. If a company has many bank relationships, many banks - potential dealers -
have private information about the firm and might use them to price CDS. Thereby, CDS
might reflective information more timely than equity (Acharya and Johnson, 2007; Qiu
and Yu, 2012).
B.3.1.3 Stock data and control variables
In addition to the firm-specific variables, we collect data on the VIX from the FRED
database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. The VIX, which equals the VIX is
the three-month implied volatility of S&P500 index options, is a common measure for the
market volatility and risk aversion. If - as Chen et al. (2011) suggests - dealers do not
hedge their CDS positions immediately, they are exposed to inventory risk. The inventory
risk is likely to be larger in times of high market volatility and dealers might be deterred
from writing new CDS contracts or might set high bid-ask spreads. We therefore expect
that more information flows from the equity market to the CDS market during periods
of high market volatility. To control further for risk aversion and risk perception, we add
the spread between Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate Bond yield and the seasoned Aaa
corporate bond yield to our sample.
Share prices are obtained from Datastream. Again, returns are calculated as th the
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difference in the natural logarithm of the stock price.11 A positive equity returns signals
an increase in the stock price and a decrease in the default risk of the firm.
B.3.1.4 Descriptives statistics
The final dataset includes 530 different reference entities. The observation period stretches
from April 2011 to December 2013 with a maximum of 713 trading days per reference
entity. For each entity, we have a minimum of 240 daily observations. As per 27th
December 2013, the sample covers 50 % of the entire net notional amount reported by
the DTCC. Financials (21.5 %), consumer good (16%) and consumer services (15%) are
the most common sectors in the sample. Approximately 52 % of the reference entities are
located in the Americas, 33% in Europe. The average firm in our sample has total assets
of 1,850 m USD million and a book value of equity of 517 m USD.
On average, the Net Notional amount of a reference entity is slightly above 1,000
m USD, i.e. above the average book value of the liabilities. The standard deviation is
high and observed net notional ranges from 54 to 12,723 m USD. Absolute risk transfer
amounts on average to 130 m USD. To make this measure of turnover comparable across
entities, we scale the absolute transfers by the size of the CDS market for that entity.
Relative to the size of the CDS market, the risk transfer amounts to just above 13% of
the net notional. Risk transfers, on average, are larger than the matured volume. Roughly
11% of the Net Notional or, in absolute terms, 91 USD million mature each week.
The average CDS spread with the regional preferred restructuring clause is 182 basis
points. Figure A.4 depicts the development of the average CDS spread and key liquidity
and trading measures over time. The average CDS spread lies around 150 basis points
in April 2011, increases to nearly 250 in late 2011 and than slowly decreases over time
11To exclude outliers, we winsorize CDS and equity returns at 0.1% level.
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to roughly 130 in late 2013. In terms of implied default probabilities, a CDS spread of
180 basis point corresponds - assuming a recovery rate of 40% - to an annualized default
probability of 2.9%.
The contemporaneous correlation between CDS returns is - as expected - negative
(-0.28) as a positive CDS return signals an increase in the credit risk but a positive equity
return a decrease in the default risk. Both, equity and CDS returns, are autocorrelated
though the pattern is more pronounced for CDS returns (See Figure A.1). The correlation
coefficients between the contemporaneous equity and CDS return with the first lag are 0.03
and 0.12, respectively. Figure A.2 depicts the cross-correlation of equity and CDS returns.
The correlation of contemporaneous CDS returns with past equity returns is stronger than
vice versa. The correlation coefficient of the contemporaneous equity returns and past
CDS returns drops to zero for the first lag.
Looking at the liquidity measure of the CDS market, we find that approximately six
out from a maximum of 15 dealers are active and 35 quotes are made for five year senior
CDS contracts.12 On average, the CDS spread was calculated based on books from more
than six contributors. The bid-ask spread of CDS, normalised by the spread, is above
50%, whereas the bid-ask spread for equity, normalised by the price, amounts to 0.2%.13
Liquidities measures do not show a consistent pattern over time (See Figure A.4).
Some measures indicate an increasing liquidity over time, for example the composite
depth, whereas, inter alia, a decreasing dealers count hints towards a decrease in liquidity.
The composite depth rises from below five to approximately 6.5 in late 2011 and stays
at this level for the rest of the observation period. Contrary, the average dealers count
12As per June 2011, DTCC lists 17 clearing dealer: Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Barclays, BNP
Paribas, Clayon, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman, Sachs, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase,
Morgan Stanley, Natixis, Nomura, Royal Bank of Scotland, Société Générale, UBS, and UniCredit.
13We conservatively remove bid and ask prices which have been incorrectly reported. In most of those
cases, the decimal was wrongly placed.
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decreases from eight to six at a steady rate. Though visually the quotes count appears
to be highly correlated with the dealers count, it follows a distinct path. The average
drops from around 40 to 25 in early 2012 and then recovers to 40 in late 2013. The CDS
Bid-Ask Spread, normalised by the CDS spread, rises from around 40% to more than 55%
of the CDS spread (dashed line in Figure A.4, Panel (d)). Since we used a normalised
bid-ask spread, the results could be driven by the changes in the CDS spread. Indeed,
the unscaled CDS bid-ask spreads displays a different pattern: it jumps in 2011 from 50
basis point to over 90. Afterwards it gradually decreases to 55 basis points (solid line in
Figure A.4, Panel (d)). Risk transfers relative to the Net Notional are relatively flat over
the sample period.
Overall, the liquidity and trading characteristics vary significantly between the en-
tities and over time. Though the variation of liquidity measures is primarily driven by
between-entity variation, there is a substantial within-entity variation. In Table B.2, I
show the decomposition of the overall standard deviation in between entity and within
entity variation. For the composite depth, the CDS bid-ask spread, dealers count, and
quotes count, the within-entity variation lies between 60% and 85% of the between entity-
variation. For risk transfers, both absolute and relative, the within-entity is larger than
the between-entity variation. To visualise the between-entity variation, Figure A.3 plots
the distribution of the averages of selected liquidity variables over the entities. Eye-balling
suggests stark differences between entities. In particular, a few entities exhibit a much
larger net notional and number of quotes then the average entity does. For risk transfers
and composite depth, the distribution is more even but range of values is still substantial.
As expected, the liquidity and trading measures are correlated. Table B.3 shows the
pairwise correlation coefficients for the different liquidity and trading measures. Regarding
the sign, the correlation coefficients are generally in line with expectations. The positive
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correlation coefficients between Depth, DC, and QC and the negative correlations coef-
ficient of those variables with both versions of the BAS CDS suggest, that all liquidity
measures point in the same direction. However, none but one of the correlation coefficients
exceed 0.5 in absolute terms. This suggest that though the liquidity measures point in the
same directions, they capture information not contained in other variables.14 Note that
even though the dealers count and composite depth appear quantitatively similar in abso-
lute numbers, the correlation between the measures is relatively low with approximately
0.3. A higher net notional and higher risk transfers are generally associated with with a
more liquid CDS market. The matured volume is only weakly correlated with the other
variables. This weak correlation was expected as the maturity of a contract is pre-defined
in the contract and therefore exogenous to current market conditions.
B.3.2 Methodology
To assess the predictability of returns, we adopt the methodology used by Hilscher et al.
(2013) and regress contemporary CDS returns on past equity returns. The main regression
equation reads as follows:
RetCDSi,t = αi +
J∑
j=1
βj × RetEqi,t−j + γ × RetCDSi,t−1 + i,t (B.1)
RetCDSi,t and Ret
Eq
i,t are the CDS and equity returns of firm i at time t, respectively.
The intercept (αi) is allowed to vary at the reference entity level. For our main results,
we use the first ten lags of equity returns, i.e. J = 10, to predict contemporaneous CDS
returns. If information is compounded simultaneously in the CDS and equity market,
the lagged equity returns should not explain current CDS returns, i.e. βj = 0∀j > 0.
14A more formal analysis of the interaction of different liquidity measures, particularly the CDS bid-ask
spread, the dealer count and Wojtowicz (2014)
187
Results for different lag structures are provided as robustness checks. The lagged CDS
returns is included to account for autocorrelation. Like Hilscher et al. (2013), we cluster
the standard errors by date. I refer to the sum of the coefficient of lagged equity returns
as cumulative effect of equity on CDS in the remainder of the chapter.
To explore the effect of CDS liquidity and trading, I estimate Equation B.1 for a
number of different samples. First, we pool all observations and obtain a single vector of
βj for the full sample to obtain baseline results, which are comparable to those of Hilscher
et al. (2013). Then, to elicit effects of liquidity and trading, we sort the observations into
subsamples based on liquidity and trading measures. The subsample are generated by
sorting the daily observations of each entity into five quintiles according to their liquidity
and trading activity.15 Higher quintile numbers indicate higher values of the split variable.
For example, liquidity quintile 1 contains the days with lowest 20% of the observation of
each entity. Note that, since the sorting takes place on the entity level, absolute values
in higher quantile can actually be lower than values in lower quintiles on an aggregate
level. These regressions by quintile serve as a preliminary test for - possible non-linear -
effects of CDS liquidity and trading on price discovery. Second, we allow the coefficients
to vary on a entity level by estimating Equation B.1 for each entity individually. By
doing so, we get a sequence of βj from Equation B.1 for each entity and can analyse how
between entity differences in βj can be explained by average CDS liquidity and trading.
We refer to results obtained from those sample as “entity-level results”. Third, we allow the
coefficients to vary not only between entities but also over time. Time-varying coefficient
are obtained by splitting the observation period in sub-periods of 120 trading days. By
shifting the estimation window by 20 trading days - roughly on trading month - in each
15By sorting the observation on the entity level, we look at the effect of within entity variation in
liquidity and trading. We also try sorting in the full sample rather than on the entity level as well as
sorting into a different number of quantiles but the qualitative implications are unaffected.
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step, we obtain a maximum of 33 sub-periods per reference entity.16 As highlighted in
the previous section, liquidity and trading does not only vary between entities but also
strongly over time. By using different estimation windows for a entity, we obtained a
number of βj, t for each entity and are now able to examine how they co-move with
liquidity and trading variables.
To assess the variation in the price discovery between entities and over time, we quan-
tify deviations from our expectation that equity returns do not explain current CDS
returns. We code two variables. First, the variable Significance indicates whether past
equity returns actually exercise a significant influence on contemporaneous equity returns.
Significance is coded as a dummy and takes the value one if the hypothesis that the sum of
the coefficient of the lagged returns is equal to zero is rejected at the 10% level. Formally,
we test the null hypothesis
∑J
j=1 βj = 0 against the alternative
∑J
j=1 βj 6= 0.
Second, we quantify the deviation from the expectation by summing up the coeffi-
cients of past equity returns. Since one expects a negative correlation between equity and
CDS returns, we multiply the coefficient with minus one to make magnitude more readily
interpretable: A larger cumulative effect can be interpreted as a stronger impact of past
equity returns on CDS returns. If the sum of the coefficient is against the expectations
larger than zero, we set the cumulative effect to zero. Formally, the magnitude is calcu-
lated as Magnitude = max
[
0,−∑Jj=1 βj]. Though Magnitude has no ready or intuitive
interpretation, we interpret a larger Magnitude as an indicator for a stronger information
flow from equity to CDS as the deviation from the null hypothesis of
∑J
j=1 βj = 0 is
larger.
To evaluate the determinants of our two measures of price discovery, we regress both,
16We also try non-overlapping estimation window. Our main results are not affected by the choice of
overlapping estimation windows. If anything, the results for the overlapping windows are weaker.
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Significance andMagnitude, on a series of liquidity and trading measures. For Significance,
we estimate a probit model of the following form:
P (Significancei,t = 1) = Φ
(
α + δ × liquidityi,t + µ× tradingi,t + κ× Significancei,t−1 + i,t
)
(B.2)
where liquidityi,t and tradingi,t are vectors with the liquidity and trading measures.
For each variables in those vectors, we first estimate a univariate regression and, second,
the multivariate regression with all variables in liquidityi,t and tradingi,t. Equation B.2
is adapted to the different samples as follows. For the entity level regressions, the time
subscripts are dropped and the intercept does not vary between entities. Explanatory
variables are average over the different estimation periods: For the entity level regressions,
the average over the entire sample period is taken; for the rolling sample, the variables are
average only over the estimation window of 120 days. To control for the macroeconomic
environment, we add the aforementioned control variables - the VIX and the credit risk
spread - to all regression based on the rolling sample. Significancei,t−1 is included to
control for autocorrelation in the dependent variable that occurs by design in this setup.
In a similar fashion, we regress Magnitude on the same set of variables. As for Sig-
nificance, we show the regression equation for the rolling sample setup. The equation on
an entity level, the intercept does not vary between entities and the time subscripts are
dropped.
Magnitudei,t = α + δi × liquidityi,t + µi ∗ ×tradingi,t + κ×Magnitudei,t−1 + i,t (B.3)
where liquidityi,t and tradingi,t are same vectors of the liquidity and trading measures
as in the probit specification. For the rolling estimation window, we also use different
combinations of window and entity fixed effects to account for unobservable effects and
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shift the focus of the regression on the within-entity variation. As the series of the mag-
nitudes for each entity is autocorrelated by design, we include Magnitudei,t−1 to control
for this autocorrelation. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are used. Again,
we include the VIX and the credit risk spread as control variables in each specification
that does not include window fixed effects.
Finally, we examine the fractional response to assess the speed with which CDS spreads
react to new information (Hilscher et al., 2013). The fractional response is defined as the
share of the CDS return at time t relative to the sum of returns from t to t+10. Formally,
the fractional is defined as: Fractional Responsei,t =
ReturnCDSi,t∑t+10
s=t Return
CDS
i,s
. To ensure that the
fractional response takes only values between zero and one, the fractional response takes
the value of 1 if the return at time t is larger than the sum of returns from t to t+10.
If the return at time t has the opposite sign as the sum of returns from t to t+10, the
fractional response takes the value of 0. Intuitively, the fractional response describes the
speed with which new informations are incorporated in CDS spread. A high fractional
responds hints towards fast incorporation of new information, a low fractional response
towards a more sluggish adjustment. Since the fractional response is bounded between
zero and one, we are able to use the following linear probability model:
Fractional Responsei,t = Φ
(
αi + δi × liquidityi,t + µi ∗ ×tradingi,t + i,t
)
(B.4)
Again, we subsequently add different sets of entity and week fixed effects to focus on
within entity variation rather than across entity differences. However, using fixed effects
in a non-linear model might lead to biased estimators due to the incidental parameter
problem. However, as the bias is most pronounced in short panels with firm fixed effects,
the bias should not be serious in our setup. Nevertheless, the results should treated with
care. Standard errors are clustered at the entity level. Unlike the first approach, the
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fractional response measure does not assess the speed of information vis-à-vis a related
security market but rather examines whether CDS exhibit some sort of “momentum” or
pronounced autocorrelation in the return pattern.
B.4 Results
B.4.1 Pooled Results
Table B.4 holds our baseline results of Equation B.1. Past equity returns do have predic-
tive power for contemporary CDS returns. Vice versa, CDS returns have only very limited
predictive power for contemporary CDS returns. The overall, untransformed cumulative
effect of past equity returns is -0.390 and 0.068 for past CDS returns. The qualitative
implications do not change if fewer lagged returns are taken into account: If only the
first five lags are considered, the effect for past equity returns is -0.31, for lagged CDS
returns the effect is 0.097. In other words, the first five lags account for roughly 80% of
the cumulative effects -
∑J
j=1 βj in Equation B.1 - and the last 5 lags account for the
remaining 20% of the cumulative effect of equity on CDS. Quantitatively, these estimates
for the full sample are very similar to those of Hilscher et al. (2013).
Table B.5 provides first insights in the impact of liquidity and trading on the price
discovery process. We estimate Equation B.1 for subsamples with different liquidity quan-
tiles. Equity returns exercises a stronger influence on CDS returns for entities for obser-
vations for the low liquidity quantiles. For instances, the observations with in the lowest
liquidity percentile of the CDS bid-ask spread exhibit a cumulative effect of 0.350 whereas
the entities of the highest percentile 0.241. We also find strong differences for the com-
posite depth: The observation in the percentile with the highest composite depth, the
cumulative effect amounts to -0.428 compared to -0.390 of the full sample. This patterns
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of increased information value of equity returns can be found for all trading measures.
Those differences suggest - against our predictions - that past equity is more informative
in times of high liquidity. The cumulative effect does not exhibit a switching behaviour
in the sense that the cumulative effect tends to be either or increasing or decreasing in
the liquidity and trading quintiles.
The different sequences of βj for high and low liquidity quintiles are visualised in
Figure A.5. In each panel, we plot the cumulative effect for the high and low liquidity
quintile of the specified variable individually. For most variables, the difference in the
βj’s is persistent in the sense that the difference between the βj of the first lagged equity
return is preserved over the 10 lag horizon and in most cases the difference in increasing
in the number of lag. Notable exceptions are the dealer count and the bid-ask spread.
For the dealer count, the difference in βj is small and the cumulative effect of the high
liquidity percentile is sometimes larger and sometimes smaller than that of the low liquid-
ity percentile. For the bid-ask spread, this pattern is even more pronounced. From the
plots, we conclude that - though the differences are existent from lag one onwards - that a
certain number of lags in needed to generate consistent differences between the high and
low liquidity and trading percentiles.
Since the number of dealers and contributors is very small - recall that for single entity
there are never more than 15 active dealers and more than 12 contributors per day - the
marginal dealer or contributor might bring valuable and noticeable information to the CDS
market. To elicit the effect of the marginal dealer and contributors, we estimate Equation
B.1 separately for days on which a dealer/contributor left or entered the market. Figure
A.6, Panel A depicts the cumulative effect of equity on CDS for the days on which an
additional dealer (dashed line) or an additional contributor (dotted line). An additional
dealer does no effect on the magnitude of the effect of equity on CDS. Two explanations
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are possible. Either the additional dealer does not bring new information to the market
or our estimation is biased. Since we do not know whether the dealer at time t-1 and
t are the same, we cannot exclude the possibility that a dealer leaves the market at the
same time as a new dealer arrives. In this case, a dealer with new information enters the
market, but our aggregate measure indicate no change. Unexpectedly, an increase in the
number of contributors increases the predictability of CDS returns by equity returns. A
possible explanation by hedging behaviour by traders (Qiu and Yu, 2012): CDS Traders
observe changes in the equity market and want to adjust their CDS portfolio. Thereby,
the increased hedging demand leads to a higher composite depth but also to a delayed
response in the CDS spread relative to stock prices. An second explanation is more
technical: The entry of a new contributor is associated with a larger return in absolute
terms.17 Assuming a constant variance of stock returns, the coefficients should be larger
values if the dependent variable can take larger values and the variance of the independent
variables remains unchanged. Finally, I examine whether the model works differently for
positive and negative CDS returns. Indeed, Panel B of Figure A.6 reveals that higher
lags of equity returns have an impact for positive CDS returns, i.e. increases in the
default risk but virtually none for negative CDS returns, i.e. decreases in default risk.
One possible explanation for this finding is that CDS traders make use of negative stock
market information, but do not price positive information from the stock market in the
CDS spreads. Again, this suggests that the leadership of in the price discovery process is
more nuanced than suggested by the baseline results in Table B.4.
As described above, we run the regression in a rolling estimation window of 120 trading
days. Figure A.7 depict the evolution of the cumulative effect of past equity returns on
CDS returns over time. At the beginning of the sample period, the magnitude is around
17I test this hypothesis in an ordered logistic regression model with quantiles of the absolute returns as
dependent and the number of contributors as dependent variable. The coefficient of the composite depth
is positive suggesting that a higher number of contributors leads to larger, absolute returns
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0.4, rises to 0.7 and then dwindles to almost zero in late 2012. In 2013, the the magnitudes
fluctuates around the mean of 0.28. To avoid possible biased due to overlapping estimation
windows, we also estimate the cumulative effect for non-overlapping estimation windows
(dashed line in Figure A.7). The results are virtually unchanged. We conclude that the
relationship between equity and CDS returns does not only vary between entities - as
discovered by the sample splits - but also over time.
B.4.2 Entity Level
To analyse cross-sectional differences between the entities, we estimate Equation B.1
individually for each reference entity. Only for roughly 54% of the 530 entities, the
past equity returns exercise a statistically significant influence on the contemporary CDS
returns at the 10% level. In other words, the pooled results of the previous section appear
to be driven by approximately half the sample whereas the remaining half does not exhibit
a robust pattern between CDS and lagged equity returns.
Table B.6 reveals the drivers of the differences in Significance in the first two columns.
Column 1 holds the results for the univariate regressions. High CDS bid-ask spreads
reduce the likelihood that equity leads CDS. This can be viewed as confirmation of our
hypothesis that high bid-ask spreads reduce arbitrage opportunities and therefore the
incentive to quickly adjust CDS spreads and stock prices to new information priced in the
other security. The coefficients of the size and trading activity proxies generally suggest,
that equity is less likely to lead CDS if the outstanding amount is large and trading
activity is high. Against the expectation, a higher dealer of quotes count does not decrease
the probability that equity leads CDS returns in the univariate regressions. Finally, we
examine how the variance of stock and CDS returns affect the relationship. For firms
with a high (low) standard deviation in CDS (equity) returns, past equity returns are less
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likely to lead CDS returns. In the multivariate regression (column 2), most regressors -
with the exception of the bid-ask spread, the quotes count, relative transfers, the absolute
matured volume and the standard deviations of returns - lose their significance.
As for the Significance, we find substantial heterogeneity of the magnitude between
the entities. Figure A.8 depicts the distribution of the effect over the entities. The
cumulative effect of equity on CDS ranges from zero to 1.5. In Panel (b) of A.8, the
distribution of the cumulative effect of CDS on equity is plotted. As for the full sample,
the information flow in this direction is smaller in magnitude and is often - against the
expectation - positive. We run all our estimations also for an information flow from CDS
to equity but without meaningful results. Therefore, and for the the sake of conciseness
and clarity, we do not report the results for the flow from CDS to equity. Columns 3 and
4 of Table B.6 examines the determinants of the magnitude. The results are inconclusive.
In the univariate regressions, higher CDS spreads increase the size of the coefficient of
past returns. As for size and trading activity, the magnitude is lower for entities with
a high volume of outstanding CDS contracts but higher for entities with a more active
market, i.e. high relative transfers and maturing volume. Again, the standard deviations
exercise a strong effect on the magnitude suggesting a partly mechanical relationship as
described above.
Overall, the regressions on the entity level suggest that liquidity and trading activity
does matter for the price discovery process though the results are not always in line with
expectations. This is not entirely surprising since the regressors show substantial within
entity variation - as shown in Table B.2 - that is not captured in this specification, which
uses averages of the liquidity and trading variables over the entire sample period.
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B.4.3 Rolling Estimation Window
In the two previous section, we documented a substantial heterogeneity both, between
entities and over time. In this section, we focus on within-entity heterogeneity. As
outlined in section B.3.2, we estimate Equation B.1 for each entity in rolling, overlapping
estimation windows.
Out of the 14,044 observations of Significancei,t, only 31.9% are actually significant
at the 10% level. The lower percentage is not surprising given the already low number
of entities which exhibit a statically significant relationship in the first place and the re-
duced number of observations per regression compared to the entity level, that should
increase the variance mechanically. For virtually all of the entities (492 out of 530),
Significancei,t takes a value for some of the rolling estimation window. For 486 of the en-
tities, Significancei,t changes its value at least once from estimation window to estimation
window. On an aggregate level, the fraction of entities for which Significancei,t = 1 is
highest at the beginning of the observation period in mid-2011 with around 40 percent.
Afterwards, the fraction drops to roughly 25% and remains stable afterwards.
Table B.7 sheds light on the determinants of Significancei,t. Equity returns are more
likely to lead CDS returns in periods of high liquidity - measured by the bid-ask spread
and the dealer and quotes count - and high relative transfers, a high CDS spread and high
relative transfers. However, in the multivariate specification, none of the variables remains
significant. Recall that each of the regressions includes the lagged value of Significancei,t,
standard deviations of equity and CDS returns and the aforementioned market variables
as controls.
Columns 3-8 of Table B.7 holds the results for the magnitude regressions for various
sets of fixed effects. In the specification without firm and window fixed effects, only
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the composite depth exercises a consistent and - as expected - negative effect on the
magnitude. The quotes count and the matured volume are marginally significant at
the 10%-level, but only in the univariate specification. Adding firm fixed effects - and
thereby accounting for time-invariant firm unobservables - renders the dealers count and
Net Notional insignificant. However, the positive sign of the dealers count suggests that
more information flow from the CDS to the equity market if the CDS market is more
dealers are active. The negative sign of Net Notional is in line with the expectations and
suggests a reduced information flow from equity to CDS in periods of a relatively large
CDS market. Adding window fixed effects, alters the picture to an extent (columns 7 and
8 of Table B.7): The dealer count remains significant but the net notional is no different
from zero at any conventional level of significance. Instead, the relative risk transfers
exercise a positive effect on the magnitude. Again, this finding is in contradiction to our
expectations as it suggests a higher information flow from equity to CDS if the trading
activity on the CDS market is higher. 18
B.4.4 Fractional Response
The results for the fractional response are shown in Table B.8. Recall that we expect a
positive sign for all liquidity and trading measures except the CDS bid-ask spread. For
the set of liquidity measures, the results are in line with this expectation though the
bid-ask spread is not significant in the baseline specification without any fixed effect. For
the trading and size measures, the results are less clear cut. Market size (net notional)
and relative transfers exhibit a positive sign. Contrary, absolute risk transfers as well
as absolute and relative maturing volume reduce the speed with which information are
incorporated in CDS spreads. Again, most variables do not remain significant in the
18A likely explanation for the stark impact of the window fixed effects is the decreasing time trend in
the Net Notional. The risk transfers remain fairly stable over the observation period.
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multivariate specification. Adding entity fixed effects (columns 3 and 4) to the makes
the coefficients larger but do not make signs flip. Adding week fixed effects renders both,
absolute and relative maturing volume as well as relative transfers insignificant.
Overall, the analysis of the fractional response suggests that liquidity - all measures
except the bid-ask spread - the absolute size, and relative transfers increase the speed
with which information are incorporated in CDS spreads.
B.5 Robustness Tests
In our analysis, we made assumptions - for example on the number of lags or the spec-
ifications of our prediction Equation B.1 - which might drive our results. This section
provides a number of robustness test. First, we vary some modelling assumptions and
check whether those changes alter the results. Second, we compare our results qualita-
tively to those of Qiu and Yu (2012), who propose a methodology that allows to identify
effects of liquidity and trading that does not rely on sample splits or varying estimation
windows.
B.5.1 Vector Autoregressive Model
Instead of including only the first lag of CDS returns for the prediction of CDS and
equity returns in equation B.1, one can estimate the cumulative effect in a full-blown
Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR) specification. We estimate the following system:
RetCDSi,t = αCDS +
10∑
i=1
βCDSCDS,iRet
CDS
i,t−i +
10∑
i=1
βCDSEq,i Ret
Eq
i,t−i + 
CDS
i,t
RetEqi,t = αEq +
10∑
i=1
βEqEq,iRet
Eq
i,t−i +
10∑
i=1
βEqCDS,iRet
CDS
i,t−i + 
Eq
i,t
(B.5)
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The estimation is carried out on the entity level and for the rolling estimation windows.
Analogous to the definitions above, we generate the variables Significance and Magnitude.
Significance takes the value of one, if the hypothesis
∑10
i=1 β
CDS
Eq,i = 0 is rejected at the
10% level and zero otherwise. Magnitude is defined as max(0,−∑10i=1 βCDSEq,i ).
Generally, the VAR model suggests a lower number of significant relationships. Only
for 229, instead of 256, entities, equity returns predict CDS returns at the 10% level. As
on the entity level, we observe a drop in the number of significant observations from 4,475
to 3,955. The magnitudes generated by the VAR specification are similar to those of our
main specification for the information flow from equity to CDS (rank-correlation of 0.79).
For the rolling estimation window, the rank correlation of Significance is 0.72.
To check whether the determinants of price discovery are dependent on the modelling
assumptions in Equation B.1, we regress Significance and Magnitude generated by the
VAR model on our liquidity and trading measure. Tables B.9 and B.10 present the
results for the entity level and rolling window regressions. The estimated coefficients for
the entity-level sample are partly different (especially for the relative transfers and relative
maturing volume), but the general picture of the determinants fo the price discovery
process does not change. For the rolling sample, the VAR approach yields even less
significant regressors.
B.5.2 Different Lag Structure
The choice of ten lags in Equation B.1 is to an extend arbitrary. As much of the cumulative
effects occurs in the first five lags, we run all regressions with five instead ten lags. The
results of the five-lag specification are similar to our main findings. Regarding Significance,
the five-lag specification suggests a higher number of significant relationships. On the
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entity level, past equity returns predict contemporaneous CDS returns in 300 instead
of 256 out of a possible 530 cases. A high rank-correlation of 0.76 indicates, that the
magnitudes generated by the VAR model are similar to the magnitudes of our main
specification. For the rolling estimation window, the rank correlation for Significance is
0.58 and the number of significant observations drops from 4,475 to 3,821.
Table B.11 and B.12 examines the determinants of price discovery for the 5-lag spec-
ification. For significance at the entity level, keeping only the first five lags makes all
trading and size variables insignificant whereas they remain similar for the magnitude
regressions. A similar pattern can be detected for the rolling estimation window with the
notable exception that relative transfers are no longer significant but the maturing volume
is. As in the VAR specification, none of the variables exercises a significant, consistent
influence on the magnitude of the information flow.
B.5.3 Qiu & Yu Methodology
Qiu and Yu (2012) examine the price discovery process amid worsening credit conditions.
The effect of worsening credit conditions is captured in the following regression:
RCDSi,t = α +
5∑
k
(
bk + b
D
k (Credit Condition Dummy)i,t
) ∗ RetCDSi,t−k
+
5∑
k
(
ck + c
D
k (Credit Condition Dummy)i,t
) ∗ RetEqi,t−k
(B.6)
The advantage of this is that the liquidity measure does not have to aggregated to
examine the effect on the price discovery process. We adapt this specification is as far
as we replace the credit condition dummy with a liquidity dummy. The liquidity dummy
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takes the value of 1 if RCDSi,t falls in the highest of three liquidity terciles for entity i.19
Results of the regression are presented in Table B.13.
The past CDS returns exercise a positive influence and past equity returns a negative
effect on current CDS returns. The positive effect of past CDS returns were expected due
to the autocorrelation exhibited by CDS returns. The negative effect of past equity effect
hints - as in our baseline specification - towards a sluggish incorporation of new information
in CDS spreads. Against our working hypothesis, a high liquidity - in particular the
composite depth and the net notional amount - to increase the autocorrelation in the
CDS returns as the additional CDS effect is positive and thereby exacerbates the already
positive CDS effect. Contrary, a high dealer count appears to reduce the autocorrelation,
i.e. shows a negative additional CDS effect. CDS liquidity and trading does not appear
the way past equity predict CDS returns. For every measure - except the maturing
volume - the additional equity effect is not different from zero at any conventional level
of significance. For both specification of the maturing volume, the additional stock effect
more than offsets the normal equity effect. This hints towards inattentive CDS traders
that only use information from other security markets if their attention on the CDS market
is required.
B.6 Conclusion
We examined the influence of trading and liquidity measures on the price discovery in
the CDS vis-à-vis the equity using a large sample of firms from 2011 to 2013. In line
with the existing literature, we find an information flow from equity to CDS rather than
vice versa. We add to the literature by documenting strong difference in the lead-lag
19Again, we try different sorting methodologies - a higher number of quantiles and an across entity
sorting into the quantiles - but the results do not change
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relationship over time and between entities. As possible determinant of the relationship,
we examine a number of liquidity and trading measures to isolate variables that signal
high or low informational value of CDS returns. Our results are not clear-cut and do
not point towards a single liquidity measure as main driver of the lead-lag relationship.
Though liquidity and trading appears to matter for the price discovery process, the actual
effect of the different measures is specification-depended.
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2011 Observations 93816 90585 93476 93476 91460 19108 17237 17237 5395 5391
Mean 5.66 0.43 6.67 32.87 193.33 992.76 128.70 0.12 56.85 0.04
Std. Dev. 1.86 0.23 3.76 33.38 178.67 925.76 176.28 0.11 263.57 0.16
2012 Observations 125720 121438 124924 124924 122792 24720 21350 21335 10346 10320
Mean 6.57 0.49 6.28 34.25 202.61 888.02 116.47 0.12 147.87 0.17
Std. Dev. 1.72 0.33 3.65 33.60 189.90 839.74 169.28 0.13 489.53 0.48
2013 Observations 113172 109322 111329 111329 111262 24798 21755 21355 22233 22230
Mean 6.54 0.56 5.76 38.57 149.89 777.79 127.49 0.16 73.53 0.10
Std. Dev. 1.61 0.35 3.28 34.59 143.38 740.34 190.49 0.19 340.11 0.37
Overall Observations 332708 321345 329729 329729 325514 68626 60342 59927 37974 37941
25% percentile 5.00 0.30 3.00 10.00 71.02 370.11 21.71 0.04 0.00 0.00
Mean 6.31 0.50 6.21 35.32 181.98 877.35 123.93 0.13 91.41 0.11
75% percentile 7.00 0.61 9.00 52.00 222.46 1107.06 151.92 0.17 0.00 0.00
Std. Dev. 1.77 0.32 3.58 33.96 173.63 835.47 179.24 0.15 379.61 0.39
CDS BAS is the CDS bid-ask spread scaled by the CDS spread of the entity and the unscaled version of the CDS
bid-ask spread. (Depth) is the number of the of contributors whose books of record are used to calculate the price.
DC and QC are the number of dealers and quotes for a 5-year CDS contract on a trading day. Spread is the
spread of a 5-year, senior unsecured CDS spread. Net Notional is the volume of outstanding net CDS positions.
Transfers is the volume of CDS trades that leads to a change in the net position of a market participant. Matured
is the volume of maturing CDS contract. The scaled versions Transfer and Matured are obtained by dividing the
absolute volume by the Net Notional. Equity BAS is the bid-ask spread of the stock, scaled by the stock price.
Equity TO is the value of the traded shares.
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Table. B.2: Variance Decompositions
Variance
Overall Between Within
Depth 1.77 1.38 1.17
CDS BAS 0.32 0.27 0.17
DC 3.58 2.92 2.14
QC 33.96 26.32 21.41
Spread 174.84 165.23 96.63
Net 928.82 865.06 268.29
Transfer 186.92 116.58 142.20
Transfer (relative) 0.15 0.05 0.14
Matured 349.75 47.41 346.04
Matured (relative) 0.35 0.06 0.34
This table shows the decomposition of the variance
into in within- and between-entity variation. The
within- and between-entity variation does not add
up to total variation due to the unbalanced panel.
The fourth row shows the within-variation relation
to the between variation. A description of the vari-
ables can be found in the notes of Table B.1.
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Table. B.3: Correlation Matrix
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CDS BAS 1
CDS BAS (unscaled) -0.001 1
Depth -0.176 -0.126 1
DC -0.337 -0.259 0.33 1
QC -0.302 -0.183 0.184 0.677 1
Spread -0.401 0.764 -0.017 0.005 0.105 1
Net Notional -0.323 -0.242 0.245 0.466 0.455 -0.01 1
Transfer -0.302 -0.104 0.212 0.377 0.437 0.119 0.56 1
Transfer (relative) -0.142 0.081 0.08 0.134 0.209 0.19 0.009 0.642 1
Matured -0.042 -0.012 0.088 0.035 0.018 0.013 0.099 0.073 -0.001 1
Matured (relative) 0.04 0.06 0.051 -0.069 -0.066 0.016 -0.059 -0.034 -0.01 0.737 1
This table shows pairwise correlation between liquidity and trading measures. A description of the variables
can be found in the notes of Table B.1.
Table. B.4: Baseline Estimates
Panel A: Equity on CDS
γ0 γ−1 γ−2 γ−3 γ−4 γ−5 γ−6 γ−7 γ−8 γ−9 γ−10
-0.388 -0.142 -0.080 -0.046 -0.040 -0.002 -0.037 -0.003 -0.022 -0.007 -0.011
(<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (0.59) (<0.00) (0.41) (<0.00) (0.15)∑5
j=1 γj = −0.310
∑10
j=1 γj = −0.390
Panel A: Equity on CDS
γ0 γ−1 γ−2 γ−3 γ−4 γ−5 γ−6 γ−7 γ−8 γ−9 γ−10
-0.305 0.013 0.007 0.044 0.016 0.015 -0.008 -0.001 -0.024 0.012 -0.007
(<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (0.61) (<0.00) (<0.00)∑5
j=1 γj = 0.097
∑10
j=1 γj = 0.068
This table shows the sequence of coefficients for Equation B.1: RetCDSi,t = αi +
∑J
j=1 βj × RetEqi,t−j + γ ×
RetCDSi,t−1 + i,t. In Panel A, contemporary CDS returns are regressed on past equity returns. In Panel B,
the roles of equity and CDS returns in Equation B.1 are reversed. The coefficients of the constant and the
own lagged return are not reported for the sake of conciseness. Robust p-value are reported in parentheses.
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Table. B.5: Sample Splits
Low Liquidity & Trading High Liquidity & Trading
Quartile 1 2 3 4 5
Depth -0.294** -0.282** -0.298 -0.343 -0.428***
(0.05) (0.03) (0.35) (0.40) (<0.00)
CDS BAS -0.35 -0.32 -0.323 -0.313 -0.241***
(0.22) (0.97) (0.91) (0.74) (<0.00)
DC -0.332 -0.277** -0.285* -0.318 -0.378**
(0.44) (0.03) (0.08) (0.92) (0.03)
QC -0.332 -0.345 -0.309 -0.296 -0.317
(0.54) (0.22) (0.57) (0.23) (0.87)
Spread -0.302 -0.224*** -0.246*** -0.308 -0.411***
(0.37) (<0.00) (<0.00) (0.60) (<0.00)
Net -0.269*** -0.26*** -0.254** -0.317 -0.424***
(0.01) (<0.00) (0.02) (0.87) (<0.00)
Transfer -0.218*** -0.264*** -0.299 -0.363* -0.395***
(<0.00) (0.01) (0.27) (0.09) (<0.00)
Transfer (relative) -0.217*** -0.287 -0.299 -0.389*** -0.369*
(<0.00) (0.11) (0.29) (<0.00) (0.07)
Matured -0.322 -0.592***
(0.63) (<0.00)
The table displays the cumulative effect for samples with different liquidity and trading activity.
The sample was split as follows: For each entity, the quantile 1 contains the observations that
exhibit the lowest liquidity or trading activity. A description of the variables can be found in the
notes of Table B.1. We test whether the cumulative effect of the subsample (-0.310) is different
from the entire sample. P-values are reported of this test are parentheses. For Matured, there
was not sufficient variation as for a lot of entities, no or only a small number of contracts mature
in a week. Quartile one is estimated using all observation with zero maturing volume, quartile
five with all observations with a positive maturing volume. ***, **, and * denote significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
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Table. B.6: Determinants of Price Discovery, Entity Level
Significance Magnitude
Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate
Depth -0.072* -0.024 0.008 0.014
(0.07) (0.68) (0.58) (0.42)
CDS BAS -0.63*** -1.435*** -0.005 0.211*
(<0.00) (<0.00) (0.94) (0.06)
DC -0.008 -0.006 0.001 0.032***
(0.68) (0.88) (0.85) (0.01)
QC 0.002 0.009** 0.00 -0.002
(0.29) (0.04) (0.87) (0.11)
Spread 0.055* -0.054 0.038*** 0.031*
(0.09) (0.37) (<0.00) (0.06)
Net Notional -0.137** 0.152 -0.075*** -0.182***
(0.05) (0.48) (0.01) (<0.00)
Transfer -1.216** -0.511 -0.128 1.206**
(0.01) (0.78) (0.35) (0.02)
Transfer (relative) -1.269 -4.14** 0.985*** -0.591
(0.21) (0.05) (<0.00) (0.31)
Matured -4.361*** -9.482*** -0.501 -0.341
(<0.00) (<0.00) (0.15) (0.68)
Matured (relative) -1.655* 0.656 0.75*** 0.446
(0.08) (0.64) (<0.00) (0.18)
SD CDS Returns -44.376*** -38.726*** -6.235* -7.348*
(<0.00) (<0.00) (0.08) (0.07)
SD Equity Returns 8.567* 16.561** 6.399*** 4.856*
(0.07) (0.02) (<0.00) (0.07)
The table presents results from Equation B.2 on the entity. The dependent variable in the
first four columns is significance. Significance is coded as a dummy, which takes the value
of 1 if the first ten lags of equity (CDS) returns predict CDS (equity) returns and zero oth-
erwise. The dependent variable in the remaining four columns is magnitude. Magnitude
is the sum of the coefficient of the lagged returns. Columns labelled “univariate” contains
coefficients of the univariate regression of the dependent variable on the independent vari-
able specified in the first column. Columns labelled “multivariate” display coefficients of
the multivariate regression of the dependent variable on all regressors specified in the first
columns. A description of the independent variables can be found in the notes of Table
B.1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Each
regression is estimated using robust standard errors.
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Table. B.7: Determinants of Price Discovery, Rolling
Significance Magnitude
Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate
Depth 0.016 0.015 -0.012*** -0.017** 0.003 0.001 0.006 -0.005
(0.10) (0.31) (0.00) (0.01) (0.80) (0.94) (0.68) (0.78)
CDS BAS -0.177*** -0.029 0.009 -0.001 0.077 0.143 0.098* 0.174
(0.00) (0.72) (0.72) (0.99) (0.12) (0.23) (0.06) (0.16)
DC 0.013*** -0.004 0.002 0.003 0.028*** 0.046*** 0.021** 0.034***
(0.01) (0.68) (0.29) (0.55) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
QC 0.002*** 0.001 0.005* 0.001 0.002* -0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.00) (0.15) (0.06) (0.14) (0.05) (0.24) (0.22) (0.30)
Spread 0.024*** 0.013 -0.001 -0.007 0.011 0.001 0.008 -0.007
(0.00) (0.28) (0.70) (0.17) (0.32) (0.96) (0.49) (0.65)
Net Notional 0.274 0.025 -0.066 -0.26 -0.318** -1.313*** -0.021 -0.546
(0.17) (0.95) (0.45) (0.15) (0.04) (0.00) (0.90) (0.11)
Transfer 0.024 -0.004 -0.007 -0.024 0.008 -0.165** -0.016 -0.115
(0.14) (0.91) (0.32) (0.18) (0.86) (0.02) (0.74) (0.14)
Transfer (relative) 0.244** -0.231 -0.036 0.109 0.187 1.07*** 0.274* 0.835***
(0.04) (0.48) (0.45) (0.41) (0.23) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00)
Matured -0.067 -0.039 -0.075* -0.083 -0.166* -0.16 -0.053 0.006
(0.53) (0.82) (0.07) (0.17) (0.07) (0.22) (0.60) (0.97)
Matured (relative) -0.08 -0.102 -0.013 0.017 -0.037 0.019 -0.018 -0.024
(0.10) (0.17) (0.57) (0.61) (0.33) (0.71) (0.63) (0.63)
Market & Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Window FE No No No No No No Yes Yes
Entity FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table presents results from Equation B.2 in the rolling sample. The dependent variable in the first two columns is significance. Significance is coded
as a dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the first ten lags of CDS returns predict equity returns and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the
remaining four columns is magnitude. Magnitude is the sum of the coefficient of the lagged returns. Columns labelled “univariate” contains coefficients
of the univariate regression of the dependent variable on the independent variable specified in the first column. Columns labelled “multivariate” display
coefficients of the multivariate regression of the dependent variable on all regressors specified in the first columns. A description of the independent
variables can be found in the notes of Table B.1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Each regression is estimated
using robust standard errors.
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Table. B.8: Determinants of the Fractional Response
Fractional Response
Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate
Depth 0.016*** -0.002 0.03*** -0.003 0.029*** 0.004
(<0.00) (0.84) (<0.00) (0.82) (<0.00) (0.77)
CDS BAS 0.009 0.084 0.038*** 0.017 -0.011 -0.058
(0.32) (0.13) (<0.00) (0.87) (0.37) (0.65)
DC 0.008*** 0.012** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.023**
(<0.00) (0.02) (<0.00) (<0.00) (<0.00) (0.03)
QC 0.001*** -0.002* 0.002*** <0.00 0.001*** <0.00
(<0.00) (0.06) (<0.00) (0.94) (<0.00) (0.81)
Spread
(× 1100) -0.01*** <0.00 -0.024*** <0.00 -0.016*** <0.00*
(<0.00) (0.31) (<0.00) (0.13) (<0.00) (0.09)
Net Notional 0.108*** 0.072 0.149*** 0.09 0.063*** 0.009
(<0.00) (0.59) (<0.00) (0.53) (<0.00) (0.96)
Transfer -0.006** -0.033 -0.056*** 0.074 -0.013 -0.028
(0.03) (0.23) (<0.00) (0.33) (0.32) (0.79)
Transfer (relative) 0.041*** 0.114 0.143*** 0.092 0.051*** 0.145
(<0.00) (0.40) (<0.00) (0.51) (<0.00) (0.38)
Matured -0.066*** -0.118** -0.056*** -0.092 0.022 -0.068
(<0.00) (0.04) (<0.00) (0.11) (0.41) (0.31)
Matured (relative) -0.072*** 0.025 -0.073*** 0.026 0.006 0.001
(<0.00) (0.65) (<0.00) (0.64) (0.88) (0.99)
Entity FE No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Week FE No No No No Yes Yes
This table examine the drivers of the fractional response as described in Equation B.4. A description of
the independent variables can be found in the notes of Table B.1.
(× 1100) indicates that a dependent
variable has been divided by 100 to make to coefficient more traceable. ***, **, and * denote significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Each regression is estimated using robust standard errors.
210
Table. B.9: Robustness Test: Vector Autoregression, Entity Level
Significance Magnitude
Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate
Depth -0.113*** -0.039 0.012 -0.004
(0.01) (0.49) (0.50) (0.81)
CDS BAS -0.178 -0.93*** -0.165* -0.357***
(0.42) (0.01) (0.05) (<0.00)
DC -0.041** -0.049 0.006 -0.009
(0.03) (0.22) (0.42) (0.45)
QC <0.00 0.009** <0.00 <0.00
(0.82) (0.04) (0.18) (0.69)
Spread 0.026 -0.034 -0.019** -0.009
(0.43) (0.59) (0.05) (0.65)
Net Notional -0.175** -0.264 0.085*** 0.155*
(0.02) (0.26) (<0.00) (0.08)
Transfer -1.28** 2.225 0.46*** -0.699
(0.01) (0.23) (<0.00) (0.31)
Transfer (relative) -2.367** -5.911*** -0.032 0.085
(0.03) (0.01) (0.92) (0.91)
Matured -3.794*** -5.336* 0.715* -0.875
(<0.00) (0.09) (0.05) (0.25)
Matured (relative) -0.453 0.92 -0.964*** 0.113
(0.66) (0.55) (<0.00) (0.76)
SD RetCDSi -25.147*** -17.624* 16.805*** 17.069***
(<0.00) (0.06) (<0.00) (<0.00)
SD RetEqi s 4.78 9.502 -3.976*** -6.339***
(0.35) (0.23) (0.01) (<0.00)
The table presents results derived from an vector autoregressive model with 10 lags on the
entity level. The dependent variable in the first two columns is Significance. Significance
is coded as a dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the first ten lags of CDS returns
predict equity returns and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the remaining four
columns is Magnitude. Magnitude is the sum of the coefficient of the lagged returns.
Columns labelled “univariate” contains coefficients of the univariate regression of the
dependent variable on the independent variable specified in the first column. Columns
labelled “multivariate” display coefficients of the multivariate regression of the dependent
variable on all regressors specified in the first columns. A description of the independent
variables can be found in the notes of Table B.1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Each regression is estimated using robust standard
errors.
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Table. B.10: Robustness Test: Vector Autoregression, Rolling Sample
Significance Magnitude
Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate
Depth 0.015 0.028 -0.033 -0.055 -0.111* 0.009 -0.069 -0.035
(0.51) (0.65) (0.13) (0.24) (0.06) (0.93) (0.24) (0.73)
CDS BAS -0.27** -0.228 -0.348*** -0.572** -1.022*** -2.499** -0.763** -1.9
(0.03) (0.54) (<0.00) (0.02) (<0.00) (0.03) (0.02) (0.10)
DC 0.01 -0.044 0.021* 0.064* 0.053 0.012 -0.023 -0.041
(0.38) (0.35) (0.07) (0.09) (0.16) (0.89) (0.55) (0.68)
QC 0.001 0.003 0.005*** -0.01 0.01** -0.009 0.007 -0.006
(0.30) (0.72) (<0.00) (0.24) (0.03) (0.61) (0.16) (0.75)
Spread
(× 1100) 0.052** -0.004 0.003 -0.059 0.102** -0.225* 0.121** -0.199
(0.01) (0.95) (0.85) (0.19) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.14)
Net Notional -0.081 -0.345 0.508 1.818 1.254 2.768 1.947** 4.687**
(0.88) (0.86) (0.22) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12) (0.02) (0.02)
Transfer 0.002 -0.01 0.013*** 0.03 -0.014 0.025 -0.034 0.008
(0.63) (0.72) (<0.00) (0.27) (0.57) (0.59) (0.19) (0.87)
Transfer (relative)
(× 1100) 0.017 0.029 0.081** -0.099 0.078 -0.313 0.074 -0.324
(0.54) (0.87) (0.02) (0.64) (0.56) (0.22) (0.59) (0.26)
Matured
(× 1100) -0.042 0.082 -0.03 -0.042 -0.071 -0.102 -0.012 -0.101
(0.18) (0.27) (0.25) (0.39) (0.15) (0.18) (0.79) (0.19)
Matured (relative) -0.157 -0.724* -0.274*** 0.119 -0.272* 0.166 -0.165 0.271
(0.24) (0.07) (0.01) (0.60) (0.08) (0.68) (0.10) (0.46)
Market & Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Window FE No No No No No No Yes Yes
Entity FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table presents results derived from an vector autoregressive model with 10 lags for the rolling sample. The dependent variable in the first two columns is
significance. Significance is coded as a dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the first ten lags of CDS returns predict equity returns and zero otherwise. The
dependent variable in the remaining four columns is magnitude. Magnitude is the sum of the coefficient of the lagged returns. Columns labelled “univariate”
contains coefficients of the univariate regression of the dependent variable on the independent variable specified in the first column. Columns labelled
“multivariate” display coefficients of the multivariate regression of the dependent variable on all regressors specified in the first columns. A description of
the independent variables can be found in the notes of Table B.1.
(× 1100) indicates that a dependent variable has been divided by 100 to make to coefficient
more traceable. The coefficients of Significancei,t−1 and Magnitudei,t−1 are not reported but smaller than one in every specification. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Each regression is estimated using robust standard errors.
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Table. B.11: Robustness Test: Five Lags, Entity Level
Significance Magnitude
Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate
Depth -0.039 -0.04 -0.019* -0.015
(0.33) (0.48) (0.06) (0.14)
CDS BAS -0.655*** -0.859*** -0.001 -0.15***
(<0.00) (0.01) (0.97) (<0.00)
DC 0.021 -0.034 -0.002 -0.005
(0.26) (0.40) (0.70) (0.45)
QC 0.007*** 0.01** 0 0.002**
(<0.00) (0.02) (0.41) (0.02)
Spread 0.06* -0.159*** -0.01** -0.018**
(0.07) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Net Notional 0.005 -0.145 0.045** 0.068
(0.93) (0.49) (0.02) (0.23)
Transfer 0.423 1.434 0.052 -0.168
(0.37) (0.38) (0.51) (0.55)
Transfer (relative) 1.368 -1.674 -0.539*** -0.345
(0.18) (0.38) (<0.00) (0.25)
Matured -1.101 -4.152 0.181 -1.082*
(0.34) (0.19) (0.37) (0.08)
Matured (relative) -2.083 -0.932 -0.729** 0.199
(0.11) (0.62) (0.04) (0.44)
SD CDS Returns -19.337** -25.503*** 2.781 -0.853
(0.01) (<0.00) (0.20) (0.71)
SD Equity Returns 20.63*** 35.21*** -1.373 2.646*
(<0.00) (<0.00) (0.15) (0.08)
The table presents results derived from Equation B.1 with a five lags on the entity level.
The dependent variable in the first two columns is significance. Significance is coded as
a dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the first ten lags of CDS returns predict equity
returns and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the remaining four columns is
magnitude. Magnitude is the sum of the coefficient of the lagged returns. Columns
labelled “univariate” contains coefficients of the univariate regression of the dependent
variable on the independent variable specified in the first column. Columns labelled
“multivariate” display coefficients of the multivariate regression of the dependent variable
on all regressors specified in the first columns. A description of the independent variables
can be found in the notes of Table B.1. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level respectively. Each regression is estimated using robust standard errors.
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Table. B.12: Robustness Test: Five Lags, Rolling Sample
Significance Magnitude
Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate Univariate Multivariate
Depth -0.009 0.041 -0.005** -0.002 0.023** 0.002 0.027** <0.00
(0.42) (0.14) (0.04) (0.68) (0.02) (0.82) (0.01) (0.98)
CDS BAS -0.193*** 0.162 -0.027** -0.028 0.006 -0.069 0.016 -0.056
(<0.00) (0.23) (0.02) (0.16) (0.87) (0.19) (0.67) (0.32)
DC 0.012** 0.015 0.001 0.008** <0.00 0.011 -0.002 0.009
(0.04) (0.48) (0.66) (0.02) (0.97) (0.24) (0.75) (0.37)
QC 0.002*** -0.002 0.001*** -0.002** <0.00 -0.002 <0.000 -0.001
(<0.00) (0.55) (0.01) (0.03) (0.49) (0.10) (0.53) (0.33)
Spread (×100) 0.047*** 0.045* 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.01 0.002 0.012
(<0.00) (0.07) (0.37) (0.24) (0.77) (0.48) (0.84) (0.44)
Net Notional 0.362 0.949 0.014 -0.019 0.036 0.143 0.026 0.351
(0.11) (0.23) (0.85) (0.86) (0.81) (0.60) (0.87) (0.25)
Transfer <0.00 0.01 0.002 -0.001 <0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0
(0.80) (0.41) (0.19) (0.61) (0.92) (0.85) (0.79) (0.94)
Transfer (relative) (×100) 0.021 -0.043 0.003 0.011 0.015 0.007 0.014 -0.011
(0.13) (0.59) (0.49) (0.43) (0.20) (0.79) (0.27) (0.72)
Matured (×100) -0.032** -0.033 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002
(0.01) (0.28) (0.26) (0.42) (0.83) (0.65) (0.75) (0.84)
Matured (relative) -0.117** 0.112 -0.012 0.017 -0.012 0.037 -0.012 0.041
(0.03) (0.39) (0.28) (0.37) (0.62) (0.25) (0.64) (0.26)
Market & Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Window FE No No No No No No Yes Yes
Entity FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
The table presents results derived from Equation B.1 with a five lags in the rolling sample The dependent variable in the first two columns
is significance. Significance is coded as a dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the first ten lags of CDS returns predict equity returns and
zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the remaining four columns is magnitude. Magnitude is the sum of the coefficient of the lagged
returns. Columns labelled “univariate” contains coefficients of the univariate regression of the dependent variable on the independent variable
specified in the first column. Columns labelled “multivariate” display coefficients of the multivariate regression of the dependent variable on all
regressors specified in the first columns. A description of the independent variables can be found in the notes of Table B.1. The coefficients of
Significancei,t−1 and Magnitudei,t−1 are not reported but smaller than one in every specification. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level respectively. Each regression is estimated using robust standard errors.
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Table. B.13: Price Discovery à la Qiu and Yu (2012)
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)
CDS Effect 0.097*** 0.119*** 0.139*** 0.12*** 0.129*** 0.101*** 0.131*** 0.12*** 0.127*** 0.127***(∑5
k=1 ck
)
(0.10) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
Equity Effect -0.19*** -0.194*** -0.198*** -0.186*** -0.193*** -0.183*** -0.194*** -0.192*** -0.2*** -0.201***(∑5
k=1 bk
)
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Additional CDS Effect 0.073*** 0.025 -0.036* 0.015 -0.008 0.055*** -0.009 0.014 -0.029 -0.025(∑5
k=1 c
D
k
)
(0.00) (0.28) (0.09) (0.47) (0.68) (0.01) (0.65) (0.52) (0.32) (0.40)
Additional Equity Effect 0.00 0.008 0.029 -0.009 0.004 -0.013 0.011 0.006 0.267*** 0.291***(∑5
k=1 b
D
k
)
(0.74) (0.70) (0.22) (0.67) (0.87) (0.51) (0.62) (0.78) (0.00) (0.00)
Obs 248,849 246,538 247,852 247,852 248,849 248,849 248,849 248,849 248,849 248,849
R2 0.040 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.041 0.039
This table provides a summary of the results of following regression: RCDSi,t = α +
∑5
k
(
bk + b
D
k (High Liquidity Dummy)i,t
) ∗ RCDSi,t−k +∑5
k
(
ck + c
D
k (High Liquidity Dummy)i,t
) ∗ REquityi,t−k . Below the sum of coefficient, the p-value of the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficient is zero
is displayed. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the date level.
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Figures
Figure A.1: Autocorrelation of Equity and CDS Returns
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(a) Equity
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(b) CDS
The figure depicts the average autocorrelation of equity and CDS returns. Each bar represents a cor-
relation coefficient of the contemporaneous returns with a lagged return. Average autocorrelations are
obtained by first calculating the the autocorrelation for each reference individually and, second, averaging
these coefficients.
Figure A.2: Cross-correlation of Equity and CDS Returns
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The figure shows the cross-correlation coefficients of contemporary CDS (solid line) and equity (dashed
line) return with past equity and CDS return. Average cross-correlations are obtained by first calculating
the the autocorrelation for each reference individually and, second, averaging these coefficients.
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Figure A.3: Heterogeneity in Liquidity between Entities
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The figures depicts the between-entity variation of several measures of CDS trading and liquidity. The
data points for each entity are obtained by taking the mean over the entire sample period. Sorting of
the entities varies between the panels. Net Notional is the net outstanding volume in USD million. Risk
Transfer are trades that resulted in a change of the individual risk position scaled by the Net Notional.
Composite Depth is number of unique contributors to the mean spread calculation process. Quotes Count
is the number of unique quotes on a trading day.
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Figure A.4: Variation over Time
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(c) Dealer and Quotes Count
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(f) Risk Transfer
The figures depicts the variation of several measures of CDS trading and liquidity over time. All variables
are depicted using a moving average of 11 days. CDS Spread is the quoted CDS spread of the 5-year
tenor and the restructuring clause specified in the text. Dealer Count and Quotes Count are the numbers
of unique dealers and quotes on a trading day. Composite Depth is number of unique contributors to the
mean spread calculation process. Bid-Ask spread is the quoted bid-ask spread absolute and scaled by the
CDS spread. Net Notional is the net outstanding volume in USD million. Risk Transfer are trades that
resulted in a change of the individual risk position scaled by the Net Notional.
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Figure A.5: Sample Splits I
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(a) Negative / Positive Returns
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(b) Composite Depth
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(c) Dealer Count
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(d) Bid-Ask Spread
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(e) Net Notional
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(f) Risk Transfer
The figure shows the cumulative effects of equity on CDS for different liquidity and trading quantiles.
The lines depict the cumulative sum of the coefficient of lagged equity returns from the equation B.1:
RetCDSi,t = αi +
∑10
j=1 βj × RetEqi,t−j + γ × RetCDSi,t−1 + i,t. Solid lines show coefficients that are estimated
based on those observations of RetCDSi,t that fall in the lowest quintile of the variables specified below.
Dashed lines are based on observations that fall in the highest quintile of the specified variable.
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Figure A.6: Sample Splits II
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(a) Additional Dealer and Contributor
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(b) Maturing and Non-Maturing
-
.
4
-
.
3
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
Cu
m
ul
at
ive
 E
ffe
ct
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lag
Negative
Positive
(c) Positive and Negative CDS Returns
The figure shows the cumulative effects of equity of equity on CDS for different samples. The lines
depict the cumulative sum of the coefficient of lagged equity returns from the equation B.1: RetCDSi,t =
αi +
∑10
j=1 βj ×RetEqi,t−j + γ ×RetCDSi,t−1 + i,t.In panel (a), the dashed and dotted lines show the sequence
of βj for RetCDSi,t during which the reported number of contributors (dotted) or dealer banks (dashed)
increases. In panel (b), the short-dashed line depicts the cumulative effect for CDS returns on week in
which CDS contracts matured. Panel (c) compares the coefficients lagged equity returns for positive and
negative RetCDSi,t separately.
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Figure A.7: Variation of the Cumulative Effect of Equity on CDS over Time
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
M
ag
ni
tu
de
01jul2011 01jul2012 01jul2013
overlapping periods non-overlapping periods
The figure depicts the cumulative effect in the pooled sample over time. The solid line shows the cumu-
lative effect obtained by using overlapping estimation windows of 120 days. The dotted line shows the
cumulative effect for non-overlapping time periods.
Figure A.8: Distribution of the Cumulative Effect
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(b) CDS on Equity
This figure depicts the distribution of the cumulative effect of equity on CDS on Panel (a) and CDS on
Equity on Panel (b) over the entities. The cumulative effect is calculated as the sum of the coefficient of
lagged equity (CDS) returns in the regression: RetCDSi,t = αi +
∑10
j=1 βj ×RetEqi,t−j + γ×RetCDSi,t−1 + i,t, i.e.
the cumulative effect equals
∑10
j=1 βj × RetEqi,t−j For Panel (b), the roles of equity and CDS returns are
reversed.
221
Figure A.9: Fraction of Predicting Relationships
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This figure depicts the fraction of entities for which equity returns do predict CDS returns in Equation,
i.e. Significancei,t = 1, in percentage points.
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